Abstract
We show that the old Czechoslovak personal tax system was opaque, inequitable and neg lected adverse incentive effects, because in large part it was being used as an instrument of social policy to encourage family formation, growth and support. We also show that because the old system's distribution effects can be generated by a simple linear tax system, its extraordinary complexity was entirely unnecessary. An analysis of the new direct tax systems of the Czech Republic and Slovakia show that they are both more progressive than their predecessors, and yet still retain some reduced influences of the now less emphasized pro-natalist policy. The new tax and benefit arrangements of the Czech Republic are incor porated in a tax-benefit model which is used to show that the variety of household preferences and circumstances within any group - social, income or geographical is such that even minor revenue-neutral changes can produce unex pected distributional results which social policy advisors and analysts need to consider.
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