This paper explores three connected claims about the interrelation of psychology and neuroscience that occur in discussions within theoretical psychology. The first and second claims are that neuroscience cannot offer a complete account of human psychology because it can show only correlations between neural events and cognitive or behavioral events. The third claim is that neuroscience ultimately is incomplete or irrelevant to psychological accounts since it is silent on crucial cultural and historical issues relevant to human knowledge and action. We argue that all of these claims are false, not because neuroscience can replace psychology, but because each discipline should be seen to complement and support the other.
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