In their critique of Klein (2014b), Trafimow and Earp present two theses. First, they argue that, contra Klein, a well-specified theory is not a necessary condition for successful replication. Second, they contend that even when there is a well-specified theory, replication depends more on auxiliary assumptions than on theory proper. I take issue with both claims, arguing that (a) their first thesis confuses a material conditional (what I said) with a modal claim (Trafimow and Earp’s misreading of what I said) and (b) their second thesis has the unfortunate consequence of refuting their first thesis.
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