James Maffie claims that weak continuity reliabilism is compatible with the principles, as well as the insights, of the Strong Programme in the Sociology of Knowledge (SPSK). There are three possible readings of weak continuity reliabilism: I argue that the first two are unsound, while the third is actually inconsistent with the principles of SPSK. SPSK is instead compatible with an identicist epistemology, one that does not aim to distinguish scientific epistemology from our everyday epistemic practice.
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