The main question of this contribution is how to define a (relatively) autonomous psychological level. It will be introduced by some remarks on the general problem of reduction and explanatory levels. The arguments for a psychological level will be applied to the question: in what sense can (mental) causation figure in psychological explanations? As it turns out, much depends on what, precisely, we want to know: are we interested in psychological questions about events at the neurological, physiological level; or in psychological questions about meaningful actions in intersubjective contexts?
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