Potter et al.’s (1999) response to my ‘Against Relativism in Psychology, on Balance’ (Parker, 1999) neatly summarizes what they take a ‘critical realist’ position to be and how ‘relativists’ should defend themselves. Their response also illustrates why the version of critical realism I elaborated is more thoroughly critically relativist than Potter et al. assume and how their version of relativism actually rests on a rather uncritical subscription to realism.
Easthope, A. (1999) Englishness and National Culture. London: Routledge.
2.
Edwards, D. , Ashmore, M. and Potter, J. (1995) ‘Death and Furniture: the Rhetoric, Politics, and Theology of Bottom Line Arguments against Relativism’, History of the Human Sciences8: 25-49.
3.
Gergen, K. J. (1991) The Saturated Self. New York: Basic Books.
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Parker, I. (1996) ‘Against Wittgenstein: Materialist Reflections on Language in Psychology’, Theory & Psychology6(3): 363-384.
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Parker, I. (1998) ‘Against Postmodernism: Psychology in Cultural Context’, Theory & Psychology8(5): 621-647.
6.
Parker, I. (1999) ‘Against Relativism in Psychology, on Balance’, History of the Human Sciences12(4): 61-78.
7.
Potter, J. , Edwards, D. and Ashmore, M. (1999) ‘The Parker-complex’, History of the Human Sciences12(4): 79-88.
