North Korea's Arduous Trip

1 Chosun Ilbo [Chosun Daily], 14 June 2000 (in Korean).

2 South Korea has made efforts to downplay every unexpected incident with North Korea, for instance the naval clash along the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the Yellow Sea on 15 June 1999.

3 Ministry of Unification of the Republic of Korea, Korean Unification Bulletin, no. 17, March 2000.

4 Younghwan Kihl, `Seoul's Engagement Policy and US-DPRK Relations', Korean Journal of Defence Analysis, vol. X, no. 1, Summer 1998, pp. 21-48, on pp. 25-26.

5 Ministry of Unification of the Republic of Korea, Korean Unification Bulletin, no. 15, January 2000, p. 4.

6 Within less than two weeks after the summit, the South Korean conglomerate Hyundai and the North Korean authorities agreed to develop the Mt. Keumgang area into a special economic zone and to build a west coast industrial complex in Haejoo. See Hankyere Sinmun [Hankyere Daily], 30 June and 5 July 2000 (in Korean).

7 Banning Garrett & Bonnie Glaser, `Looking Across the Yalu', Asian Survey, vol. XXXV, no. 6, June 1995, pp. 528-545, on pp. 535-536.

8 See Robert A. Manning, `The United States in North Korean Foreign Policy', in Samuel S. Kim, ed., North Korean Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War (Hong Kong, Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 140-159, on p. 146.

9 North Korea's gross domestic product (GDP) fell by 3.0% in 1991, 7.6% in 1992, 5.4% in 1993, 1.7% in 1994, 2.0% in 1995, 2.1% in 1996 and 6.8% in 1997. See Vladimir D. Andrianov, `Economic Aspects of the North Korean Nuclear Program', in James Clay Moltz & Alexandre Y. Mansourov, eds, The North Korean Nuclear Program: Security, Strategy, and New Perspectives from Russia (New York & London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 41-50, on p. 41.

10 See Manning (note 8 above), p. 158. North Korea has suffered annual grain shortages in the region of two million tons since 1992 and produced only 60-70% of total demand even before the great flood of 1995 and 1996. See Kim Philo, `The Sociopolitical Impact of Food Crisis in North Korea', Korea and World Affairs, vol. 23, no. 2, Summer 1999, pp. 207-204, on p. 210.

11 Toshio Miyatsuka, `Joint Ventures and a Special Economic Zone in North Korea', JETRO China Newsletter, no. 96, January-February 1992, pp. 15-21.

12 Andrianov (note 9 above), p. 46.

13 In normalizing relations with South Korea in 1965, Japan paid `reparations' of $800 million. At the end of 1994, a comparable sum, based on the consumer price index, would have been $3.76 billion, but North Korean spokesmen have advanced arguments that seek to justify a payment by the Japanese of $5-10 billion. See Selig S. Harrison, `US Policy Toward North Korea', in Dae-sook Suh & Chae-jin Lee, eds, North Korea After Kim Il Sung (Boulder, CO & London: Lynne Rienner, 1998), pp. 61-84, on p. 66.

14 See Hongnack Kim, `Japan in North Korean Foreign Policy', in Samuel S. Kim, ed., (note 8 above), pp. 116-139, on pp. 134, 116.

15 See Manning (note 8 above), on pp. 140-141.

16 Chuck Downs, Over the Line: North Korea's Negotiating Strategy (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1999), pp. 280-283.

17 Nicholas Eberstadt, The End of North Korea (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1999), p. 19.

18 Ibid., p. 21.

19 Chosun Ilbo [Chosun Daily], 12 July 2000.

20 Eberstadt (note 17 above), p. 21.

21 Robert Scalapino, North Korea at a Crossroads (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, 1997), p. 16; Younghwan Kihl, `North Korea's Political Problem: The Regime Survival Strategy', The Economics of Korean Reunification, vol. 2, no. 2, 1997, pp. 82-97, on p. 90.

22 Yeonchul Kim, `Recent Changes in the International Environment Surrounding the Korean Peninsula and Changes in North Korea's South Korea Policy', The Economics of Korean Reunification, vol. 3, no. 1, 1998, pp. 104-115, on p. 104.

23 Jaehoon Shim & Adrian Edwards, `No Turning Back', Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 June 2000, pp. 16-19, on p. 17.

24 `What Is Kim's Objective?', Jugan Donga [Weekly Donga], 29 June 2000 (in Korean).

25 Rodong Sinmun [Rodong Daily], 1 January 1991, cited in Gapchol Kim, `The Principle of Separating Economics from Politics, and Prospects for Improvement in South-North Relations', East Asian Review, vol. 10, no. 2, Summer 1998, pp. 18-39, on pp. 26-27.

26 Ibid., p. 27.

27 In an interview with the Financial Times, 16 July 2000, President Kim described a crucial moment in the talks: `After a heated argument, the North Koreans said: “This is the end of the discussion. No more.” But then they came back and proposed a looser form of federation that would keep the two governments as they are but establish a central government as a formality'.

28 Minwoong Kim, `Nationalism and the Kims' Adventure', Sindonga [Monthly New Donga], July 2000 (in Korean).

29 China promised to provide in 2000 additional aid to North Korea worth as much as $400-450 million in coal, food and daily necessities. `China Reportedly Agrees To Provide Additional Aid', Chosun Ibo, 4 June 2000, in BBC SWB FEW/0644 WORLD/3, 14 June 2000.

30 `The DPRK and Russia express the willingness to get in touch with each other without delay if the danger of aggression to the DPRK or to Russia is created... [They] confirm their commitment neither to sign with a third country any treaties and agreements... nor to participate in any actions, steps and blocs.' See Article 2 of the DPRK-Russia Joint Declaration signed by Kim Jong Il and Vladimir Putin, The People's Korea, 20 July 2000, available at http://www.korea-np.co.jp/pk/.

31 Korea Herald, 29 July 2000.

32 `The Force Driving the Koreas to Reunite', 10 June 2000, available at http://www.stratfor.com/Asia/commentary/0006100130a.htm.

33 Joongang Ilbo [Joongang Daily], 16 June 2000 (in Korean).

34 Hankyere Sinmun, 14 June 2000.

35 Comment by A. P. Loshykov, Russia's deputy foreign minister, in his interview with the Korea Herald, 29 September 2000. He also said that Russia plans to have summit meetings with both Korean leaders either at the end of this year or early next year.

36 `South Radio Sets Russian President's North Korea Visit at 19th July', BBC SWB FE/3863 D/3, 10 June 2000.

37 Donga Ilbo [Donga Daily], 18 June 2000.

38 It is said that the USA and the North will soon establish liaison offices or consulates at both capitals as a preliminary step to open ambassadorial-level ties. See the Korea Herald, 14 October 2000.

39 Chosun Ilbo [Chosun Daily], 22 October 2000.

40 The USA revealed its long-term concern in the G-8 statement: `We look forward to a constructive response to international concerns over security, non-proliferation and human rights issues'. See The Times, 22 July 2000.

41 Korea Times, 21 June 2000.

42 David Reese, The Prospects for North Korea's Survival (London: IISS, 1998), p. 84.

43 Nayan Chanda & Shim Jaehoon, `Trouble on the Tracks', Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 September 2000, pp. 14-18, on p. 18.

44 Even a senior officer of the South Korean Unification Ministry admitted: `Now that relations with the US is one of the most urgent issues for the North, inter-Korean matters are being put on the back burner'. See the Korea Herald, 22 October 2000.

45 The two Koreas agreed to establish a joint economic consultative body to implement various economic issues. They also agreed to sign a pact on a trade settlement system soon. South Korea will send 500,000 tons of food, worth about $90 million, to help the North. Meanwhile, little progress has been made on security affairs. The two Koreas have yet to start discussions on such basic confidence-building measures as military hotlines and mutual observation of military exercises. See the Korea Herald, 29 September and 9 October 2000.

46 Interview with the Financial Times, 17 July 2000.