What motivates people to make decisions in the present that benefit their self in the future? An emerging literature suggests that farsightedness is influenced by the degree of connection people perceive between their present and future self. People who see their core identity as changing substantially over time, into a substantially different future self, are less likely to forgo benefits in the present to ensure larger deferred benefits to be enjoyed by that future self they are not as connected to. Recent lab, field, and neural evidence has related such connectedness to time discounting, as well as more generally to a range of provident behaviors. This review discusses what is known and what remains to be studied about the bases of perceived connectedness, how people incorporate connectedness into their decision-making, and which psychological and contextual factors may influence the role of connectedness in decision-making.
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