Sage Journals: Discover world-class research

Abstract

We chart our agreements and disagreements with Wallach and Wallach's (2001) arguments. After listing some areas of agreement, we then make four arguments that undermine the Wallachs' project. First, we argue the discovery of `laws' is a goal neither of scientists nor of the discipline. Second, we suggest the Wallachs' claim that social psychological theories are infused with unfalsifiable theories about the nature of psychological variables misses the logical distinction between measurement models and conceptual hypotheses. Third, we look at the role that circularity plays in deductive logic and conclude that circularity is rarely a serious problem in practice. Fourth, we examine what effect bits of research have on scientific progress, and argue that `non-progressive' papers do not hinder progress. The best response to the Wallachs' concerns about social psychology is provided by a glance at progress within the field today. The state is very good; circularities, tautologies and untested assumptions do not pose a significant threat to progress in the science of social psychology.

Keywords

circularity scientific progress social psychology experiments tautology

Get full access to this article

View all access options for this article.

References

Chomsky, N. (1992). What Uncle Sam really wants. Berkeley, CA: Odonian Press.

Duhem, P. (1954). Aim and structure of physical theory. New York: Atheneum. (Original work published 1906.)

Feyerabend, P. (1975). Against method. London: New Left Books.

Heider, F. (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York: Wiley.

Hempel, C.G. (1962). Aspects of scientific explanation. In C.G. Hempel (Ed.), Aspects of scientific explanation and other essays in the philosophy of science, Vol. 3 (pp. 98-169). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Horgan, J. (1996). The end of science. New York: Broadway Books.

Hull, D.L. (1988). Science as a process. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Kitcher, P. (1993). The advancement of science. New York: Oxford University Press.

Kuhn, T.S. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions (2nd ed.). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

10.

Lakatos, I. (1970). Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes. In I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave (Eds.), Criticism and the growth of knowledge (pp. 91-196). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

11.

Latour, B. (1987). Science in action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

12.

Laudan, L. (1977). Progress and its problems. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

13.

Polanyi, M. (1958). Personal knowledge. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

14.

Popper, K. (1959). The logic of discovery. London: Hutchinson.

15.

Quine, W.V.O. (1961). Two dogmas of empiricism. In W.V.O. Quine (Ed.) From a logical point of view (2nd ed.; pp. 22-46). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Original work published 1953.)

16.

Quine, W.V.O. , & Ullian, J.S. (1970). The web of belief. New York: Random House.

17.

Schaller, M. , & Crandall, C.S. (1998). On the purposes served by psychological research and its critics. Theory & Psychology, 8, 205-212

18.

Schaller, M. , Crandall, C.S. , Stangor, C. , & Neuberg, S.L. (1995). `What kinds of social psychology experiments are of value to perform?' A reply to Wallach and Wallach (1994). Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 611-618.

19.

Wallach, L. , & Wallach, M.A. (2001). Experiments in social psychology: Science or self-deception? Theory & Psychology, 11(4), 451-473.

Social Psychology and the Pragmatic Conduct of Science

Abstract

Keywords

Get full access to this article

References