The cat came back: Evaluating arguments against psychological measurement

Abstract

The possibility or impossibility of quantitative measurement in psychology has important ramifications for the nature of psychology as a discipline. Trendler’s (2009) argument for the impossibility of psychological measurement suggests a general and potentially fruitful strategy for further research on this question. However, the specific argument offered by Trendler appears flawed in several respects. It seems to conflate what must hold true with what one must know and also equivocate on the necessary evidence. Moreover, if the argument supported its conclusion, it would rule out qualitative discourse on psychology as well as psychological measurement. Taking Trendler’s argument as an example, one can formulate a general structure to arguments adopting the same basic strategy. An overview of the requirements that such arguments should meet provides a metatheoretical perspective that can assist authors in constructing such arguments and readers in critically evaluating them.

Keywords

measurement philosophy of science psychometrics quantity validity

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