Recent research suggests that the DSM psychiatric classification is in a paradigmatic crisis and that the DSM-5 will be unable to overcome it. One possible reason is that the DSM is based on a neopositivist epistemology which is inadequate for the present-day needs of psychopathology. However, in which sense is the DSM a neopositivist system? This paper will explore the theoretical similarities between the DSM structure and the neopositivist basic assumptions. It is shown that the DSM has the following neopositivist features: (a) a sharp distinction between scientific and non-scientific diagnoses; (b) the exclusion of the latter as nonsensical; (c) the faith on the existence of a purely observable basis (the description of reliable symptoms); (d) the introduction of the operative diagnostic criteria as rules of correspondence linking the observational level to the diagnostic concept.
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