The distinction proposed by Davidson (1963, 1980, 1987) between causes and reasons in the explanation of action is examined in the context of traditional positions on the issue of determinism and the will, and in light of causation theories advanced by Aristotle and Hume. It is suggested that explanations of volition limited to efficient causation and variance-partitioning approaches in empirical research are deficient, and that psychology should explicitly incorporate established philosophical positions on the will into emerging theories of volition.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
1.
Aristotle . (1941a). On the generation of animals. In R. McKeon (Ed.), The basic works of Aristotle (pp. 665-680). New York: Random House.
2.
Aristotle . (1941b). Physics. In R. McKeon (Ed.), The basic works of Aristotle (pp. 218-394). New York: Random House.
3.
Aristotle . (1941c). Metaphysics. In R. McKeon (Ed.), The basic works of Aristotle (pp. 689-926). New York: Random House.
4.
Bandura, A. (1989). Human agency in social cognitive theory. American Psycholaogist, 44, 1175-1184.
5.
Cross, S. , & Markus, R. (1990). The willful self. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 16, 726-742.
6.
Davidson, D. (1963). Actions, reasons and causes. Journal of Philosophy, 60, 685-700.
7.
Davidson, D. (1980). Agency. In Essays on actions and events (pp. 43-61). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
8.
Davidson, D. (1987). Problems in the explanation of action. In P. Pettit (Ed.), Metaphysics and morality (pp. 35-49). New York: Blackwell.
9.
Deese, J. (1985). American freedom and the social sciences. New York: Columbia University Press.
10.
Gergen, K.J. (1985). The social constructionist movement in modern psychology. American Psychologist, 40, 266-275.
11.
Ghez, C. (1985). Introduction to the motor systems. In E.R. Kandell & J.H. Schwartz (Eds.), Principles of neural science (pp. 429-442). New York: Elsevier.
12.
Harcum, E. (1991a). Behavioral paradigm for a psychological resolution of the free will issue. Journal of Mind and Behavior, 12, 93-114.
13.
Harcum, E. (1991b). The relative utility of complementary disparate views on voluntarism and determinism. Journal of Psychology, 125, 217-228.
14.
Harré, R. (1992). On being taken on by others. In D.N. Robinson (Ed.), Social discourse and moral judgement (pp. 61-74). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
15.
Hershberger, W.A. (1989). Synergy of action. In W.A. Hershberger (Ed.), Volitional action: Conation and control (pp. 3-20). New York: Elsevier Science.
16.
Hollandsworth, S. (1990, February). The codependency conspiracy. Texas Monthly, 110-137.
17.
Howard G. , & Conway, C.G. (1986). Can there be an empirical science of volitional action?American Psychologist, 41, 1241-1251.
18.
Howard, G. , Curtin D., & Johnson, A. (1991). Point estimation techniques in psychological research: Studies on the role of meaning in self-determined action. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 38, 219-226.
19.
Howard, G. , Youngs, W., & Siatczynski, A. (1989). A research strategy for studying telic human behavior. Journal of Mind and Behavior, 10, 393-412.
20.
Hume, D. (1739/1967). A treatise of human nature. (L.A. Selby-Bigge, Ed.). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
21.
James, W. (1890/1950). The principles of psychology (Vol. 2). New York: Dover.
22.
Lamiell, J. (1990). Explanation in the psychology of personality. Annals of Theoretical Psychology, 6, 153-192.
23.
Lashley, K. (1951). The problem of serial order in behavior. In F. Beach, C. Morgan, D. Hebb, & H. Nissen (Eds.), The neuropsychology of Lashley: Selected papers (pp. 507-529). New York: McGraw-Hill.
24.
Mill, J.S. (1843/1875). System of logic (Vol. 2, 9th ed.). London: Longmans, Green, Reader & Dyer.
25.
Mook, D.G. (1987). Motivation: The organization of action. New York: W.W. Norton.
26.
Polli o, H. , & Henley, T. (1991). Empirical and philosophical reactions to Harcum's `Behavioral paradigm for a psychological resolution of the free will issue'. Journal of Mind and Behavior, 12, 115-134.
27.
Powers, W.T. (1989). Volition: A semi-scientific essay. In W.A. Hershberger (Ed.), Volitional action: Conation and control (pp. 21-38). New York: Elsevier.
28.
Reid, T. (1764/1967). Inquiry into the human mind. In H.M. Bracken (Ed.), Thomas Reid: Philosophical works (Vol. 1; ed. and discussed by Sir William Hamilton; pp. 95-201). Hildesheim: Georg Olms.
29.
Reid, T. (1788/1967). Essays on the active powers of the human mind. In H.M. Bracken (Ed.), Thomas Reid: Philosophical works (Vol. 2; ed. and discussed by Sir William Hamilton; pp. 511-670). Hildesheim: Georg Olms.
30.
Robinson, D.N. (1978). On reasons and causes in psychological explanations. Paper presented at the annual convention of the American Psychological Association, Toronto, Canada.
31.
Robinson, D.N. (1985). Philosophy of psychology. New York: Columbia University Press.
32.
Robinson, D.N. (1989). Aristotle's psychology. New York: Columbia University Press.
33.
Rychlak, J. (1991). Some theoretical and methodological questions concerning Harcum's proposed resolution of the free will issue. Journal of Mind and Behavior, 12, 135-150.
34.
Sauvayre, P. , & Auerbach, C. (1990). Free will, identity, and primary creativity. New Ideas in Psychology, 8, 221-230.
35.
Shotter, J. (1990). Knowing of the third kind. Utrecht: ISOR.
36.
Shotter, J. (1992). Social constructivism: Relativism, moral sources and judgements of adequacy. In D.N. Robinson (Ed.), Social discourse and moral judgement (pp. 183-204). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
37.
Smith, N. (1954). Determinists and libertarians. Mind, 63, 317-337.
38.
Taylor, R. (1967). Determinism. In P. Edwards (Ed.), Encyclopedia of philosophy (Vol. 2, pp. 359-378). New York: Macmillan.
39.
Tipton, I. (1988). Freedom of the will. In G.H.R. Parkinson (Ed.), The handbook of western philosophy (pp. 489-503). New York: Macmillan.
40.
Wundt, W. (1894/1977). Lectures on human and animal psychology (J.E. Creighton and E.B. Titchener, Trans.). London: Swan Sonnenschein. [Reissued; edited and prefaced by D.N. Robinson: University Publications of America.]
