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Abstract

Every day, people face snap decisions when time is a limiting factor. In addition, the way a problem is presented can influence people’s choices, which creates what are known as framing effects. In this research, we explored how time pressure interacts with framing effects in risky decision making. Specifically, does time pressure strengthen or weaken framing effects? On one hand, research has suggested that framing effects evolve through the deliberation process, growing larger with time. On the other hand, dual-process theory attributes framing effects to an intuitive, emotional system that responds automatically to stimuli. In our experiments, participants made decisions about gambles framed in terms of either gains or losses, and time pressure was manipulated across blocks. Results showed increased framing effects under time pressure in both hypothetical and incentivized choices, which supports the dual-process hypothesis that these effects arise from a fast, intuitive system.

Keywords

risky decision making time pressure framing effects dual-process theory open data

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Thinking Fast Increases Framing Effects in Risky Decision Making

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