Abstract
In light of the well-established international legal principle of non-use of force in international relations, Nigel Biggar’s In Defence of War may give rise to concern in the academy of international lawyers. But the gap between the book’s conclusions and the current international law on the use of force turns out to be less significant upon closer inspection than at first sight. This essay reviews Biggar’s concept of ‘just war as punishment’, his view on the legal status of the ‘unjust warrior’, and his position on ‘humanitarian intervention’ from the perspective of international law. The essay is critical of the relevant passages in several more specific respects. At the same time, the essay reads the book as an elaborate general word of caution against an overarching presumption in favour of a maximalist interpretation of the principle of non-use of force in international relations—and it finds merit in that cautionary approach.
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