Neither scientists nor the green lobby alone have driven the climate change story. A whole range of 'political actors', ranging from energy interests to international bureaucracies, has been involved. All found appeals to 'science' useful. This has created serious difficulties for scientific research where the pressure to create consensus must be replaced by the freedom to argue and debate, to test different theories and empirical sources. For the sake of both science and policy, therefore, the greenhouse debate 'must stay on the boil' a bit longer, with scientists and their environmental camp followers treating the rest of us as grown-ups. They need to air their arguments, not just hand our conclusions and prescriptions. It is most unlikely that the debate will be resolved in the short run by science. Science will remain a servant of politics, and should therefore take great care in what it offers and how it responds to opportunities. Short-termism may not only be the fate of politicians.
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