Abstract
I defend my earlier position that operational definition is a ritual procedure that obscures and misleads psychologists about the nature of science. I use examples from Grace's (2001) paper and briefly sketch new problems for operationism as an approach to mentalistic vocabulary. I conclude that operationism is not the theoretically neutral technique it is purported to be, but instead endorses behaviorism and anti-realism in philosophy of science.
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