Seeking mechanisms underlying accountability in crises: A qualitative comparative analysis of 29 cases in China

Abstract

Following crises, accountability invariably follows. Notably, the extant literature has largely overlooked the manner in which local governments enact crisis accountability during such events. Utilizing Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), this study investigates 29 safety crises across China. Drawing on principles from principal-agent theory and governance network theory, we examine how combinations of four conditions—namely hierarchical pressure, social pressure, crisis severity, and network complexity—result in varying levels of crisis accountability by local governments. The research identifies three principal mechanisms that elucidate high levels of crisis accountability: the reputation maintenance mechanism, the pressure-based mechanism, and the blame avoidance mechanism. Furthermore, the findings indicate that hierarchical pressure from the central government is the predominant factor influencing high crisis accountability. This study advances the governance and policy literature by elucidating the mechanisms underlying crisis accountability at the local government level.