Legal Forms and Reproductive Norms

Abstract

This article draws on Pashukanis's concept of legal form and on O'Brien's concept of synthetic value to argue that legal form plays a role in reproductive relations by constructing legal subjects as the bearers of reproductive responsibilities. Pashukanis conceived of legal form as playing a particular role in capitalist exchange relations by interpellating subjects as the bearers of property rights. O'Brien argued that reproduction's specific value is synthetic value, which represents the value of integrating nature and reason in species continuity. Synthetic value is distinct from exchange value or emotional value which may also attach to reproductive process. By working through Pashukanis's method of extracting legal form from specific social relations and by adapting it to reproductive relations, an example is provided of how legal form analysis can be extended beyond the particular context of capitalist exchange relations. Just as legal form constitutes owners and non-owners as legal subjects, so it constitutes reproducers and non-reproducers. By tracing the way in which law attributes reproductive responsibility, legal form analysis shows us how law draws a line between good and bad reproducers. Each legal form has this internal contradiction between wanting to attribute responsibility and not to attribute it, and this contradiction is a hook which social forces such as sexuality, gender, race, class and disability can latch on to in pushing legal form to shape reproductive responsibilities in a particular way. Each legal form is also externally contradicted by other legal forms. When law negotiates a balance between the reproductive norms of responsibilities and rights, it demonstrates how particular legal forms manage the interaction of different sets of social relations, such as reproduction and exchange.