In her assessment of Ansoff (1993), Kenwood (1996) argues that there is room for personal volition and agency in social constructionism. This assertion is examined in light of the social constructionist doctrine of ontological mutism enunciated by Gergen, according to which any ontological commitment is refused and `whatever is, simply is'. An ontology of the individual-as-agent is considered, and the consequences of ontological mutism are explored. It is argued that a clear commitment to the grounding assumptions of some settled ontology is a prerequisite for coherent considerations of agency or even volition, because without such a commitment it is impossible to decide what exists and if it moves.
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