The argument that only a weak version of social constructionism allows for a generative psychology and therefore honors the pragmatic standard is challenged by Botschner, who claims that the proposed advantages of weak constructionism are not clear. Botschner's comments seem to stem from a number of misconceptions about the original argument and from some points of divergence in the reading of Wittgenstein and James. These misconceptions are addressed and the original argument is clarified.
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