Sharrock and Coulter (1999) complain that I have ignored their arguments. They rely more on assertion and appeal to authority than on argument but make clear here (what was before uncertain) that, in their view, there is no place at all for empirical psychology; no gap needing to be filled between natural language and neurophysiology. I consider the views of the authorities cited (Ryle and Wittgenstein) and suggest that neither will serve their purpose. There is a place for psychology, though its achievements have so far been unimpressive. Help is required from philosophy-Husserl and Polanyi are the most likely sources.
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