Peter Winch’s 1958 book The Idea of a Social Science contains two distinguishable sets of theses, one set bearing on the individual-level understanding of human beings, the other on the society-level understanding of the regularities and institutions to which human beings give rise. The first set of claims is persuasive and significant but the second is a mixed bunch: none is well established and only some are sound.
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2.
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Pettit, Philip (1998) ‘Defining and Defending Social Holism’, Philosophical Explorations1: 169-184.
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Taylor, Charles (1985) Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
6.
Winch, Peter (1990) The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy, 2nd edn.London: Routledge.
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Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1953) Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Blackwell.
