Abstract
In this reply to Brian Steverson's objections to my reconciliationist argument, I have clarified the requirements that follow from my principles of environmental justice. I have also clarified the notion of intrinsic value that I am endorsing and the grounds on which my claim of greater intrinsic value for humans rests.
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