Abstract
In this article, I analyse the legal construction of `Islamic headscarves' from the perspective of intersectionality, concentrating on the relevant jurisprudence under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). First, I explain the (updated) concept of intersectionality which provides my perspective for analysing the case-law. Second, I outline trends salient in earlier decisions (Karaduman and Dahlab). Third, I examine how these trends were developed in Şahin v Turkey, the most elaborate Strasbourg authority on the issue of headscarves so far. My analysis suggests that intersectionality was fragmented in the Şahin judgment, which is to a great extent due to the choice of Article 9 ECHR (right to freedom of religion) as the primary legal basis. I argue that this fragmentation is unsatisfactory. Finally, I suggest alternative, more `intersectionality-friendly', legal bases for a headscarf claim in the framework of the ECHR, and offer some thoughts as to how such an alternative argument might proceed.
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