This article analyzes whether nation-building-style interventions can work. Rather than seeking to debate the propriety of intervention in theory, it asks more practically whether the strategy has any hope of succeeding. History shows that intervention can indeed serve power interests, but holds fewer examples demonstrating the success of nation-building attempts, particularly in enforcement contexts. The article addresses this question by examining the most comprehensive and long-lasting nation-building attempt to date, the NATO and OSCE effort in Bosnia. By posing four questions which can be used to assess progress, the article attempts to determine the value of nation-building as an international strategy by assessing the political, social, and economic efforts to rebuild the country. Finally, it seeks to define the lessons learned by six years in Bosnia in terms of both constructing more effective operations in the future and informing world publics more adequately about their length and complexity.
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References
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* Andrea Kathryn Talentino is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science, Tulane University.
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1 Some states may of course try to achieve unilateral gain through multilateral action, and may use collectively articulated principles as a cover for selfish interest.
3.
Albrecht Schnabel & Ramesh Thakur, eds, Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2000).
4.
3 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace (New York: United Nations, 1992); available at http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html.
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and Barbara F. Walter, `Designing Transitions from Civil War', in Barbara F. Walter & Jack Snyder, eds, Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), pp. 38-69.
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5 Elizabeth M. Cousens, `Introduction', in Elizabeth M. Cousens & Chetan Kumar, eds, Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001), pp. 1-20.
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6 Raymond C. Taras & Rajat Ganguly, Understanding Ethnic Conflict: The International Dimension, 2nd edn (New York: Longman, 2001), pp. 97-98.
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7 John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), p. 77.
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8 Taras & Ganguly (see note 6 above) use `changing the mutually antagonistic attitudes of ordinary people' as their benchmark, though others are more precise on their criteria. See in particular Michael W. Doyle & Nicholas Sambanis, `International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis', American Political Science Review, vol. 94, no. 4, December 2000, pp. 779-801.
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and Roland Paris, `Wilson's Ghost: The Faulty Assumptions of Postconflict Peacebuilding', in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson & Pamela Aall, Turbulent Peace (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), pp. 765-784.
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10 Chaim Kaufman, `Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars', International Security, vol. 20, no. 4, Spring 1996, pp. 136-175.
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11 One proponent of this view is Tony Borden, Executive Director of the Institute for War and Peace Reporting: `Is It Time To Rewrite Dayton?', NATO Review, Winter 2000-2001, pp. 22-27. See also Charles-Philippe David, `Alice in Wonderland Meets Frankenstein: Constructivism, Realism, and Peacebuilding in Bosnia', Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 22, no. 1, April 2001, pp. 1-30.
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12 See Cousens (note 5 above).
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13 Interviews with Kishore Mandhyan, Deputy Head of Civil Affairs, UNMIBH, and Chris Riley, Head of Media Development, OHR, Sarajevo, 26 and 27 June 2000.
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14 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 1A, Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement.
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15 Interview with IPTF Deputy Commissioner Michael Stiers, Sarajevo, 22 June 2000.
17.
Harry Eckstein , Internal War: Problems and Approaches (New York: Free Press, 1964).
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17 ICG Balkans Report No. 118, The Wages of Sin: Confronting Bosnia's Republika Srpska, October 2001; ICG Balkans Reports available at http://www.crisisweb.org.
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18 For example, though the government was formed at the end of 1995, the Serbian representative to the federal presidency only agreed in July 2000 to house his offices in the same building as the Bosniac and Croat representatives.
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19 Though the police are professionalized, they are not unified. With a few exceptions, the police force in the RS is entirely made up of Serbs, while in the Federation Croats work in majority Croatian areas and Muslims work in majority Muslim areas. Only Brcko functions with a truly multi-ethnic police force, where the groups work together successfully. Cooperation between Croat and Muslim units in Mostar has increased over the last year, however, and the border police are being created as a fully integrated, multi-ethnic force.
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20 One of the notable recent hardliners was Ante Jelavic, the Croat member of the joint presidency, who was elected to his post but removed in March 2001 by the High Representative, Wolfgang Petritsch, for promoting Croat self-rule.
22.
ICG Balkans Report No. 118 (note 17 above).
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22 ICG Report Balkans Report No. 91, Bosnia's Municipal Elections 2000: Winners and Losers, April 2000.
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23 Cousens & Cater (note 21 above).
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24 Independent Media Commission Report, 1998-2000 (Sarajevo: Independent Media Commission, 2000).
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25 In one case, a Muslim woman who fled Brcko in 1994 returned to find a Serb family living in her home. She rented an apartment and then filed for repossession of her home. The home of the Serb couple had been destroyed, but they purchased a new one on the black market when they first received notice of the paperwork in 1999. The illegal purchase caused the Serb couple's Temporary Occupancy Permit (TOP) to become void and gave them no recourse to seek eviction of the family then living in their `new' house. In June 2000, the Serbs received a final notice of eviction from the first house, but the Muslim owner offered to let them remain on the bottom floor as long as she could have the top for her own family.
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26 In another example, Muslims and Serbs are working together in an area outside Brcko to clean up the ruins of a housing settlement and prepare the area for a rebuilding project, with the new houses divided between the two groups.
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27 UNHCR, Returnee Monitoring Study, Minority Returnees to the Republika Srpska - Bosnia and Herzegovina, June 2000.
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28 ICG Balkans Report No. 95, Bosnia's Refugee Logjam Breaks: Is the International Community Ready?, May 2000.
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29 Interviews with Barbara Smith, UNHCR, Sarajevo, 23 June 2000; Livio Sarandrea, Senior Human Rights Officer, OSCE Regional Centre, Banja Luka, 4 July 2000; David Makhmurian, Field Officer, and Caroline Rowlands, Protection Officer, UNHCR, Banja Luka, 5 July 2000.
31.
30 This project is conducted under the auspices of the Cultural Affairs Division of the US Embassy.
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31 The political-economic nexus is particularly acute because Bosnia's 13 administrative units include five different levels of government: state, entity, canton, city, and municipality.
33.
32 See ICG Balkans Report No. 115, Bosnia's Precarious Economy: Still Not Open for Business, August 2001.
34.
33 The lack of housing and the slow pace of construction are a major source of frustration. This author witnessed a Serb demonstration at the municipal building in Brcko to protest the lack of progress, and interviewed participants who also expressed concern that other ethnicities had their claims decided more quickly. While hardly authoritative, these comments highlight the intersection between life circumstances and ethnic nationalism.
35.
34 Numerous workers in different agencies expressed this sentiment, including Chris Riley and Andy Bearpark of the OHR, Michael Doyle of the ICG, and senior officers at the OSCE Regional Centre in Banja Luka, when interviewed in June and July 2000.
