The Coupling of the Syrian-Lebanese Peace Tracks

1 Earlier, Palestinian irregular troops and the Arab Liberation Army (sponsored by an Arab League recommendation in December 1947) precipitated the first wave of war as they attempted to prevent the implementation of the GA Resolution 181 (II), which proposed a partition plan for Palestine.

2 Laurie Brand, `Palestinians in Syria: The Politics of Integration', Middle East Journal, vol. 42, no. 4, 1988, pp. 621-637, on p. 622.

3 Aryeh Shalev, an Israeli officer who particpated in border negotiations between Syrian and Israel during the early 1950s, argues differently. He says the Syrians were hard on the issues, but not on contacts. He dismisses the assertion that there was no rapprochement between the two countries as both simplistic and one-sided. For more on this, see Aryeh Shalev, The Israel-Syria Armistice Regime, 1949-1955, JCSS study no. 21 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1993).

4 In 1968, following a major confrontation between the Israeli army and Palestinian organizations in the Jordan valley, the Fatah movement, led by Yassir Arafat, assumed control of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and transformed it into an umbrella organization for the mainstream guerrilla groups.

5 Israel has always focused on peace and security, whereas Syria has demanded the return of the Golan Heights and setting a fairly short time-frame for Israeli withdrawal. See al-Hayat (Beirut), 15 December 1999.

6 Badr Hasan Shaf'i, `Al-Mufawadat al-Suriyya al-Israilia ila Ayn?', Al-Siyasa al-Dawliyya (Cairo), no. 138, September 1999, p. 110.

7 Patrick Seale, `Asad's Regional Strategy and the Challenge from Netanyahu', Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 26, no. 1, 1996, pp. 27-41, on p. 36.

8 For more on this, see Moshe Ma'oz, Syria and Israel: From War to Peacemaking (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 130-134.

9 Ibid.

10 Itamar Rabinovich, The Brink of Peace: The Israeli-Syrian Negotiations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 160.

11 Jerusalem Post, 17 March 2000.

12 Haramoun (Beirut), no. 288, 19 December 1999.

13 This argument was presented by John Aziz, a writer on Lebanese affairs, during a seminar on the challenges of peace that was held in Beirut on 14 March 2000.

14 Cherif J. Cordahi, ed., Lebanon: Country Report, 1st Quarter, 1999 (Kent: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1999), p. 16.

15 In view of Israel's conception of sprawling Gaza Strip as an unusually densely populated refugee camp, where extreme poverty has mightily contributed to religious militancy, the sparsely populated settlements apparently serve as a forward security buffer. The Palestinian-Israeli Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Oslo II) acknowledged the existence of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza for reasons of security and public order (see article XII).

16 The negotiations were guided by the principles of the 1991 Madrid peace conference, which called for exchanging land for peace. Syrian and Israeli negotiators (led by Waled al-Muallim and Itamar Rabinovich respectively) achieved considerable progress on key issues related to land, peace, security, and water. Terrorist attacks that claimed the lives of dozens of Israelis hardened public opinion in the Jewish state on the eve of the 1996 elections that brought Benjamin Netanyahu to power. For more on this, see Rabinovich (note 10 above).

17 In connection with its strategic objectives in Lebanon, Syria maintains an undisclosed number of troops ranging from 40,000 to 80,000 (stationed in the north, Biqa Valley, and Beirut, in addition to many thousands of intelligence men [mukhabarat] and local informants.

18 Uri Savir, The Process: 1,100 Days that Changed the Middle East (New York: Random House, 1998), p. 288.

19 Syria's punitive response to the Treaty took the form of reigniting the civil war in Lebanon, and quickly curtailing the central government's authority in most parts of the country.

20 Middle East Insight, September-October 1999, at http://mideastinsight.org/9_99/abboud_9.99.html.

21 Fares Boueiz, al-Safir (Beirut), 8 June 1995.

22 Fares Boueiz, al-Nahar (Beirut), 14 July 1999.

23 Fares Boueiz, Al-Hawadith (London), 8 October 1998.

24 Cordahi (note 14 above), p. 7.

25 Simon Karam, al-Nahar (Beirut), 5 July 1995.

26 Ibid.

27 Some Lebanese analysts believe that calling for recognizing the 1923 borders would strengthen the Israeli argument that its withdrawal from the Golan Heights should be to the 1949 armistice line. Syria insists that the Israelis pull back to the 4 June 1967 line, which showed Syrian gradual control of the eastern shores of Lake Tiberias during the 1949-67 period.

28 These lands have been incorporated into Israel proper since the Jewish state unilaterally redrew the border with Lebanon; they are not part of Israel's self-declared security belt.

29 Obviously, the Lebanese do not expect the Israelis to pay them anything, but they assume that compensation would be one dividend of peace contributed by the USA and possibly other rich countries.

30 Ghassan Salame, al-Nahar (Beirut), 30 June 1995.

31 Hilal Khashan, Palestinian Resettlement in Lebanon: Behind the Debate (Montreal: Montreal Studies on the Contemporary Arab World, 1994).

32 Al-Nahar (Beirut), 6 September 1999.

33 Al-Safir, 29 June 1996.

34 Widespread demonstrations broke out in different parts of Lebanon in February 2000 in protest against the Israeli attacks and US sanction of them, on grounds of Hezbollah's provocation. Many demonstrators scolded the Arab states, but fell short of referring to Syria by name, for not offering a helping hand to Lebanon as it bore the brunt of the attacks. In a rare show of solidarity, Arab dignitaries such as Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Jordanian King Abdullah II, and Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Abdullah paid surprise visits to Beirut. In March 2000 the Arab League's Ministers of Foreign Affairs held a meeting in Beirut, the first in 30 years, to register their support for Lebanon. This special attention to Lebanon, which coincided with criticism of Syria in private circles, put Damascus on the spot for using Lebanon as an expendable card in its tightrope diplomacy with Tel Aviv.

35 This came in sharp contrast to previous Hezbollah leaders' rhetoric that Israel will not be spared attacks from territory it relinquishes.

36 It is generally understood here that Syria's control of Lebanon serves as the only viable negotiating card Damascus has. To remove this card would weaken the leverage Syria could bring to bear on negotiations with Israel over the Golan Heights.

37 Future T.V. (Beirut), 9 January 2000.

38 Ghassan Tueini, al-Nahar, 11 January 2000.