Political competition is reflected in the strategic interaction of regional government's behavioral motivation driven by “official tournament.” Especially since environmental protection was officially included in the official performance appraisal system in 2005, the interactive trend of local governments’ economic development and environmental protection is more obvious. The policy uncertainty caused by this interaction is a major challenge for the government to promote regional sustainable development. Different from previous studies that only focus on the impact of political competition on environmental governance, this paper studies the impact of political competition on the low-carbon technology innovation from the perspective of sustainable development. Combined with the characteristics of Provincial Party Secretaries and Provincial Governors, the influence mechanism of political competition on low-carbon technology innovation is analyzed based on the method of spatial dubin model. Firstly, it finds that political competition has a significant negative impact on low-carbon technology innovation in the region and its adjacent regions, which is mainly caused by the political competition of Provincial Governors, while the political competition of Provincial Party Secretaries has no significant impact on low-carbon technology innovation. Secondly, the results of the mediation effect test show that reducing the intensity of environmental regulation in exchange for economic growth and political promotion opportunities is one of the reasons why the political competition of Provincial Governors inhibits low-carbon technology innovation. Thirdly, the results of the heterogeneity test of official characteristics show that the age of Provincial Governors is less and the tenure is longer, the stronger the inhibiting effect of Provincial Governors’ political competition on low-carbon technology innovation is. These conclusions provide policy suggestions for enterprises to make environmental investment decisions under different political environments.
SahooSKumarAUpadhyayA. How do green knowledge management and green technology innovation impact corporate environmental performance? Understanding the role of green knowledge acquisition[J]. Business Strategy Environ2023; 32: 551–569.
2.
SharifAKocakSKhanHHA, et al.Demystifying the links between green technology innovation, economic growth, and environmental tax in ASEAN-6 countries: the dynamic role of green energy and green investment[J]. Gondwana Res2023; 115: 98–106.
3.
DeshengLJiakuiCNingZ. Political connections and green technology innovations under an environmental regulation[J]. J Cleaner Prod2021; 298: 126778.
4.
LiGGuoFDiD. Regional competition, environmental decentralization, and target selection of local governments[J]. Sci Total Environ2021; 755: 142536.
5.
YangTLiaoHWeiY. Local government competition on setting emission reduction goals[J]. Sci Total Environ2020; 745: 141002.
6.
XuYGeWLiuG, et al.The impact of local government competition and green technology innovation on economic low-carbon transition: new insights from China[J]. Environ Sci Pollut Res2023; 30: 23714–23735.
7.
ManG. Political competition and economic growth: a nonlinear relationship?[J]. Eur J Polit Econ2014; 36: 287–302.
8.
KahnMELiPZhaoD. Water pollution progress at borders: the role of changes in China's political promotion incentives[J]. Am Econ J: Econ Policy2015; 7: 223–242.
9.
JiangSLiJ. Do political promotion incentive and fiscal incentive of local governments matter for the marine environmental pollution? Evidence from China’s coastal areas[J]. Mar Policy2021; 128: 104505.
10.
WuJDengYHuangJ, et al.Incentives and outcomes: China's environmental policy[R].National Bureau of Economic Research, 2013.
LiuWNgoP. Voting with your feet: political competition and internal migration in the United States[J]. Eur J Polit Econ2020; 65: 101931.
13.
RauscherM. Economic growth and tax-competing leviathans[J]. Int Tax Public Finance2005; 12: 457–474.
14.
HolzingerKSommererT. Race to the bottom’or ‘race to Brussels’? Environmental competition in Europe[J]. JCMS: J Common Market Stud2011; 49: 315–339.
15.
LiLSunJJiangJ, et al.The effect of environmental regulation competition on haze pollution: evidence from China’s province-level data[J]. Environ Geochem Health2021: 1–24.
16.
LuSYaoYWangH. Testing the relationship between land approval and promotion incentives of provincial top leaders in China[J]. J Chin Political Sci2022: 1–27.
17.
QueWZhangYSchulzeG. Is public spending behavior important for Chinese official promotion? Evidence from city-level[J]. China Econ Rev2019; 54: 403–417.
18.
LiHZhouL. Political turnover and economic performance: the incentive role of personnel control in China[J]. J Public Econ2005; 89: 1743–1762.
19.
LeTYalcinE. Endogenous expropriation and political competition[J]. Econ Politics2023; 35: 313–332.
20.
PangBQKengSZhangSY. Does performance competition impact China's leadership behaviour? Re-examining the promotion tournament hypothesis[J]. China Quarterly2023: 1–18.
21.
LiuCYXinLLiJY. Environmental regulation and manufacturing carbon emissions in China: a new perspective on local government competition[J]. Environ Sci Pollut Res2022; 29: 36351–36375.
22.
YouDMZhangYYuanBL. Environmental regulation and firm eco-innovation: evidence of moderating effects of fiscal decentralization and political competition from listed Chinese industrial companies[J]. J Cleaner Prod2019; 207: 1072–1083.
23.
YuJZhouLZhuG. Strategic interaction in political competition: evidence from spatial effects across Chinese cities[J]. Reg Sci Urban Econ2016; 57: 23–37.
24.
LiZMartinez-VazquezJ. Fiscal decentralization and interregional capital misallocation: evidence from China[J]. J Asia Pacific Econ2021: 1–34.
25.
LiX. Local government decision-making competition and regional carbon emissions: experience evidence and emission reduction measures[J]. Sustain Energy Technol Assess2022; 50: 101800.
26.
LiuLLiL. Effects of fiscal decentralisation on the environment: new evidence from China[J]. Environ Sci Pollut Res2019; 26: 36878–36886.
27.
WuMCaoX. Greening the career incentive structure for local officials in China: does less pollution increase the chances of promotion for Chinese local leaders?[J]. J Environ Econ Manage2021; 107: 102440.
28.
TangJQinF. Analyzing the impact of local government competition on green total factor productivity from the factor market distortion perspective: based on the three stage DEA model[J]. Environ Develop Sustain2022: 1–29.
29.
ZhangNDengJAhmadF, et al.Local government competition and regional green development in China: the mediating role of environmental regulation[J]. Int J Environ Res Public Health2020; 17: 3485.
30.
JiXLiuSLangJ. Assessing the impact of officials’ turnover on urban economic efficiency: from the perspective of political promotion incentive and power rent-seeking incentive[J]. Socioecon Plann Sci2022; 82: 101264.
31.
ZhengSKahnMESunW, et al.Incentives for China's urban mayors to mitigate pollution externalities: the role of the central government and public environmentalism[J]. Reg Sci Urban Econ2014; 47: 61–71.
32.
ChenYJLiPLuY. Career concerns and multitasking local bureaucrats: evidence of a target-based performance evaluation system in China[J]. J Dev Econ2018; 133: 84–101.
33.
ZhaoCFengFChenY, et al.Local government competition and regional innovation efficiency: From the perspective of China-style fiscal federalism[J]. Sci Public Policy2021; 48(4): 488–489.
34.
WangLKongDZhangJ. Does the political promotion of local officials impede corporate innovation?[J]. Emerg Markets Finance Trade2021; 57: 1159–1181.
35.
ZhengDShiMPangR. Agglomeration economies and environmental regulatory competition: evidence from China[J]. J Cleaner Prod2021; 280: 124506.
36.
LiWZhengM. Governance mechanism of air pollution and its effects: evidence from Chinese prefecture-level cities[J]. China Ind Econ2016; 4: 93–109.
37.
AlesinaAFTroianoUCassidyT. Old and young politicians[R].National Bureau of Economic Research, 2015.
38.
WangY. Tenure of local officials, Yardstick competition and public goods investment[J]. Finance Trade Econ2016; 1: 24–35.
39.
PetrovskyNJamesOMoseleyA, et al.What explains agency heads’ length of tenure? Testing managerial background, performance, and political environment effects[J]. Public Adm Rev2017; 77: 591–602.
40.
MinWUZhouLA. Political incentives and city construction: The visibility of public projects[J]. Econ Res J2018.
41.
CaiAZhengSCaiL, et al.How does green technology innovation affect carbon emissions? a spatial econometric analysis of China’s provincial panel data[J]. Frontiers Environ Sci2021; 630.
42.
AnselinLBeraAK. Spatial dependence in linear regression models with an introduction to spatial econometrics[J]. Statist Textbooks Monographs1998; 155: 237–290.
43.
LeeLYuJ. A unified transformation approach for the estimation of spatial dynamic panel data models: stability, spatial cointegration and explosive roots[J]. Ohio state University, manuscript, 2009.
44.
ElhorstJ. Matlab Software for Spatial Panels[J]. 2014; 37(3): 389–405 .
45.
AnselinL. Spatial econometrics[J]. Handbook Spatial Anal Social Sci2022: 101–122.
46.
LiuZSunH. Assessing the impact of emissions trading scheme on low-carbon technological innovation: evidence from China[J]. Environ Impact Assess Rev2021; 89: 106589.
47.
ZhuJFanYDengX, et al.Low-carbon innovation induced by emissions trading in China[J]. Nat Commun2019; 10: 4088.
48.
KongGKongTDLuR. Political promotion incentives and within-firm pay gap: evidence from China[J]. J Account Public Policy2020; 39: 106715.
49.
ZhongSXiongYXiangG. Environmental regulation benefits for whom? Heterogeneous effects of the intensity of the environmental regulation on employment in China[J]. J Environ Manag2021; 281: 111877.
50.
BaiJLuJLiS. Fiscal pressure, tax competition and environmental pollution[J]. Environ Resource Econ2019; 73: 431–447.
51.
LevinsonA. Environmental regulations and manufacturers’ location choices: evidence from the census of manufactures[J]. J Public Econ1996; 62: 5–29.
52.
SongMXieQWangS, et al.Intensity of environmental regulation and environmentally biased technology in the employment market[J]. Omega2021; 100: 102201.
53.
JieWBinL. Environmental regulation and enterprises’ TFP——an empirical analysis based on China's industrial enterprises data[J]. China Ind Econ2014; 3: 44–56.
54.
DingYMcQuoidAKarayalcinC. Fiscal decentralization, fiscal reform, and economic growth in China[J]. China Econ Rev2019; 53: 152–167.
55.
DengYYouDWangJ. Research on the nonlinear mechanism underlying the effect of tax competition on green technology innovation-an analysis based on the dynamic spatial Durbin model and the threshold panel model[J]. Resources Policy2022; 76: 102545.
56.
ElhorstJ. Spatial econometrics: from cross-sectional data to spatial panels[J]. 2014; 37(3): 389–405.
57.
LeSageJ. Introduction to spatial econometrics[M]. undefined, 2009,Chapman and Hall/CRC, 2009.
58.
WooldridgeJM. Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data MIT press[J]. Cambridge, ma, 2002, 108(2): 245–254.
59.
ShaoSFanMTYangLL. Economic restructuring, green technical progress, and low-carbon transition development in China: an empirical investigation based on the overall technology frontier and spatial spillover effect[J]. World2022; 38: 46–69.
60.
KelejianHHPruchaIR. A generalized spatial two-stage least squares procedure for estimating a spatial autoregressive model with autoregressive disturbances[J]. J Real Estate Finance Econ1998; 17: 99–121.
