Turkey as a `Special Case' for the EU

1 EU 1999 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession, 13 October 1999; available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey/ rep_10_99/index.htm.

2 Turkey's integration into NATO was not smooth: originally some of the member-states were not at all keen to include Turkey owing to fears that it would draw attention away from the central front. Turkey was able to overcome this resistance by sending troops to Korea: the third largest contingent in the UN-mandated forces, after the US and Korean contingents, was the Turkish one. See Ali Karaosmanoglu, `Turkey and the Southern Flank', in John Chipman, ed., NATO's Southern Allies: Internal and External Challenges (London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 287-353, on p. 296.

3 Sultan Selim III proclaimed a New Order (Nizam-i Cedid) in 1793 and introduced Westernizing reforms in response to European military threats. See Mehmet Ali Birand, The Generals' Coup in Turkey: An Inside Story of 12 September 1980 (London: Brassey's, 1987), p. 1.

4 Metin Heper & Aylin Güney, `The Military and Democracy in the Third Turkish Republic', Armed Forces & Society, vol. 22, no. 4, Summer 1996, pp. 619-639.

5 Quoted in George Harris, `The Role of the Military in Turkey: Guardians or Decision-Makers?', in Metin Heper & Ahmet Evin, eds, State, Democracy and the Military (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1988), pp. 177-200, on p. 181.

6 Ben Lombardi, `Turkey: Return of the Reluctant Generals?', Political Science Quarterly, vol. 112, no. 2, Summer 1997, pp. 191-215; available at http://www.epn.org/psq/lombardi.html.

7 Birand (note 3 above), on p. 62.

8 This campaign played on the provocative actions of Prime Minister Erbakan, who, during state visits in 1997, openly embraced ties with Libya and Iran, regarded with suspicion by the military. See Aylin Güney, `The Challenge of Political Islam and the Military in Turkey: Recent Crisis and Future Prospects', unpublished paper for the conference on `Political Armies', Utrecht University, 13-14 April 2000.

9 Türk Silahli Kuvvetleri Ic Hizmet Kanunu, Kanun No. 211, Kabul Tarihi 4.1.1961 [Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Act, Law No. 211, passed on 4 January 1961].

10 Metin Heper & Aylin Güney, `The Military and the Consolidation of Democracy: The Recent Turkish Experience', Armed Forces & Society, vol. 26, no. 4, Summer 2000, pp. 635-657.

11 See William Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 163.

12 This is significantly stronger than the modest role given to the MGK in the 1961 constitution, of which Article 111 specified that the MGK was to provide `help in the decision-making regarding national security issues and in their coordination'.

13 The idea of `existential' threat, here applied to Turkish politics, stems from Ole Wæver's work on the securitization of political issues. See Ole Wæver, `Securitization and Desecuritization', in Ronnie D. Lipschultz, ed., On Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 46-86.

14 Harris (note 5 above), p. 179.

15 Hale (note 11 above), p. 310.

16 One of the largest and most profitable holding companies in Turkey, OYAK comprises some 30 enterprises that employ around 30,000 people; it is exempt from duties and taxes. I am grateful to an anonymous referee who drew my attention to the relevance of this factor; see also Eric Rouleau, `Turkey's Dream of Democracy', Foreign Affairs, vol. 79, no. 6, November/December 2000, pp. 100-114.

17 Lombardi (note 6 above).

18 Lâle Sariibrahimoglu, Turkish Defence Procurement, Joint Ventures and Offset Agreements, Global Defence Market Reports (London: SMi Publishing, 1999), p. 53.

19 Heper & Güney (note 10 above), p. 643.

20 Sariibrahimoglu (note 18 above), p. 54.

21 See Ali L. Karaosmanoglu, `Officers: Westernization and Democracy', in Metin Heper, Ayse Öncü & Heinz Kramer, eds, Turkey and the West: Changing Political and Cultural Identities (London: I. B. Tauris, 1993), pp. 19-34, on p. 32.

22 The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe withdrew the Turkish parliamentary delegation's right to their seats in response to the military coup of 1981; the Turkish delegation resumed its place only after elections in 1984.

23 See `The Washington Declaration', NATO Press Communiqué NAC-S(99)63, 23 April 1999, and EU's Copenhagen Criteria, available at http://europa.eu.int./comm/enlargement/intro/criteria.htm.

24 Barry Buzan & Thomas Diez, `The European Union and Turkey', Survival, vol. 41, no. 1, Spring 1999, pp. 41-57.

25 Hale (note 11 above, on p. 323) makes the point that while the United States did not promote the coups of 1960, 1971 and 1980, it did not oppose them either.

26 NATO's Madrid Summit (1997) laid down the conditions for NATO membership, stating that any `European state in a position to further the principles' of the Washington Treaty could be invited to join. It also added that states with ethnic or external territorial disputes would not be included until the disputes were settled in accordance with OSCE principles. See `Nato's Enlargement', Press Info, 4 July 1997, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/m970708/infopres/e-enl.htm.

27 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for emphasizing this point.

28 Ole Wæver, `Imperial Metaphors: Emerging European Analogies to Pre-Nation-State Imperial Systems', in Ola Tunander, Pavel Baev & Victoria Einangel, eds, Geopolitics in Post-Wall Europe: Security, Territory and Identity (London: Sage, 1997), pp. 59-93.

29 Samuel P. Huntington, `The Clash of Civilizations?', Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 3, Summer 1993, pp. 22-49.

30 Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, `Turkey in the New Security Environment in the Balkan and Black Sea Region', in Vojtech Mastny & R. Craig Nation, eds, Turkey Between East and West (Boulder, CO: Westview), pp. 71-95, on p. 77.

31 Among other things, Turkish lawmakers threatened not to renew the mandate of Operation Northern Watch from the Incirlik air base if Resolution No. 596 in the House of Representatives was adopted. See Nicole Pope, `US Congress Withdraws Armenian Genocide Resolution', Turkey Update, 20 October 2000.

32 General (retired) Cevik Bir pointed out that Turkey's geographic location and its status as a frontline state made it necessary to consider Turkey as a centre of power that could influence the regional balance. See Cevik Bir, `Turkey's Role in the New World Order', Strategic Forum, no. 135, February 1998; available at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum135.html.

33 Meltem Müftüler-Bac presents this view in `Turkey's Role in the EU's Security and Foreign Policies', Security Dialogue, vol. 31, no. 4, December 2000, pp. 489-501.

34 Van Ham makes the point that while there were 2 million in uniform during the Kosovo crisis, it was not possible to prepare 40,000 troops to fight a regional war. Most European troops are still trained to repeal a Soviet ground attack rather than to be rapidly deployed for Petersberg tasks. See Peter van Ham, `Europe's Common Defense Policy', Security Dialogue, vol. 31, no. 2, June 2000, pp. 215-228, on p. 223.

35 `Last Line of Defence', The Economist, 10 June 2000, pp. 13-14.

36 See Eric Rouleau, `La République des `Pachas': Ce Pouvoir si pesant des militaires turcs' [Turkey's Modern Pashas], Le Monde diplomatique, September 2000; available at http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2000/09/rouleau/14221.html. Rouleau quotes figures from Defense Week, 14 February 2000; however, the recent (February 2001) crisis in the Turkish economy has also put pressure on the Turkish army to moderate military expenditures.

37 Ömür Orhun, `European Security and Defence Identity - Common European Security and Defence Policy: A Turkish Perspective', Perceptions, vol. 5, no. 3, September-November 2000, pp. 115-124.

38 Joseph Fitchett, `Turkey Puts Roadblock in EU Force Negotiations', International Herald Tribune, 26 January 2001.

39 Turkish Daily News, 21 June 2000.

40 Selcuk Gultasli, `EU Diplomats: Turkey Cannot Be Involved in ESDI Decision-Making', Turkish Daily News, 5 June 2000.

41 First, NATO members would be consulted on any EU operation using Alliance assets (which in practice means every EU action). Second, non-EU NATO members would be included on a military/political committee of contributors in any operation in which they may be involved. Finally, non-EU NATO members would be consulted prior to operations in their own region. See `EU Offers Turkey a Say in Proposed New Force', Financial Times, 14 November 2000.

42 Fitchett (note 38 above).

43 David E. Sanger, `Bush Tells Blair He Doesn't Oppose New Europe Force', New York Times, 24 February 2001.

44 `Turkey Accepts EU Membership Terms but Balks on Cyprus', Los Angeles Times, 10 November 2000.

45 For the full text of the `2000 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession', see http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_11_00/index.htm.

46 The introduction to and selections from the National Programme released on 19 March 2001 can be found at http://www.anadoluajansi.com.tr/eng/npdx.html.

47 `Kurdish Intellectuals Find MGK Report Unacceptable', Turkish Daily News, 23 June 2000.

48 Norwegian state television (NRK) interview, 6 June 2000.

49 `Why Are We Waiting?', The Economist, 10 June 2000, pp. 6-9.