Abstract
It is difficult to exaggerate Alasdair MacIntyre's influence on contemporary Christian ethics. Under his influence, many have sought to show the distinctive features of a Christian account of the virtues, even while discovering that they have needed to go further than MacIntyre himself does. In an attempt to illustrate why some Christian ethicists and theologians have noted MacIntyre's reluctance to follow through on some of his own projects’ most salient aspects, this article examines his 1994 lectures on truthfulness and lying. In particular, I ask why he unexpectedly proposes a rule that suffers from Kantian abstraction. Even though articulating rules can be a crucial task, Christian ethics can often do better. Rather than search for a rule or even practices that require truthfulness, I suggest instead that Christian witness be explored as itself a truth-telling practice.
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