Although clinical diagnosis of delusions is usually not difficult, defining delusions is more complicated. This study analyzes the concept of delusions, in particular persecutory delusions. Patients with persecutory delusions are convinced of others’ malicious intentions and are impervious to counterevidence. Conventionally, expression of intention is accepted at face value unless contradictory evidence is available. First-person authority regarding intention is respected in human society. Contemporary philosophy tends to limit the scope of first-person authority, but it cannot be eliminated. Persecutory delusions contravene first-person authority as one of the fundamental principles of daily life, even in the absence of malicious intention on the part of the patients. Two ways of denying others’ first-person authority are investigated. This study adds new insight to Manfred Spitzer’s formal definition of delusions.
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