Affective experience in neuroscience and phenomenology: An epistemological analysis of emotions and feelings

Abstract

This paper proposes an investigation of affective experience bridging the field of phenomenology and cognitive neuroscience. Drawing on Husserl’s phenomenology and the mainstream cognitive neuroscience approach, I will differentiate affective phenomena into two categories: emotions and feelings. According to neuroscience, Panksepp’s proposal is followed to further distinguish three forms of emotional processes. I propose that neuroscience holds greater heuristic value in the primary and secondary processes of affective experience, which can be defined as emotions, while phenomenology acquires greater significance in the third level, which I interpret as being related to feelings. Epistemological details of neuroscience are introduced to distinguish two distinct approaches to the measurement of emotions and feelings. This brief insight into empirical methodologies is crucial to justify the introduction of phenomenological analyses.

After a brief introduction to the phenomenological method, this paper proposes a series of phenomenological analyses to demonstrate how complex affective phenomena, such as desires and feelings, can be investigated. Such an approach will refer to intentionality, constitutive functions, and experiential layers. This does not necessarily contradict neuroscience, but it allows us to introduce new insights into the classifications of feelings that, in the long run, may influence empirical research.