Recent research highlights the implications of group dynamics in the acceptance and promotion of misconceptions, particularly in relation to the identity-protective attitudes that boost polarisation over scientific information. In this study, we successfully test a mediational model between right-wing authoritarianism and pseudoscientific beliefs. First, we carry out a comprehensive literature review on the socio-political background of pseudoscientific beliefs. Second, we conduct two studies (n = 1189 and n = 1097) to confirm our working hypotheses: H1 – intercorrelation between pseudoscientific beliefs, authoritarianism and three axioms (reward for application, religiosity and fate control); H2 – authoritarianism and social axioms fully explain rightists’ proneness to pseudoscience; and H3 – the association between pseudoscience and authoritarianism is partially mediated by social axioms. Finally, we discuss our results in relation to their external validity regarding paranormal and conspiracy beliefs, as well as to their implications for group polarisation and science communication.
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