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References
1.
1 Ryan C. Hendrickson, `NATO's Open Door Policy and the Next Round of Enlargement', Parameters , Winter 2000-2001, pp. 53-66.
2.
2 Based on interviews with NATO officials, January 2001.
3.
3 Letter from 11 August 2000; available at http://www.expandnato.com/bushtolt.html.
4.
4 Based on interviews with US officials from the Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff.
5.
5 Hearings of the House International Relations Committee, 7 March 2001; and Frank T. Csongos, `Baltics: Washington Says No Russian Veto Over NATO Expansion', Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 15 March 2001; available at http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2001/03/15032001122304.asp.
6.
6 Condoleezza Rice, `Now, NATO Should Grow', New York Times , 8 July 1996, 23(A).
7.
7 John Hall, `Bush Adviser Urges Limits to U.S. Intervention', Tampa Tribune , 8 September 1999, p. 7.
8.
8 The success of the first round of NATO enlargement was secured by a group of deeply motivated individuals in key political positions in the Clinton administration, primarily National Security Adviser Anthony Lake, who were able to overcome bureaucratic opposition. See James Golgeier, Not Whether, But When: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999).
9.
9 Off-the-record interview, January 1999.
10.
10 See Andrew Michta, ed., America's New Allies: Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in NATO (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1999).
11.
11 Peter W. Rodman, `The Fallout from Kosovo', Foreign Affairs , vol. 78, no. 4 (July/August 1999), pp. 45-51, on p. 48.
12.
12 This new US perspective became clear in early March 2001 when Washington rejected the efforts of Britain and other allies to use more assertive action to monitor Albanian insurgents in a border zone in Serbia from which NATO had excluded the Yugoslav army. The US objections focused on avoiding any expanded mission for NATO troops that would engage the Alliance, and especially US armed forces, in a wider Balkan conflict. See Jane Perlez, `U.S. Says G.I.'s Based in Kosovo Won't Help Keep Peace in Serbia', New York Times , 9 March 2001, p. 1.
13.
13 Vince Crawley, `U.S. Candidates Pose Different Defense Strategies: Bush to Review Deployments Focus on Primary Mission', Defense News , vol. 15, no. 32, 14 August 2000, p. 10.
14.
14 Based on interviews conducted during 1999 and 2000.
15.
15 As quoted in William Drozdiak, `Europeans Question Bush's Views on NATO', Washington Post , 15 December 2000, p. 31(A).
16.
16 For discussion of the NATO-EU capabilities gap, see David Yost, `The NATO Capabilities Gap and the European Union', Survival , vol. 42, no. 4, Winter 2000-2001, pp. 97-128.
17.
17 For example, WEU Associate Partners participate in most WEU meetings, whether the subject matter pertains to them directly or not, and are free (and often invited) to join in the debate or add their approval to a topic paper.
18.
18 Quoted in Jeremy Strozer, `Securing a United Future: Europe, U.S. Must Settle on United Foreign Policy', Defense News , vol. 15, no. 14, 10 April 2000, p. 15.
19.
19 Douglas Hamilton, `NATO Could Become “Relic” Over EU Force - U.S.', Reuters, 5 December 2000.
20.
20 Douglas Hamilton, `NATO Bogged Down Over Deal with European Union', Reuters, 14 December 2000.
21.
21 See Jeffrey Simon, `Partnership for Peace (PFP): After the Washington Summit and Kosovo', Strategic Forum , no. 167, August 1999, pp. 1-6.
22.
22 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Santa Maria da Feira, 19-20 June 2000, Appendix 1.
23.
23 `EU Says 15 Nonmembers Want to Join Its New Military Force', Reuters, 22 November 2000.
24.
24 Christina Mackenzie, `EU Leaders to Close Capabilities Gap', Defense News , vol. 15, no. 48, 4 December 2000, on pp. 1, 52.
25.
25 The author is grateful to Charles Barry and a senior EU official for assistance in attaining clarification on these and other WEU-related issues.
26.
26 `Russia Tells EU Wants End to NATO Monopoly in Europe', Reuters, 22 October 1999.
27.
27 See Sean Kay, `EU Beware: Russia Wants to Divide the Alliance', Wall Street Journal Europe , 30 November 2000; Sean Kay, `What is a Strategic Partnership?', Problems of Post-Communism , vol. 47, no. 3, May-June 2000, pp. 15-24. Also see `Highlights of U.S.-EU Cooperation Under the New Transatlantic Agenda', The White House, 18 December 2000.
28.
28 This plan is credited to Jeffrey Simon of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University.
29.
29 The PARP allows participants to exchange data with NATO on defense plans and budgets, and to identify areas to improve interoperability between their forces and NATO in peacekeeping, search and rescue, and humanitarian operations.
30.
30 The EU could assign a percentage of its staff to be dual assigned - both to the EU and to the Partnership Planning Cell at SHAPE.
31.
31 General Joseph Ralston, `For the EU and NATO, a Welcome New Military Partnership', International Herald Tribune , 24 November 2000.
32.
32 Final Communiqué, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 14-15 December 2000.
33.
33 The author is grateful for insights from Joshua B. Spero of Dartmouth College, former PfP planner in the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (J-5).
