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References
1.
1 Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, fiftieth session A/AC.96/914, 7 July 1999, para. 46.
2.
2 Bjørn Møller, `The UN, the USA and NATO: Humanitarian Intervention in the Light of Kosovo', and Håkan Wiberg, `Background and Phases of the Kosovo conflict: NATO Goal Attainment', papers presented at `The Lessons of Kosovo', COPRI conference, 13 September 1999.
3.
3 The costs of the US-run Camp Hope in Albania would have enabled UNHCR to provide every refugee in private accommodation with $10 a day for several months; see Toby Porter, `Coordination in the Midst of Chaos: The Refugee Crisis in Albania', Forced Migration Review , no. 5, August 1999, p. 22.
4.
4 See comments by Kathleen Newland and Morton Abramowitz, cited in Elizabeth Becker, `With NATO in Charge, Relief looks Less Neutral', New York Times , 10 April 1999.
5.
5 Thomas G. Weiss, Military-Civilian Interactions: Intervening in Humanitarian Crises (Lanham, MA: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999).
6.
6 Joanna Macrae, `The Death of Humanitarianism? An Anatomy of the Attack', Disasters , vol. 22, no. 4, December 1998, pp. 309-317.
7.
7 David Campbell, `Why Fight: Humanitarianism, Principles and Post-Structuralism', Millennium: Journal of International Studies , vol. 27, no. 3, 1998, pp. 497-521; Tonny Brems Knudsen, `Humanitarian Intervention and International Society: Contemporary Manifestations of an Explosive Doctrine', PhD thesis, University of Århus, June 1999, pp. 51-66.
8.
8 NATO, Peace Support Operations , AJP-3.4.1.
9.
9 Sadako Ogata, `Role of Humanitarian Action in Peacekeeping Operations', UNHCR 24th Annual Vienna Seminar, 5 July 1994; International Federation of Red Cross/Crescent Societies, World Disasters Report (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 23-34. On intrastate conflict, see Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), pp. 112-113.
10.
10 Fiona Terry, `Reconstituting Whose Social Order? NGOs in Disrupted States', paper presented at conference `For Civil Strife to Civil Society: Civil Military Cooperation in Disrupted States', Canberra, 6-7 July 1999, p. 9.
11.
11 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35 (1998), Srebrenica Report, paras 490-492; Mark Duffield, `An Account of Relief Operations in Bosnia', RRN, ODI Network paper no. 3, 1994, p. 11.
12.
12 Wiberg (note 2 above).
13.
13 Michael Barutciski, `Western Diplomacy and the Kosovo Refugee Crisis', Forced Migration Review , no. 5, August 1999, p. 10. Approximately 100,000 people fled Kosovo before the bombing, another 100,000 were refugees within the region, and another 250-300,000 were still internally displaced after many had returned to their homes during the October-December 1998 ceasefire between Serb forces and the guerrillas. From the breakdown of the Rambouillet talks on 23 February 1999 to mid-May, another 750,000 had left and an estimated 400,000 to 500,000 were internally displaced. See UNHCR, The Kosovo Refugee Crisis: An Independent Evaluation of UNHCR's Emergency Preparedness and Response , February 2000 (http://www.unhcr.ch/evaluate/kosovo/toc.htm).
14.
14 Gen. Wesley Clark, news conference, NATO press release (1999) 045, 1 April 1999.
15.
15 `Humanitarian-Military Cooperation', statement by Ross Mountain (Assistant Emergency Relief Coordinator and Director, OCHA-Geneva), meeting of `Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping', NATO HQ Brussels, 24 April 1998.
16.
16 Notably in Presidential Decision Directive 25, specifying restrictive conditions for US participation; see Phyllis Bennis, Calling the Shots: How Washington Dominates Today's UN (New York: Olive Branch Press, 1996). See also Michael G. MacKinnon, The Evolution of US Peacekeeping Policy under Clinton: A Fairweather Friend? (London: Frank Cass, 1999).
17.
17 See Michael Pugh, `The Withering of Humanitarian Reform: A Rejoinder', Security Dialogue , vol. 29, no. 2, June 1998, pp. 159-161.
18.
18 UNHCR, The Kosovo Refugee Crisis (note 13 above).
19.
19 UNHCR has also become increasingly politicized: see Alex Cunliffe & Michael Pugh, `The UNHCR's Leadership in Complex Emergencies: The Triumph of Politics over Law', in Frances Nicholson & Patrick Twomey, eds, Refugee Rights and Realities: Evolving International Concepts and Regimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 175-199.
20.
20 Nicholas Morris, `UNHCR and Kosovo: A Personal View From Within UNHCR', Forced Migration Review , no. 5, August 1999, p. 15.
21.
21 Becker (note 4 above).
22.
22 Porter (note 3 above), p. 21; Nicholas Morris (note 20 above), p. 15.
23.
23 Barutciski (note 13 above), p. 8.
24.
24 UNHCR, The Kosovo Refugee Crisis (note 13 above), paras. 526 ff.
25.
25 NATO press release (note 14 above).
26.
26 `Statement of the North Atlantic Council Following the Meeting between Representatives of the NATO Member States, the EU Member States, the OSCE-CIO, the UNHCR, the Council of Europe and the Western European Union', NATO Press Release (1999) 048, Brussels, 4 April 1999 (my italics).
27.
27 Statement by Ogata to the Humanitarian Issues Working Group of the Peace Implementation Council, Geneva, 6 April 1999.
28.
28 Ibid. (original italics).
29.
29 Briefing by Ogata to the Security Council, New York, 5 May 1999.
30.
30 UNHCR press release, Geneva, 20 April 1999.
31.
31 Peter Morris, `Humanitarian Interventions in Macedonia: An NGO Perspective', Forced Migration Review , no. 5, August 1999, p. 18; Nicholas Morris (note 20 above), p. 16; Porter (note 3 above), pp. 20-23.
32.
32 Mark Duffield, `Post-Modern Conflict: Warlords, Post-Adjustment States and Private Protection', Journal of Civil Wars , vol. 1, no. 1, April 1998, pp. 65-102; Karen De Young, `U.S. Grows Stingier on Foreign Aid', International Herald Tribune , 26 November 1999, pp. 1, 4.
33.
33 Porter (note 3 above), p. 22.
34.
34 ICRC, `Respect For and Protection Of the Personnel of Humanitarian Organisations', preparatory document for first periodical meeting on international humanitarian law, Geneva, 19-23 January 1998.
35.
35 Joelle Tanguy, cited in Becker (note 4 above).
36.
36 NATO avoided humanitarian air drops as being too risky; see Roberta Cohen & David A. Korn, Forced Migration Review , no. 5, 1999, p. 12. See also Larry Minear, Ted van Baarda & Marc Sommers, NATO and Humanitarian Action in the Kosovo Crisis (Providence, RI: Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, Brown University, 2000), pp. 41-55.
37.
37 Overseas Development Agency/Ministry of Defence, `Initiatives in Bosnia', MND/SW, report on activities April 1996-Sept. 1996, unclassified document, London, 1997.
38.
38 UNHCR, The Kosovo Refugee Crisis (note 13 above), para. 544.
39.
39 Center for Defense Information, `Getting the Military out of Humanitarian Relief', Defense Monitor , vol. 36, no. 6, 1997, pp. 1-7.
40.
40 France opposed strengthening NATO and did not agree to NATO preparations, exchange of plans or coordination with UNHCR in Kosovo. The UK was concerned about potential costs: UNHCR, The Kosovo Refugee Crisis (note 13 above), para. 530.
41.
41 See Tom Woodhouse, `The Gentle Hand of Peace? British Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution in Complex Political Emergencies', International Peacekeeping , vol. 6, no. 2, Summer 1999, pp. 24-37.
42.
42 The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Washington, DC, 24 April 1999, para. 24.
43.
43 Confidential NATO sources, interviewed July 1999.
44.
44 WEU draft Concept on Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), WEU Brussels, WEU-DMS 99246, 17 February 1999.
45.
45 Max Boot, Wall Street Journal , 2 November 1999.
46.
46 Overseas Development Agency/Ministry of Defence (note 37 above).
47.
47 Peter Morris (note 31 above), p. 19.