This paper proposes the development and formalization of a model, already implicit in much philosophy of science, as a vehicle for moving to the unification of theories in psychology and the social sciences. Its two essential foundations are (i) an emphasis on process rather than structure (or actions rather than things) and (ii) the analysis of phenomena of interest to psychology on an indeterminate number of levels. Processes on each level provide a description of the phenomena, and are related to processes at lower and higher levels, such that at each level they provide structure for levels above. It is proposed that existing scientific theories are legitimate at their own levels, but should be articulated into a complete model of reality on the basis of processes rather than reduced to the neural or any other level on the basis of structure.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
1.
Ayala, F.J. , & Dobzhansky, T. (Eds.). (1974). Studies in the philosophy of biology. London: Macmillan.
2.
Beckner, M. (1974). Reduction, hierarchies and organicism. In F.J. Ayala & T. Dobzhansky (Eds.), Studies in the philosophy of biology. London: Macmillan.
3.
Bloor, D. (1976). Knowledge and social imagery. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
4.
Bohm, D. (1957). Causality and chance in modern physics. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
5.
Breakwell, G.M. , & Rowett, C. (1982). Social work: A social psychological approach. Wokingham, Van Nostrand Reinhold.
6.
Campbell, D.T. (1974). 'Downward causation' in hierarchically organised biological systems. In F.J. Ayala & T. Dobzhansky (Eds.), Studies in the philosophy of biology. London: Macmillan.
7.
Chalmers, A. (1990). Science and its fabrication. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.
8.
Churchland, P.M. (1986). Some reductive strategies in cognitive neurobiology. Mind, 95, 279-309.
9.
Churchland, P.M. (1988). Matter and consciousness: A contemporary introduction to the theory of mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
10.
Churchland, P.S. (1986). Neurophilosophy: Toward a unified science of mind-brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
11.
Churchland, P.S. (1988). The significance of neuroscience for philosophy. Trends in Neurosciences, 11, 304-307.
12.
Clarke, D.D. , & Crossland, J. (1985). Action systems: An introduction to the analysis of complex behaviour. London: Methuen.
13.
Doise, W. (1986). Levels of explanation in social psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
14.
Feyerabend, P. (1975). Against method. London: New Left Books.
15.
Gergen, K.J. (1973). Social psychology as history. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 26, 309-320.
16.
Gleick, J. (1987). Chaos: Making a new science. London: Heinemann.
17.
Hannay, A. (Ed.). (1986). Symposium on Patricia Smith Churchland'sNeurophilosophy. Inquiry, 29(2), 139-272.
18.
Harrd, R. (1979). Social being. Oxford: Blackwell.
19.
Harré, R. (1980). Man as rhetorician. In A.J. Chapman & D.M. Jones (Eds.), Models of man. Leicester: British Psychological Society.
20.
Harré, R. , Clarke, D., & de Carlo, N. (1985). Motives and mechanisms. London: Methuen.
21.
Hawking, S.W. (1988). A brief history of time. London: Bantam.
22.
Henriques, J. , Hollway, W., Urwin, C., Venn, C., & Walkerdine, V. (1984). Changing the subject. London: Methuen.
23.
Hooker, C.A. (1981). Towards a general theory of reduction. Part I: Historical and scientific setting. Part II: Identity in reduction. Part III: Cross-categorized reduction. Dialogue, 20, 38-59, 201-236, 496-529.
24.
Kimble, G.A. (1989). Psychology from the standpoint of a generalist. American Psychology, 44, 491-499.
25.
Margolis, J. (1984). Philosophy of psychology. Englewood-Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
26.
McGuire, W.J. (1983). A contextualist theory of knowledge: Its implications for innovation and reform in psychological research. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 16, 1-47.
27.
Miller, J.G. (1978). Living systems. New York: McGraw Hill.
28.
Mulkay, M. (1979). Science and the sociology of knowledge. London: Allen & Unwin.
29.
Paranjpe, A.C. (1989). Towards a pluralist approach to psychology: A metatheoretical critique of the unity of science model. In D.M. Keats, D. Munro, & L. Mann (Eds.), Heterogeneity in cross-cultural psychology. Lisse: Swets & Zeitlinger.
30.
Phillips, D.C. (1987). Philosophy, science and social enquiry. New York: Pergamon.
31.
Popper, K.R. , & Eccles, J.C. (1977). The self and its brain. New York: Springer International.
32.
Potter, J. , & Wetherell, M. (1987). Discourse and social psychology. London: Sage.
33.
Quine, W.V.O. (1980). From a logical point of view. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
34.
Smithson, M. (1987). Fuzzy set analysis for the behavioral and social sciences. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Turner, J.C. (1987). Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory. Oxford: Blackwell.
37.
Tyler, F.B. (1989). A psychosocial perspective on cross-cultural unity in psychology. In D.M. Keats, D. Munro, & L. Mann (Eds.), Heterogeneity in cross-cultural psychology. Lisse: Swets & Zeitlinger.
38.
Weinberg, G.M. , & Weinberg, D. (1979). On the design of stable systems. New York: Wiley.
39.
Woolgar, S. (1988). Science: The very idea. London: Tavistock.
