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References
1.
1 `Open the Club', The Economist , 29 August 1992, p. 14.
2.
2 See David Malone, `The UN Security Council in the Post-Cold War World: 1987-97', Security Dialogue , vol. 28, no. 4, December 1997, pp. 393-408.
3.
3 See Hilaire McCoubrey & Justin Morris, Regional Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era (The Hague: Kluwer, 2000).
4.
4 See Inis Claude, Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962), pp. 155-205.
5.
5 See Thomas Robinson & David Shambaugh, eds, Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997).
6.
6 See Hilaire McCoubrey, `Kosovo, NATO and International Law', International Relations , vol. 14, no. 5, August 1999, pp. 29-46.
7.
7 See Burns Weston, `Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Decision Making: Precarious Legitimacy', American Journal of International Law , vol. 85, no. 3, July 1991, pp. 516-535; Andrew Cooper, Richard Higgott & Kim Nossal, `Bound to Follow? Leadership and Followership in the Gulf Conflict', Political Science Quarterly , vol. 106, no. 3, Fall 1991, pp. 391-410; and David Caron, `The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council', American Journal of International Law , vol. 87, no. 4, October 1993, pp. 552-588.
8.
8 Peter Wallensteen, `Representing the World: A Security Council for the 21st Century', Security Dialogue , vol. 25, no. 1, March 1994, pp. 63-75, on p. 64.
9.
9 Weston (note 7 above), p. 524.
10.
10 Inis Claude, `Collective Legitimization as a Collective Function of the United Nations', International Organization , vol. 20, no. 3, Summer 1966, pp. 367-379, on p. 370.
11.
11 See UN Charter Articles 23 and 27.
12.
12 See Bruce Russett, Barry O'Neill & James Sutterlin, `Breaking the Security Council Restructuring Logjam', Global Governance , vol. 2, no. 1, January/April 1996, pp. 65-80.
13.
13 Jerzy Ciechanski, `Restructuring of the UN Security Council', International Peacekeeping , vol. 1, no. 4, Winter 1994, pp. 413-439, on p. 416.
14.
14 See Bhikhu Parekh, `The Logic of Intercultural Evaluation', in J. Horton & S. Mendus, eds, Toleration, Identity and Difference (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), pp. 163-197.
15.
15 See Sydney Bailey & Sam Daws, The Procedure of the UN Security Council (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), pp. 141-153.
16.
16 See UN Doc. GA Res. 47/62, 11 December 1992 and UN Doc. GA Res. 48/26, 3 December 1993, respectively. See Hanna Newcombe, `Reform of the UN Security Council', Peace Research Reviews , vol. 8, no. 3, May 1979; Ciechanski (note 13 above); Wallensteen (note 8 above); Bruce Russett, `Ten Balances for Weighing UN Reform Proposals', Political Science Quarterly , vol. 111, no. 2, Summer 1996, pp. 259-269; and see Russett, O'Neill & Sutterlin (note 12 above).
17.
17 See UN Doc. GA/9693, 20 December 1999.
18.
18 See `Conference Room Paper by the Bureau of the Working Group on the Security Council', UN Doc. A/AC.247/1997/CRP.8 of 29 May 1997.
19.
19 See UN Doc. A / AC.247 / 1997 / CRP.11 of 27 June 1997, `Harare Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity on the Reform of the United Nations Security Council', para. 2(a) and OAU Doc. AHG/Dec.3 (XXXIII) of 4 June 1998, `Decision of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity on the Procedure for the Rotation of the Two Permanent Seats Claimed by Africa'.
20.
20 See Final Document of the XIIth Summit of the Nonaligned Movement, 2-3 September 1998, Durban, South Africa, para. 66(c).
21.
21 See Ambassador Tono Eitel, Permanent Representative of Germany to the UN, Statement to the Open-Ended Working Group, 23 April 1996. See `Basic Standpoint of the Government of Japan on Security Council/Reform', 14 May 1999, http://www.un.int/japan/sc; and Fujita Hiroshi, `UN Reform and Japan's Permanent Security Council Seat', Japan Quarterly , vol. 42, no. 4, October/December 1995, pp. 436-442.
22.
22 See Ambassador Bill Richardson, Permanent Representative of the United States to the UN, Statement on Security Council reform to the Open-Ended Working Group, 17 July 1997.
23.
23 See UN Charter, Article 108.
24.
24 Harare Declaration, para. 6(c) and NAC/FM 12/Doc. 12 of 8 April 1997, `Declaration Adopted at the Twelfth Ministerial Conference of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries', New Delhi, 7-8 April 1997.
25.
25 See Ambassador Celso L. N. Amorim, Permanent Representative of Brazil to the UN, Statement on Total Size of an Enlarged Security Council to the Open-Ended Working Group, 4 May 1998.
26.
26 Harare Declaration, para. 3.
27.
27 See Panos Tsakaloyannis & Dimitris Bourantonis, `The European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Reform of the Security Council', European Foreign Affairs Review , vol. 2, no. 2, Summer 1997, pp. 197-209.
28.
28 See UN Charter Article 23(1). Emphasis added.
29.
29 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping A/47/277-S24111 (New York: United Nations, 1992), para. 17.
30.
30 Kofi Annan, `Two Concepts of Sovereignty', The Economist , 18-24 September 1999, pp. 49-50.
31.
31 See Sean Murphy, `Democratic Legitimacy and the Recognition of States and Governments', International and Comparative Law Quarterly , vol. 48, no. 3, July 1999, pp. 545-581.
32.
32 See Bhikhu Parekh, `The Cultural Particularity of Liberal Democracy', in D. Held, ed., Prospects for Democracy: North South East West (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), pp. 156-175.