Classifying and Clarifying: A Reply to Van Hezewijk

Abstract

In response to Van Hezewijk's comments, I argue, first, that I have a less stringent view of comparing theories than he assumes. My aim is to provide a rough guideline for identifying intellectual undercurrents ('clarifying') rather than defining features for category membership of theories ('classifying'). Second, I maintain that rationalism and naturalism are useful diagnostic terms indicating two broad methodological options in psychology: the crux of the distinction is whether functional and adaptive considerations enter into perceptual explanations. Put thus, I feel the naturalism-rationalism distinction, without being absolutely clear-cut or exhaustive, gauges a deep controversy between ecological psychology and the representationalist mainstream. Third, I defend my claim that Marr is in an important sense a supporter of Gibsonian naturalism. In Marr, as well as in Gibson, the structure of the environment is a factor in psychological explanation, whereas Fodor and classical psychophysics hold that only the physical impact on the sensory surface counts.