The capacity to predict the behavior of other individuals is vital to the well-being and reproductive success of many species. There are two main strategies animals can use to make such predictions: (a) infer from observable cues that another agent is in a mental state and use this information to predict the agent’s behavior or (b) use the observable cues alone to predict the agent’s behavior. The first strategy is called theory of mind, the second behavior reading. A long-standing methodological issue has been how to determine experimentally whether animals use theory of mind or behavior reading to predict others’ behavior. One experimental method, called experience projection, may be capable of resolving this issue.
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