Abstract
Paradigm change is a special type of conceptual change, but what makes it special? A useful strategy for analysing conceptual changes is to identify and then contrast the respective sets of judgement criteria in play before and after the change. Several types of conceptual change can thus be structurally distinguished within moral, aesthetic as well as cognitive domains. This strategy also makes it possible to identify the specific structure of what Kuhn called paradigm change, which I suggest can be seen as a form of criterion mutation and concomitant domain transformation. This fits well with the claim made in recent conceptual change literature that there is a structural similarity between various forms of collective and individual conceptual change, particularly in the history of the sciences and corresponding approaches to science education. In both cases, local incommensurability between the stages, as opposed to acommensurability, is the hallmark of paradigm change.
Keywords
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
