Simmel’s sociology of time: On temporal coordination and acceleration

Abstract

Time plays an integral role in understanding how the social is possible. However, most discussions of sociological classical thinkers—such as Georg Simmel—remain starkly underexplored in terms of their theories’ temporal presuppositions. While most responses to Simmel’s work credit him for his major contributions to the sociology of space, in this paper I aim to systematically reconstruct his explicit and implicit temporal assumptions and explore how these inform some of his social-theoretical writings and his sharp temporal diagnosis of modernity. For this purpose, I re-evaluate some of his central works using a theory distinction between social-theory, which aims to answer what constitutes the social, versus theory-of-society, where the key focus is what form or forms human societies have taken so far, and especially what form modern society takes. By offering a new reading of Simmel’s philosophical and sociological writings, I formulate a comprehensive social theory of time, in which time is both located within individual consciousness and reciprocally mediated by a culturally fixed and supra-individual timeframe, thus highlighting the temporal tensions between individual flexibility and social standardization and coordination. Simmel’s diagnosis of modernity reveals a conceptualization of time in spatialized terms, a monetization of time, and an acceleration of life.

If one understands the sociological classics, among them Georg Simmel, as theorists of modernity, it is not surprising that temporal questions are at the core of their analyses. The modern epoch is defined as one that seeks the new, differentiates itself from the old, and installs linear concepts of time and historical concepts of progress as the dominant axes of coordination. However, a closer investigation into Simmel’s work reveals a form of engagement with temporality that goes beyond this epochal self-determination. Indeed, temporality seems to be a realm of human existence that fundamentally determines the way in which sociality is possible and conceivable.

“Simmel’s remarks on space and time are among the most interesting and yet most unexplored aspects of his work” (Kemple, 2018: 166). Taking a systematic look at the centrality of temporal concepts within Simmel’s theory is worthwhile, as he provides both a unique and early version of what could be called a knowledge-sociological understanding of time, as well as a sharp diagnosis of modern temporal regimes. This systematic exploration may be aided by the distinction between social-theory and theory-of-society made by some German thinkers (Lindemann, 2011; Reckwitz, 2016). This distinction, as will be shown, is also present in Simmel’s meta-theoretical demands for sociology as an academic discipline, which he formulates in his central work Soziologie. Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung (Sociology. Inquiries into the Construction of Social Forms) (Simmel, 1908). I argue that, in the writings of the classical sociologists, we can find elements of social-theory and theories-of-society that center around the importance of time for social coordination (Sozialtheorie) as well as the demarcation of modern and pre-modern societies (Gesellschaftstheorie). Within the social-theoretical dimension, I focus on the concerns of agency, norms, and methods for supra-individual processes, suggesting that considerations regarding time play a vital role in these arguments. The theory-of-society-inspired discussion highlights the specific temporal transformation processes Simmel describes as emblematic to modern and urban life. To support my argument, I analyze a selection of Simmel’s writings, focusing not only on his explicit and implicit temporal assumptions, but also on how these inform some of his social-theoretical writings, and how the specific distinctions are mapped onto the demarcation of the modernity of contemporary society.

Overview of Simmel’s influence on the sociology of time

Simmel’s thoughts’ influence on the sociology of time remains largely underexplored. An exploration of the reasons for the absence of systematically including temporality in the reconstruction of his social-theory is imminent. Sociological discussions of time take off in the early 20^th century and center around the theory of philosopher Henri Bergson “who was becoming en vogue among European intellectuals in the early twentieth century” (Kemple, 2018: 110). Pitirim Sorokin and Robert Merton published one of the first sociological comprehensions of some of these ideas in their essay “Social Time” in 1937. In their functional analysis of social time, they highlight its significance for social collaboration, the necessity of fixing collective rhythms, and its role in social differentiation (Sorokin and Merton, 1937: 615)—all these elements can already be found in Simmel’s sociological writings. Although the authors mention Simmel’s essay “Metropolis and Mental Life” in a footnote, they fail to point out the systematic integration of temporal elements in Simmel’s social-theory. The additional long-standing exclusion of Simmel from the sociological canon (Kemple, 2018; Müller, 2018: 84) due to his Jewish background, unconventional theorizing, and broad range of topics he researched makes it hard to trace back Simmel’s influence on the more acknowledged sociologists of time. As a result, existing references of Simmel’s thoughts on time within social theories hence remain either unspecified or underdeveloped. These two shortcomings of existing literature can be exemplified in Norbert Elias Über die Zeit (on time) (1988) and Lawrence Scaff’s (2005) “The Mind of a Modernist.” This is the point of departure for this paper, which 84 years later is led to conclude that Simmel’s innovative thoughts around the importance of time for the social are still glaringly underexamined.

Many theses in Über die Zeit by one of the most prominent time theorists in the field of sociology, Norbert Elias, read as a continuation of the direction Simmel’s ideas were pursuing and show the importance of Simmel’s temporal conceptualizations. Both thinkers lay out non-ontological social theories of time; that is, they highlight its quality as a genuinely social phenomenon and not just as a feature of existence more broadly. Instead of addressing what time is, they ask how it functions and thus delimit their temporal theoretical claims from both an objective and a subjective epistemological understanding of time. Simmel’s relational theory, which emphasizes the interdependence of social structures and personality structure as well as the interrelatedness of humankind with nature and the human ability to build bridges between the subject and object (Simmel, 1909/1997), is foundational for Elias’ (1988) understanding of time as a paradigmatic example of the interdependence of nature, society, and the individual (3).

A long-standing tradition of Simmel scholarship focuses on his formal sociology and the integral distinction between form and content. While form “designates the social expression of human acting with, for or against each other, but also supra-individual structures” (Ziemann, 2018: 797, own translation) and should be at the core of sociological analysis, content refers primarily to “what is present in the individuals as instinct, interest, purpose, inclination, psychic state and movement in such a way” (Simmel, 1908: 6, own translation). In the same vein Lawrence Scaff (2005), providing one of the most detailed accounts of Simmel’s thoughts on time, claims that content is foremost perceived by other scholars as an emergent and time-bound phenomenon, while the form is held to be mainly timeless (6). Nevertheless, thinking through two of Simmel’s central sociological formal concepts “interactions” (Wechselwirkungen) and “lived experience,” (Erleben)—Scaff however shows that both concepts cannot operate without an understanding of process, coordination, and degree of integration and are thus deeply temporal (15). Yet the focus of most scholars on Simmel’s formal sociology and the misunderstanding of this being a timeless category may explain their neglect of Simmel’s social-theoretical endeavors to grasp the social significance of time, as this is perceived to be a matter of content and hence dismissed by a sociological analysis. Consequently, this is a narrowing of the sociological view that Simmel opens through his methodological foundations in Soziologie. Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung (1908) and makes it impossible to reveal the significance of temporality for his construction of social-theory. Hence, I propose another Simmelian theory distinction which lies outside the scope of his formal sociological analysis and is often overlooked within the anglophone Simmel scholarship.

Theoretical framework

In order to broaden the perspective and render visible Simmel’s sociology of time, one must turn to the theory distinction between Sozialtheorie (social-theory) und Gesellschaftstheorie (theory-of-society) used in contemporary German academic discourse (e.g., Lindemann, 2011; Reckwitz, 2016). In unrefined form this distinction is already present in Simmel’s (1908) central work Soziologie. Untersuchungen über die Form der Vergesellschaftung (Lindemann, 2002: 227). In the first chapter Simmel proposes that the objects of sociology as a science are critically set and simultaneously limited by two basic philosophical lines of questioning, and thus levels of theorizing: the epistemology of society (Die Erkenntnistheorie der Gesellschaft) and the metaphysics of society (Die Metaphysik der Gesellschaft) (Simmel, 1908: 25). While these thoughts remain marginal for Simmel’s sociological endeavors in Soziologie. Untersuchungen über die Form der Vergesellschaftung, where he mainly focuses on the formal sociology, he opens the sociological field in the first chapter “Das Gebiet der Soziologie” (The Field of Sociology) of his following work Grundfragen der Soziologie (Fundamental Questions of Sociology) (1917/1999) to include two more areas—a general sociology (die allgemeine Soziologie) and a philosophical sociology (die philosophische Soziologie) (Müller 2018: 44, Simmel, 1917/1999: 77). The epistemology of society and the metaphysics of society, forming the pillars of the philosophical sociology, are hence further developed and become part of Simmel’s sociological program. Noting this major shift of the sociological program throughout Simmel’s work has only recently come into sight of the secondary literature (Müller, 2018; Ramstedt, 2011) and enables the divergence from a strict focus on Simmel’s formal sociology to exist, as the Grundfragen der Soziologie make it fully clear “that formal sociology is only one perspective, but it must be supplemented by general and philosophical sociology” (Müller, 2018: 47, own translation). Thus, re-evaluating some of Simmel’s works from the perspective of this theoretical distinction not only does justice to Simmel’s agenda of a philosophical sociology, but also makes it possible to systematically trace the significance of time within his social-theoretical claims, which might remain indiscernible when adhering to a strict sociology of forms. For this aim, I will define and demarcate the two theory dimensions in terms of their scope and explanatory value, and I will also extrapolate questions around temporality which are of relevance for Simmel’s sociological theorizing. In the following chapter I will apply this perspective to a study of Simmel’s social-theory of time and his temporal theory-of-society.

Part of Simmel’s philosophical sociology is the epistemology of society, which will from now on I refer to as social-theory. It “comprises the conditions, basic concepts, prerequisites of the individual research, which cannot find a solution in the research itself, since they are already the basis of it” (Simmel, 1908: 25). Social-theory therefore defines which phenomena and objects are understood to be genuine social phenomena and should thus be taken as the basis of any further investigations. While it is closely linked to the neighboring discipline of social philosophy, addressing similar concerns such as agency, norms, morals, and tradition, it transcends traditional European philosophical horizons by applying new concepts and methods for supra-individual, sub-individual processes and structures (Reckwitz, 2016: 8). For Simmel it is these new concepts and “not its [sociology as a discipline] object, but her way of looking at things, the special abstraction it carries out that differentiates” sociology from the other sciences (1908: 10, own translation). While social-theory aims at general validity and universality without being temporally or spatially bound, it does include interrogations of temporality, subject theory, and ethics, which are often contained in the theoretical reflections as unquestioned presuppositions. In respect to a reconstruction of Simmel’s social-theory of time, it is therefore relevant to ask both, whether his basic concepts which he considers to be genuine social phenomena, such as interrelations (Wechselwirkungen) and forms of association (Vergesellschaftung) include temporal presuppositions and elements, but also to what extent he understands time itself to be a genuine social phenomenon. Accordingly, I will interrogate Simmel’s ontological claims, subject-theoretical conceptualizations, concepts regarding the supra-individual processes, and reflections on norms regarding these questions.

Gesellschaftstheorie encompasses the word “Gesellschaft” which is often translated with the English word “society” and can be defined as “the structured ensemble of interconnected social entities” (Reckwitz, 2016: 8, own translation). Thus, theories-of-society investigate society as a whole and try to find exhaustive descriptions of specific historical constellations or transformational processes (Lindemann, 2011). The key problem posing itself to a theory-of-society style analysis is what form or forms human societies have taken so far, and specifically what form the modern society takes (Reckwitz, 2016). Thus, theories-of-society investigate society as a whole and try to find exhaustive descriptions of specific historical constellations or transformational processes (Lindemann, 2011). Simmel, who perceives this to be the task of any metaphysics of society (Lindemann, 2002: 227), notes that such an endeavor is comprised of empirical observations and theoretical assumptions so that the “individual research is led to completions and connections and is related to questions and concepts that have no place within the experience and immediate objective knowledge” (Simmel, 1908: 25, own translation). This rootedness in empirical evidence makes theories-of-society more temporally and spatially bound than social-theories. Sociology as a discipline is specifically interested in the structural principles of modernity that are assumed to be wholly different from archaic or more traditional forms of social organization and in their normative evaluation (Reckwitz, 2016: 9). In Simmel’s studies on the life forms within the metropolis, the modern money-economy and the tragedy of culture, he formulates his theory-of-society on the characteristics of modernity through the empirical elaboration of his social-theoretical concepts. Regarding the investigation of a temporal theory-of-society, we must ask, if within the observations and theses of the specifically modern arrangement of social forms, such as the interactions within the money-economy and the drifting apart of subjective and objective culture, particular importance is attached to temporal phenomena.

Much like Simmel’s concepts of “form” and “content,” which refer to an analytical and epistemological distinction that is intricately entwined and coincides within the object of study itself (Simmel, 1908: 6), social-theory and theory-of-society are also interrelated. “There is no relationship of determinacy between social-theory and theory-of-society but rather one of enabling (and at the same time limiting) the basic conceptuality of social-theory does not summarily determine the statements of social theory, but it does delimit a scope of what becomes visible in it” (Reckwitz, 2016: 10, own translation). Accordingly, the conceptual basis of Simmel’s social-theory, the categories with which he operationalizes the social, and how these are infused with and structured by temporal presuppositions delimits the scope of what becomes visible within Simmel’s temporal theory-of-society. Hence while his social-theory addresses the processes of association (Vergesellschaftung) and societies as constituted by interactions his theory-of-society asks how modern phenomena such as the money-economy affect these interactions and how modern they are in their form.

These insights have implications for the selection of texts based on which Simmel’s various arguments and theses on time are reconstructed. Therefore, in principle, we can identify both individual texts as well as phases of work that are devoted more to social-theoretical issues such as Soziologie. Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung (1908), Das Problem der Sociologie (The problem of sociology) (1984/1992), and Grundfragen der Soziologie (Fundamental questions of sociology) (1917/1999), all of which can be attributed to Simmel’s early work phase of (re)founding sociology. ¹ Yet in his more social-theoretical works, such as Philosophie des Geldes (Philosophy of Money) (1900/1958) and “Die Großstadt und das Geistesleben” (“Mentropolis and mental life”) (1903/2006), which can best be attributed to the middle phase of his work and are part of his philosophy of culture, he makes these claims, not only about the empirical configuration of modern society but also about the social-theoretical underpinnings of it. Accordingly, the following analysis will be structured in such a way that the social-theoretical reflection will mainly be based on texts from this early phase of his work, while the reconstruction of the temporal theory-of-society will mainly refer to texts from the middle phase of his work and in particular to Simmel’s thoughts on the money-economy. In some cases, however, the central texts of Simmel’s sociology of the time, such as “Die Großstadt und das Geistesleben” (1903/2006), can also be read as examples of social-theoretical and theory-of-society style arguments and are analyzed with respect to the interweaving of the two theoretical dimensions.

Simmel’s social-theory of time

To understand Simmel’s social-theory of time, we must turn towards his perspective on the social world as a form of living, what recent scholars refer to as his “life-sociology” (Kemple, 2018; Lash, 2005, 2010; Fitzi, 2016). These scholars frame Simmel’s sociological paradigm as a “life-sociological ‘action and structure theory’” (Fitzi, 2016: 60) and read his later life philosophical thoughts in Lebensanschauung (The View of Life) (Simmel, 1918/1994) as a coherent continuation of his earlier sociological a priori in Soziologie. Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung (1908). Thomas Kemple points us towards a central tension within Simmel’s sociological thinking that mirrors his perspective of the social world as “social-life”: “when we emphasize the term social then stable structures and well-defined systems tend to be highlighted, but when life is stressed then transformation and movements become more prominent” (2018: 110). Time, as the driving force of this flow, becomes a central moment in both Henri Bergson’s thinking and his adaption by Simmel. Both center around the question of how life is “manifested in duration (durée) and unceasing change, and how thought is enlivened through a constant process of association and dissociation” (11). To fully understand the core of Simmel’s sociological thought, we must understand how he conceptualizes the “dynamic fluxes and flows [temporal categories]” of life as “structured forms of association (Vergesellschaftung)” and what role time plays within these concepts (11). Thus, the following reconstruction of the basic ontological claims, subject-theoretical conceptualizations, and conceptualization of supra-individual processes of his life-sociology will show how Simmel’s social-theory is genuinely built upon a thinking with and through temporality.

Within the chapter “Transzendenz des Lebens” (transcendence of life) from Lebensanschauung (1918/1994), Simmel explicates the foundations of his epistemology of time and embeds it into his life philosophy. Inspired by Bergson’s idea of life as passing through the organic body of individuals (Kemple, 2018: 110), Simmel adopts a vitalist experience-based conception of time, according to which time only attains meaning in the realization of life and through the consciousness of the individual. He defines time as “the form of consciousness of what life itself is in an immediate concreteness that cannot be expressed, that can only be experienced” (Simmel, 1918/1994: 11, own translation). Time, for Simmel, is a procedural procession of sequences that transcend the punctual moment of the present (Gegenwartsmoment). Outside of life and the consciousness of human experience, time is timeless, so to speak, because “only life transcends the time-free present point of every other reality in both directions [past and future]” (Simmel, 1918/1994: 11, own translation). This organistic time concept, which is at the basis of Simmel’s life-sociology, is in stark contrast to a Newtonian mechanistic time, which consists of discrete and interchangeable elements and is subject to an external causation (Simmel, 1914/2000). On the contrary, at the heart of Simmel’s concern on the contrary is the lived time, which is the real, running time and how these fluxes of newness and creation are transformed into structured forms of objective social structures and rigidity through the process of association (69).

Underlying this procedural procession of sequences is a typical modernistic understanding of time as linearity. Simmel’s language reflects a conceptualization of the human experience of time in spatialized terms, whereby the flow of time is projected onto a plane. The spatial allegory “both directions” which he uses to describe the locality of past and future concerning the present reveals this linear thinking. This concept of a linear procession of time is also reflected in his understanding of time finding its realization within the individual spirit. Simmel claims: “In full purity, however, the living of the past into the present occurs only when life has reached the stage of the spirit […] For this purpose, it has two forms at its disposal: the objectification in concepts and images […] and the memory, with which the past of the subjective life not only becomes the cause of the present but is also transferred into it in relative immutability of its content” (Simmel, 1918/1944: 9, own translation). This sequential succession of temporal units and the idea that the past is realized within the present moment through memory reveal his consecutive linear understanding of time.

Simmel’s vitalist conceptualization of time experienced in the form of life contains subject-theoretical assumptions which have epistemological implications for Simmel’s social-theory and that we must unravel in what follows. Simmel’s late works reveal a subject that, in a vitalist manner, is conceived as a being of difference and produces what Simmel refers to as “life-time.” In Simmel’s view, life is fundamentally understood from the point of view of the indivisible individual, whose soul stands in relation to a total spirituality. Accordingly, it is also the delimited individual, through whom time flows in the form of a stream of life, that is the key to the following passage:

Only the bearers of them [present moments as extended past and future] (i.e. not those who have it, but who are these moments) are individuals, i.e. closed beings centered in themselves, unambiguously set off against each other. By flowing through individuals, or more correctly, as these individuals, the stream of life nevertheless accumulates in each of them, becomes a firmly delineated form and stands out both against its peers and against the environment with all its contents as a finished thing and does not tolerate any blurring of its scope. (Simmel 1918/1994: 12, own translation; my emphasis)

Simmel (1903/1950) understands human nature as determined by the delineation of boundaries and the making of distinctions. The human being as a being of difference (Unterschiedswesen), as he asserts in “Die Großstadt und das Geisteleben” is dependent on these demarcations for cognition, and consequently produces time as a processual sequence of past, present, and future.

If one only focuses on these elements of Simmel’s subject-theoretical claims and ignores the larger context of his philosophical and social-theoretical thoughts, one might simply find a reformulation of Kant’s subject-centered epistemological theory of time. This conclusion, however, would carelessly neglect the dual character of Simmel’s life-sociology. Its conceptual nature revolves around the question of how the individual contents are transformed into forms of association (Kemple, 2018: 111). This enables him to think of the subject as relational and always dependent on the objective culture and hence results in the theory of a culturally mediated temporality. By introducing the concepts of interactions (Wechselwirkungen) and the process of association (Vergesellschaftung) Simmel answers the social-theoretical question of how the existence of society is possible. In doing so he transcends traditional European philosophical horizons and introduce a new conceptual perspective on the supra-individual processes to explain not only how the individual produces time, but also of how the individual’s time is produced by objective culture. This interrelation between individual flow and social reproduction is mirrored in the temporal tension discussed by Simmel in terms of the distinction between natural and cultural time.

This distinction between natural and cultural time is most clear in the last chapter of his Philosophie des Geldes (1900/1958). Here, his thinking about time revolves around the rhythm of life and how this rhythm is influenced by different social forms. To approach this question, he assumes that human life flows according to a “natural rhythm” which is influenced by the objective culture. The “natural time” of (organic) life is understood by Simmel as a rhythmic rising and falling and is oriented towards an “external nature,” for example, in the change from day to night (552). This “natural rhythm” “can be described as the symmetry transferred to time, just as there is symmetry within space as a rhythm” and is ordered, continuous, and standardized (556). This once again indicates a spatialization of time. Simmel posits that the temporal sequencing and orientation of human actions are originally patterned in accordance with these natural rhythms. This serves both the conservation of energy by means of habits and routines and the fulfillment of the basic human need for a balance between “variety and stability” (553, own translation). In less cultivated societies the temporal organization and coordination of needs is strongly oriented to natural rhythms such as day and night times or seasonal fluctuations. By schematically contrasting culturally less developed and industrial societies, he demonstrates how sleeping times, mating times or birth rates were originally structured according to these natural rhythms. The greater the dependence of a community on nature, the more it is dependent on “natural time” and its rhythms in the timing of these activities (554). Culture and especially money liberate from this dependence on nature and natural times and enable a process of association (Vergesellschaftung) through the means of establishing a cultural time.

This cultural time is detached from natural rhythms and follows other regularities and logics, allowing for both individual flexibility in the temporal arrangement of human actions and a supra-individual coordination and alignment of activities. Thus, in the last chapter of Philosophie des Geldes, Simmel makes the distinction between natural rhythms and cultural time and formulates his culturalization of time thesis as follows: “In short, if culture, as one is accustomed to say, transcends not only space but also time, this means that the definiteness of temporal divisions no longer forms the compelling scheme for our doing and enjoying, but that this depends only on the relationship between our will and ability and the purely factual conditions of their operation” (Simmel, 1900/1958: 555, own translation). The “definiteness of temporal divisions” refers to the rhythms produced by a “natural time” where an immediate satisfaction of desire occurs. The organization of temporal frameworks as cultural time, on the other hand, is “freed from rhythm, and is more balanced to provide freedom and possible irregularities among individualities; in this differentiation, the elements of uniformity and diversity, which are united in rhythm, have diverged” (Simmel, 1900/1958: 555, own translation).

The central enabling conditions of this cultural time are objective cultural goods such as the telegraph and the telephone, artificial lighting, and the expansion of transportation (555). Despite the detachment from the “natural rhythm,” cultural time may also result in continuity and an arrangement of activities in time, which, however, follow a completely different logic. It no longer follows “the inner demands of physiological-psychological energetics” but “either directly the ruthlessly objective machine movement or the compulsion for the individual worker, as a member of a group of workers each of whom performs only a small partial process, to keep pace with the others” (559, own translation). Labor and its organization for the development of a cultural time is central to this point. Therefore, in his “Die Großstadt und das Geisteleben” essay, Simmel argues that “the technique of metropolitan life, in general, is not conceivable without all of its activities and reciprocal relationships being organized and coordinated most punctually into a firmly fixed framework of time which transcends all subjective elements” (13). These culturally mediated rhythms are integrated within a supra-individual framework that enables a group’s temporal organization. One might argue that the general logical functioning of this supra-individual framework can be seen as the necessary condition for social functioning as such; however, the characteristics and temporal norms vary historically and between different contexts.

Following Simmel, the object lesson (Denkobjekt) of the mealtime (Mahlzeit) is particularly well suited to illustrate this transcendence of naturality since the genuinely sociologically relevant temporal coordination becomes so transparent here. In his essay “Soziologie der Mahlzeit” he writes: “Now all the regulations about eating and drinking arise, not in the here unessential respect of the food as matter but concerning the form of its consumption. Firstly, the regularity of meals appears here. […] The commonality of the meal, however, immediately brings about a temporal regularity, because a group can come together only at a predetermined hour - the first overcoming of the naturalism of eating.” (Simmel, 1910/2000: 142, own translation). It is the communality of social interactions (Wechselwirkungen), which requires a simultaneity, here in the form of the meal, which inevitably produces a regularity of the temporal frame. I would like to draw attention to the concept of the communality of the meal specifically because it allows us to see that temporality is inevitably connected to the social and thus shows us how time plays a key role within Simmel’s social-theory.

This freedom from instinctive and immediate desire-satisfaction through the cultural framework of time also allows for the adaptation of rhythms of different social activities under this cultural-temporal function. To illustrate this point, Simmel compares the different patterns the framework creates in the rhythm of work and eating—that is a regular and repeated pattern:

This already indicates how much the rhythm of the meals ¬ and its counterpart - corresponds to that of the work. Also, here different sequences of quite different relations can be recognized. The natural man works exactly as irregularly as he eats. After tremendous exertions of strength, to which necessity or whim drives him, there follow periods of absolute laziness, both quite accidentally and alternating in an unprincipled way. Probably rightly, at least for the more northern countries, one has formed a fixed order of activities, a sensible rhythm of tension and relaxation of the forces, which began with plow-based agriculture. These rhythms reach an utmost degree approximately with the higher factory work and with the work in offices of all types. (Simmel, 1900/1958: 558, own translation)

Here, then, we see how the form of the cultural time frame that coordinates certain rhythms makes social gathering and interaction possible in the first place. The time frame’s contents as well as individual rhythms, in turn, vary and can be adapted to the respective purpose. They adapt and are transformed according to the complexity of the social structures and degrees of labor division. It is perhaps this part of his theory where the lines between social-theory and theories-of-society become most blurred. To clarify them, he makes this general social-theoretical distinction between natural rhythms and cultural time. The more complex societies get, the larger the objective culture becomes and the more reliant the constituents of society become on cultural time. Yet, it is unclear if Simmel thinks of the “natural-man,” as he calls the pre-modern man or uncivilized human being, as entirely lacking these culturally mediated times, or if this distinction is an a-priori for all human groups and interrelations (Wechselbeziehungen) within them and thus an essence of the social itself.

Lastly, Simmel’s social-theory of time contains elements of what we might refer to as temporal norms. These norms can be understood as a codex of rules around durations, timings, and sequences and coordinate both interindividual and supra-individual relationships. In his essay “Soziologie der Mahlzeit” he most accurately delineates how these norms affect the temporal shaping of a social event. The hierarchy of the meal refers to the establishment of social standards around the sequencing of the meal and sanctioning thereof, which he describes as follows:

In the same vein lies what might be called the hierarchy of the meal: that one no longer reaches into the bowl arbitrarily and at random, but that a certain order is observed in which one serves oneself; in the English trade clubs, the forerunners of today’s trade associations, a penalty was sometimes determined for someone drinking out of turn. (Simmel, 1910/2000: 142, own translation)

As much as temporal norms regarding timing and sequencing enable social gatherings to take place, they are also structured along gendered and class hierarchies of power. Simmel emphasizes this aspect when comparing the cultural patterns observant in the dining habits of different class-status groupings: “In the lower classes, where the meal is essentially centered around food according to its substance, no typical regulations of the eating gesture are formed. In the higher ones, where the attraction of being together to its – at least alleged – culmination in ‘society’ dominates the mere matter of the meal, there develop the manners intended for it, a code of rules from the holding of knife and fork to the appropriate topics of table conversation” (Simmel, 1910/2000: 143, own translation). Accordingly, a more complex differentiation of temporal norms around the holding of the mealtime is more likely to belong to the so-called higher strata.

The discussion of Simmel’s social-theory of time revealed the centrality of temporal concept for understanding how society is possible. His life-sociological thought is deeply concerned with questions of time, while his distinction between natural and cultural time becomes relevant to understand how a complex society’s functioning is possible. All these assumptions form the backbone of Simmel’s cultural analysis, through which he tries to understand what characterizes modernity’s temporal structures.

Simmel’s temporal theory-of-society

In Simmel’s temporal theory-of-society, time is essential to explain the structural principles of modernity that are wholly different from the archaic or more traditional forms of social organization. His major writings Philosophie des Geldes and “Metropolises and Mental Life” contain many of his observations regarding the uniqueness and newness of a modern social organization regarding temporal phenomena. The centrality of time for modernity can be seen in Simmel’s theses on the monetization of time, the standardization and metrics of clock time, and the acceleration of life rhythms.

Simmel’s book Philosophie des Geldes, from 1900 (revised in 1907), incorporates both elements of social-theory of money-economy (Geldwirtschaft) and a temporal theory of modern society. Geldwirtschaft should not be regarded merely as a contextless social form, which is unbound temporally or spatially, but rather as an organizing and structuring principle which is distinctive of modernity. Although the central work contains elements of social-theory and theory-of-society, Simmel does make distinct statements about specific temporal moments of modernity. He considers modernity to be determined by the social forms of the money-economy and different from pre-modern forms of society mainly in this respect. This argument becomes apparent in Simmel’s writing when he contrasts archaic forms of societies to the modern society characterized by money-economy in an ideal-typical fashion.

Simmel’s account “of how money assigns numerical values to qualitative differences and also how relationships among people and between things are calculated and quantified in terms of their price or value in exchange” (Kemple, 2018: 27) can be extended to these society-level notions of time. These are primarily addressed in terms of labor time and its impact on the rhythmic-temporal organization of everyday life contents. The following argument can be reconstructed from Simmel’s Philosophie des Geldes: in modernity, money transactions become quantified in terms of a price or value simultaneously. These transactions are also applied to one’s own time in the form of labor time. Money allows for this valuation of one’s own time and enables a subjectivation of time and more individual freedom over how this time is spent. Simmel describes the effect of monetization of time as follows: “Thus it [(money)] is the most effective means, […] for transforming a rhythm of living conditions from one that is compelling us into a supra-individual harmony and lack of fluctuation of the same, into one which allows our personal forces and interests a freer, on the one hand more individual, on the other hand more purely objective fulfillment.” (Simmel, 1900/1958, 559, own translation). This kind of monetization of time depends upon the subjectivation of time that was described above in terms of Simmel’s social-theory; it assumes the idea of ownership of time and attachment thereof to the individual as described in Simmel’s philosophy of life. Furthermore, the quantification of time in the form of money is the prerequisite of labor time as a commodity that can itself be structured and exchanged. Hence the capitalist money-economy must be accompanied by a specific kind of culturalization of time—the monetization of time itself. Modern wage labor in its first stage of development, in contrast to pre-industrial societies, depends on a more fixed way of coordinating time, which is at the same time freed from the natural rhythms of activities: “Probably rightly, at least for the more northern countries, a fixed order of activities, a sensible rhythm of tension and release of forces, merely began with plowlike agriculture. This rhythm reaches its extreme degree approximately with the higher factory work and with the work in offices of all kinds” (Simmel, 1900/1958: 558, own translation).

Simmel’s thesis regarding modern labor time, however, goes further than simply stating that time is money and that the organization of labor time leads to a rhythmic organization thereof. On a collective level, the money-economy has not only led to wage labor (Lohnarbeitertum) but has also made the rhythms of employment more flexible and uncertain which also affects the rhythm of life. Capitalistic economies are a lot more susceptible to fluctuations of the market than traditional economies. Simmel argues that, as a consequence of the monetization of time and the commodification of one’s labor time, which is valued and exchanged on a market is exposed to greater instabilities. This in turn affects the rhythm of life (i.e., the symmetry of activities in the course of time). This becomes again more uncertain in more developed industrial nations: “Thus capitalism and the corresponding economic individualization […] have made work as a whole […] into something much more uncertain, subject to much more random constellations than existed at the time of the guilds, when the greater stability of working conditions also gave the other contents of life of the day and year a much firmer rhythm” (Simmel, 1900/1958: 559, own translation).

This juxtaposition within the objective standardization processes can be seen in the quantification and fixing of the time frame with the individualization and flexibility of individual patterns represented by the flexibility of wage labor patterns. This juxtaposition is characteristic of Simmel’s sociological thought and his diagnosis of modern societies. In his essay “Das Geld und die moderne Culture” (Money and the Modern Culture), Simmel aptly sums up this fundamental tension as a structural feature of modernity:

If sociology wanted to formulate the contrast of the modern time to the Middle Ages, then it could try it with the following. In the Middle Ages, man is found in binding affiliation to a community or to a landed estate, to the feudal federation or to the corporation […] This uniformity has been destroyed by the newer times. On the one hand, it has placed the personality on its own and given it an incomparable inner and outer freedom of movement; on the other hand, it has given the factual contents of life an equally incomparable objectivity. (Simmel, 1884/1996: 187, own translation)

Analogously, this dichotomy can be found within Simmel’s temporal reflections on modernity’s culturalization of time, which finds its expression precisely in an objectively standardized grid and in the individual flexibility of rhythms. Hence in Simmel’s temporal theory-of-society we see how Simmel’s thinking about time is quite essentially shaped by his basic sociological-theoretical paradigms.

In “Die Großstadt und das Geisteleben” Simmel offers us the most detailed insights on the standardization and objectification of time as a process of culturalization characteristic of modern and urban life. Simmel published this essay in 1903 onwards, just 7 years after the German Kaiser decreed a new regulation of time according to Greenwich mean time. Previously, each city and region in Germany had its own time, based on the sun’s position. The local church clocks were calibrated accordingly. A traveler on foot or in a carriage could therefore set his pocket watch forward or backward by 1 minute every 18 km, depending on whether he was traveling in a westerly or easterly direction. From 1830, however, the desire to travel had increased rapidly due to a heavy increase in railroad tracks and travel. Between 1840 and 1880, more than 33,000 km of railroad tracks were laid in Germany and both travel and exchange were heavily affected by this (Goege, 2018). These new and quicker means of transportation, as enabled through the railway, connected cities along with a standardization of time and new (accelerated and coordinated) ways of commercial exchange between cities. It is this specific historical constellation and transformation process in which Simmel’s observations on the standardized time within the metropolis are embedded and which structure his temporal theory-of-society.

Due to the rise of the capitalist money-economy, the everyday organization of practices now required meticulous timing. Although one might question what the driving force is, or if money-economy can even be thought of as separate from the specific modern temporal-regime, the metrics and standardization of time in the form of clock-time are necessary prerequisites for a complex society based on the division of labor as described by Simmel in “Die Großstadt und das Geisteleben.” In the following passage the close interlinking of standardized temporal organization and the money-economy becomes apparent: “Because of the character of calculability which money has there come into relationships of the elements of life a precision and degree of certainty […] just as externally this precision has been brought about through the general diffusion of the pocket watch” (1903/1950: 13). In the metropolis of the early 20^th century, a cultural system of relations (Wechselwirkungen) develops between the materiality of the pocket watch as a technology of time-metrics, the cultural logic of calculability induced by the money-economy, and the individual subjects as an actor within this nexus—a nexus we might refer to as cultural time.

In the passage on the importance of clocks and pocket-watches in the metropolis, Simmel refers to the particularity that temporal coordination occupies within the modern monetary economy, as it is prevalent in the concentrated metropolis. While the analysis of Simmel’s social-theory revealed the necessity of supra-individual temporal coordination of the social as such, the perspective of a theory-of-society sharpens the focus of the specificity of the significance of this temporal coordination’s significance within the money-economy. “In the view of this fact the lack of the most exact punctuality in promises and performances would cause the whole to break down into inextricable chaos. If all the watches in Berlin suddenly went wrong in different ways even only as much as an hour, its entire economic and commercial life would be derailed for some time” (1903/1950: 13). The emergence of this standardized clock time, however, is a necessary but insufficient condition for the modern monetary economy of the metropolis. Beyond the standardization, an internalization of temporal norms is required for the structural functioning of the modern metropolis. Simmel carefully maps out modern temporal norms and assigns “punctuality, calculability, and exactness” as typical metropolitan norms and “irrational, instinctive, and sovereign” traits as typical of archaic or rural societies (13). The internalization of the temporal norms is further described by Simmel in terms of the threatened defeat of individual culture by objective culture in modern societies.

Some of the most culture-critical, or even pessimistic, elements of Simmel’s temporal theory-of-society are included in what may be called his acceleration thesis. In accordance with his general theoretical outlook both on the individual mind and the objective culture, Simmel locates these acceleration tendencies both within the form of life and the objective cultural production. In the last chapter of Philosophie des Geldes, for instance, Simmel traces the consequences of the multiplication of the quantum of money. Simmel claims that the increase of money causes an increased temptation to spend it and thus an increased turnover of commodities and an acceleration of economic imaginations (Simmel, 1900/1958: 570). The increasing speed of the circulation of money, in turn, has a direct impact on the pace of life. If we recall Simmel’s definition of time as an experience bound to life and the individual’s cognition, we can understand how he establishes a diagnosis for the correlation between the objective increase of the rate of change and the acceleration of time. According to Simmel, because the individual is a being of differences and distinctions (Unterschiedswesen), he or she experiences time as a sequential succession of the past, the present, and the future. If this sequential order is attached to a material commodity culture, which has a higher turnover rate within the money-economy, the automatic result must be an acceleration of the experienced time. In his essay “Die Bedeutung des Geldes für das Tempo des Lebens” (“The Importance of Money for the Pace of Life”) brings together these two arguments by claiming, “not the time of life can pass faster or slower, but the same unit of time can have more or less emphasized, sharply differentiated, consciousness arousing contents and thus determine the pace of life as a faster or slower one” (Simmel, 1897/1992: 217, own translation). The application of this social-theoretical mechanism to the social-diagnostic observation of the money-economy finds its expression in the following statement: “From all this it follows to what extent money-designates the increase of the pace of life, as it is measured by the number and variety of impressions flowing in and superseding each other.” (Simmel, 1900/1958: 577, own translation).

The effects this phenomenon has on life forms are a central concern to Simmel’s temporal theory-of-society. In this respect, Simmel emphasizes “the tendency of money to flow together […] to accumulate in localized centers […] this tendency and ability of money has the psychic effect of increasing the colorfulness and fullness of life, that is, its tempo” (Simmel, 1900/1958: 577, own translation). These effects on mental life are further explained in “Die Großstadt und das Geisteleben.” With respect to his understanding of life in the form of a stream of consciously experienced sequences, he describes how the quantity and speed of these sequences have increased within urban modernity. Again Simmel uses an ideal-typical contrast to accentuate his acceleration thesis: “To the extent that the metropolis creates these psychological conditions – with every crossing of the street, with the tempo and multiplicity of economic, occupational and social life – it creates in the sensory foundations of mental life, and the degree of awareness necessitated by our organization as creatures dependent on differences, a deep contrast with the slower, more habitual, more smoothly flowing rhythm of the sensory-mental phase of town and rural existence” (Simmel, 1903/1950: 12). Thus, one of the distinctive structural principles of urban modernity is the constant acceleration of social, economic, and occupational life.

Correspondingly, in line with Simmel’s dualism of mental life versus the sovereign powers of society, we find similar accelerative tendencies within his descriptions of the objective culture in his 1911 essay “Der Begriff und die Tragödie der Kultur” (“The Concept and Tragedy of Culture”). The money-economy’s increasing speed of circulation likewise leads to an increased speed of cultural production, be it knowledge, goods, or cultural trends. This acceleration of objective cultures production as a result of the monetary transactions tendency to enhance and mobilize all forms of societal transactions can be seen as the central cause of the “tragedy of culture” (Rosa, 2018: 552, Simmel, 1911/1996; Schäfer, 2018). Coupled with the division of labor, this increased speed of circulation of money detaches the produced good more and more from the producer and thus leads to potentially unlimited multiplication of the contents of objective culture. Simmel concludes that this growth results in “a logic and dynamic […] that carries away the contents of culture with ever-increasing acceleration and distance from the purpose of culture” (Simmel, 1911/1996: 416, own translation). The purpose of culture is the subject’s cultivation, which is in its essence the soul’s path to itself (416). By the means of culture, the subject objectifies itself through the means of culture, and “returns to oneself with the enrichment from this creation” (416). With an ever-growing and accelerating objective culture, subjective culture fails to keep up with these developments and becomes ever more distant and alienated from it. Accordingly, we can state at this point that acceleration is a central component of the complex causes of the tragedy of culture as attested by Simmel.

Conclusion

At the core of Simmel’s sociology is the question of how society is possible (Simmel, 1908: 27). In approaching this question, Simmel, typical of the classical thinkers of our discipline, takes two paths: that of social-theory and that of the theory-of-society. Both paths intersect, with sociality being fundamentally determined by its temporality. This paper aims to examine Georg Simmel’s sociology of time along those two paths. The advantage of such a systematic distinction between social and societal theory is that it makes it possible to consider Simmel’s thoughts about time, which have been lost due to a long focus on his formal sociology. The re-evaluation of some of Simmel’s key writings could show that for Simmel an understanding of how society is possible also requires its theorization with respect to time. As systematic explorations of Simmel’s social-theoretical claims are not available, this paper offers both a new perspective on the importance of time for the social, as well as on the distinctive characteristics of classical sociological theory as compared to contemporary sociological theory. A further advantage of such a perspective is that it allows us to take Simmel, who is often read as an unsystematic thinker, seriously in his writing about time in its continuities. This was achieved by showing how Simmel’s social-theory of time contains a cross-work integration of certain social-theoretical paradigms such as the simultaneity of objective standardization and individual flexibilization.

Concerning Simmel’s social-theory of time, a coherent heuristic was elaborated, which extracted the most important aspects of the epistemological foundations, supra-individual processes, and norms that give meaning and value to temporality. For this purpose, the social-theoretical questions were answered to what extent he considers time itself to be a genuine social phenomenon and in what way his basic concepts include temporal presuppositions. First and foremost, Simmel adopts an experience-based conception of time, with time only attaining meaning in the realization of life and through the consciousness of the individual. Furthermore, Simmel’s supra-individual culturalization of time in the form of interrelations (Wechselbeziehungen) was explored. This culturalization of time is described by Simmel in terms of a distinction between natural and cultural time, through which the geometrical alignment of activities in time is released from natural rhythms and is adapted to other social needs, such as the division of labor or the reproduction of classed and gendered hierarchies of power. In this part of the analysis, I emphasized that the friction in Simmel’s sociological theory between individual flux and objective rigidity is reflected within this supra-individual cultural framework of time. Simmel’s theory-of-society is no less elaborate and tries to demarcate modernity’s temporal structures from pre-modern societies. This paper demonstrates that temporal aspects are indispensable in his diagnosis of modernity and cultural critique. For Simmel, the valuation of monetization of time, its standardization, and acceleration of its pace are distinct elements of a modern society that is influenced by the monetary economy.

I end my reflections on Simmel’s sociology of time on a critical note. In general, the systematic consideration of these temporal elements of sociological theory or modern theoretical thinking need not remain an end in itself. However, this consideration is a necessary first step to enable a critical reflection on the self-production of Western people as the owners of a “civilized” cultural time. As can be seen, especially in the overlaps between social-theory and theories-of-society in the demarcation of natural time versus cultural time, however tentative or broadly formulated, this attempt at an anthropological construction of temporality implies certain notions of cultural superiority. Firstly, it should be noted that the comparison of “simple societies” and “complex/differentiated/developed societies” is made along with implicit assumptions of a linear development from “lower” to “higher” levels of culture. Furthermore, there is a certain degree of functionalism in Simmel’s theory; the emergence of a technique (e.g., of time determination) is only connected with its functional necessity according to a social degree of development. Ultimately, Simmel seems to embrace a modernist/modernization-theoretical philosophy of history. This could serve as a starting point for further research; the construction of a Western cultural time as superior to “natural” time seems to me to be both an under-researched and worthwhile endeavor.