Abstract
Winch’s The Idea of a Social Science is explicitly based on a conception of philosophy. This article outlines and criticizes this conception, and then explores the relevance of this for Winch’s conception of social science. Winch identifies philosophy with conceptual analysis, and social science with unearthing the meaning of concepts operating within a form of life. These identifications produce a one-sided view both of philosophy (which must also criticize schemes of concepts and propose alternatives to them) and of social science (which must also explain schemes of concepts and sometimes attempt to change them).
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