In their commentary on Lopes (1991), Oaksford and Chater (1992) assume that (1) the psychological literature was once rife with presumptions of normative rationality; (2) bias research illustrates the bounded rationality viewpoint; and (3) people would not violate rational rules if they knew the correct rule and were relieved of the need for computation. Although these assumptions are shared by many, none stands up to scrutiny.
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