Abstract
Tajfel and Turner's (1979, 1986) social identity theory, the minimal group paradigm with which the theory is associated and two core findings stemming from that paradigm are the focus of this paper. The development of the social identity concept is reviewed, and particular detail is devoted to the empirical basis of the theory, given that the theory was constructed to account for these data. It is found that the data are replete with weaknesses-confounds and susceptibility to alternative explanations-and that these weaknesses have gone largely unheeded. A careful inspection of the theory reveals that it is a reductionistic approach to individual identity or self: the theory specifies in no manner the psychological state of the individual prior to entry into the `ingroup', and in turn the individual's social identity is then equated with physical presence in a group, whereby membership is brought about not by psychological forces, but by arbitrary assignment. Two alternative, social-psychological theories are reviewed that serve as riper candidates for the generating of psychological hypotheses regarding the individual's approach towards and avoidance of, identification with and distancing from, other individuals and groups. It is concluded that social identity theory is little more than its own minimal paradigm, and is superfluous as an account of systematic social-psychological phenomena.
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