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References
1.
1 Frederick Shields, Preventable Disasters: Why Governments Fail (Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1991); Philip Tetlock & Aaron Belkin, eds, Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996). For a similar attempt from a different angle, see Barbara Tuchman, The March of Folly (New York: Knopf, 1984).
2.
2 The term `deadly conflict' is used as established by the work of the Carnegie Commission for the Prevention of Deadly Conflict; see Jane Holl, ed., Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report (New York: Carnegie Commission for the Prevention of Deadly Conflict, 1997). The present work also follows on from a previous project on state collapse; see I. William Zartman, ed., The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995); and James Rosenau, `The State in an Era of Cascading Politics', in James Caporaso, ed., The Elusive State (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1989), pp. 17-48.
3.
3 See Michael Lund, Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 1996); Bruce Jentleson, ed., Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000); I. William Zartman, ed., Preventive Negotiation: Avoiding Conflict Escalation (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001).
4.
4 The cases and instances are fully analyzed in I. William Zartman, Cowardly Lions: Missed Opportunities to Prevent Deadly Conflict (forthcoming).
5.
5 I. William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); I. William Zartman, `Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond', in Paul Stern & Daniel Druckman, eds, International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War (Washington, DC: National Academy Press), pp. 225-250.
6.
6 I. William Zartman, ed., Elusive Peace: Negotiating to End Civil Wars (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995).
7.
7 I. William Zartman & Jeffrey Z Rubin, eds, Power and Negotiations (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2000).
8.
8 Bruce Jentleson, With Friends Like These: Reagan, Bush and Saddam (New York: Norton, 1994); Efraim Karsh & Inari Rautsi, `Why Saddam Invaded Kuwait', Survival , vol. 33, no. 1, January 1991, pp. 18-39; John Cooley, `Pre-War Gulf Diplomacy', Survival , vol. 33, no. 2, March 1991, pp. 125-139.
