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References
1.
1 Accounts which seek to contest simplified understandings of the Kashmir conflict and present an alternative perspective include: Sumantra Bose, The Challenge in Kashmir: Democracy, Self-Determination and a Just Peace (New Delhi, Thousand Oaks, CA & London: Sage, 1997); Tavleen Singh, Kashmir: A Tragedy of Errors (Delhi: Penguin India, 1995); Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in the Crossfire (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000); and Balraj Puri, Kashmir: Towards Insurgency (Delhi: Orient Longman, 1993). See also Robert Wirsing, India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute (New York: St. Martin's, 1994), and Raju Thomas, ed., Perspectives on Kashmir (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992).
2.
2 Vajpayee made his statement on 19 November 2000, and the Indians' moratorium on offensive combat operations came into effect on 28 November. The full text of Vajpayee's statement can be found at http://pmindia.nic.in/infocentre/press.htm.
3.
3 See `Ramzan Truce: Pakistan Responds with “Restraint” on the LOC', Hindustan Times , 3 December 2000, p. 1.
4.
4 The Kashmir Valley is divided administratively into six districts: Baramulla and Kupwara in north Kashmir, Srinagar and Badgam in central Kashmir, and Anantnag and Pulwama in south Kashmir.
5.
5 All statistics relating to population figures cited in this article are estimates based on the Government of India census conducted in Jammu & Kashmir in 1981. Since that time, no official census results have been available. See Population Atlas of India (Delhi: Controller of Publications, Government of India, 1999).
6.
6 Of course, this ethno-linguistic identity is inevitably infused with a religious dimension because the vast majority of the valley's population is Muslim. The Muslim element of Kashmiri regional identity, centred historically and geographically on the valley, has also been somewhat accentuated since 1989 because of the radicalization induced by the protracted violent confrontation with the Indian state.
7.
7 The Jammu region has six districts: three in the northern and western parts of the region have overall Muslim majorities (Poonch, Rajouri and Doda) while the other three, located to the south and east, are predominantly Hindu (Jammu, Udhampur and Kathua). Significant religious minorities are, however, present in each of these districts. Moreover, the confessional Hindus of the Jammu region are, like their Muslim compatriots, internally divided along faultlines of language, ethnicity, caste and party affiliation.
8.
8 See Bose (note 1 above).
9.
9 The ceasefire line of January 1949 was renamed the LOC by the Indo-Pakistani agreement of 1972.
10.
10 The JeM is led by Maulana Masood Azhar, a radical Pakistani cleric. He formed the group in early 2000 as a breakaway group from its parent organization, Harkat-ul-Jehad-I-Islami, after his followers forced his release from an Indian prison by hijacking an Indian Airlines civilian airliner to Kandahar, the Taliban stronghold in southern Afghanistan.
11.
11 The Statesman (Calcutta), 7 September 2000, p. 1.
12.
12 `Militancy Gains Momentum in Doda, Udhampur: Local Ultras Outnumber Foreigners', Kashmir Times , 8 September 2000, p. 1.
13.
13 Daily Excelsior (Jammu), 19 September 2000, p. 1.
14.
14 `Inside the Jehad Factory', Outlook (New Delhi), 25 September 2000, p. 38.
15.
15 Indian Express , 25 September 2000, p. 1.
16.
16 Kashmir Times , 23 August 2000, p. 1.
17.
17 `Immediate Tasks in Kashmir', editorial in Economic and Political Weekly (Bombay), 12 August 2000, pp. 2883-2884.
18.
18 Sumantra Bose, `Kashmir: Sources of Conflict, Dimensions of Peace', Survival , vol. 41, no. 3, Autumn 1999, pp. 149-171, on pp. 163-164.
19.
19 Muzamil Jaleel, `The Ramzan Thaw', Indian Express , 20 December 2000, p. 8.
20.
20 In the first weeks after the Indian prime minister's announcement, the Pakistan-based leaders of HM kept insisting that India acknowledge the need for a tripartite conference on the Kashmir dispute - meaning, essentially, that it concede a central and integral role for Pakistan in any talks. However, the group's operational commander inside J&K, Abdul Majid Dar (the key figure in the HM's ceasefire declaration in summer 2000), maintained total silence. `Hizb Threat to Intensify Attacks', Kashmir Times , 5 December 2000, p. 1.
21.
21 Bose (note 18 above), p. 165.
22.
22 The vast majority of Indian army personnel deployed in Jammu & Kashmir (as well as the Border Security Force and the Central Reserve Police Force) are non-Muslims from outside J&K.
23.
23 These steps to normalization are described in greater detail in Bose (note 18 above), pp. 165-166.
24.
24 However, in a departure from its standard language, the State Department commented in December 2000 that India, Pakistan and `all residents of the Kashmir region' need to be involved in any meaningful peace process. Hindustan Times , 6 December 2000, p. 1.
25.
25 Abdul Sattar, interview with CNN International, 3 December 2000.
26.
26 This `trifurcation' proposal was publicly rejected by Indian Home (Interior) Minister L. K. Advani in November 2000.
27.
27 See Kashmir Study Group, Kashmir: A Way Forward , February 2000. The Kashmir Study Group is sponsored by businessman Farooq Kathwari.
28.
28 For a critique of partitionist `solutions' to the Kashmir tangle, see Amitabh Mattoo, `Divide and Rue: Towards Polarisation in Jammu & Kashmir', Times of India , 6 October 2000 (op-ed page).
29.
29 Mufti Mohammed Sayeed, former home (interior) minister in the Indian government.
30.
30 This argument is developed in Bose (note 1 above).
31.
31 `Valley's Left and Right, All Say Talk to Pakistan: You Have To Involve Them, Say Parties from National Conference to Congress, even BJP', Indian Express , 9 December 2000, p. 1.
32.
32 See `Delhi Plays Cool to Pak Border Truce Offer', Times of India , 3 December 2000, p. 1; `India Says No to Tripartite Talks with Pakistan', Hindustan Times , 5 December 2000, p. 1.
33.
33 See interview with Salahuddin in India Today , 18 September 2000, p. 32.
34.
34 `India-Militant Talks Fine: Pakistan', Hindustan Times , 5 December 2000, p. 1.
35.
35 Prime Minister's statement in the Indian parliament, 20 December 2000.
36.
36 Bose (note 18 above), pp. 149-171.
37.
37 Author's personal conversation with Yasin Malik in Delhi, 12 December 2000.
