Public administration reform and political will in cases of political instability: Insights from the Israeli experience

Abstract

How do public administration reforms develop in cases of political instability? Administrative reform has always been on the agenda of governments. Ample literature discusses its necessity and the factors that are associated with both its successes and failures worldwide. Nevertheless, only a few studies discuss the impact of political instability on public administration reform. Focusing on the Israeli experience, we explore public administration reform in the context of political instability. Using content analysis and in-depth interviews, we highlight how political instability adds more costs to politicians’ cost-benefit calculations about actively promoting public administration reform, as well as how it blocks their desire to engage in mundane work when large, visible reforms have been proposed. Our findings indicate that the problems of non-governability and political instability that create the need for administrative reform also create powerful barriers to it—particularly the lack of political will.

Introduction

Red tape, organizational disfunctions, inefficiency, irresponsible spending, and other administrative failures have challenged and are still challenging societies worldwide to various degrees. It is not surprising, therefore, that administrative reform has always been on the agenda of governments (Reiter and Klenk, 2019). While in most cases the declared goal is to improve public sector performance (Pierre, 2011), the objectives and instruments of administrative reform vary (Götz et al., 2018). They may focus on components such as financial management, audits and performance, personnel, and organization. Thus, they may modify both the processes and the structure of public organizations (Ongaro, 2009).

As in many other areas, public administration ideas and arrangements in one political setting (past or present) can be used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political setting (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000). Nevertheless, the characteristics and strategies of each reform are based on local needs, political considerations and institutional settings (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2017). These insights underscore the crucial importance of understanding the relationship between the implementation of reforms, decision-making processes and the context when exploring the variations in the strategies the government adopts.

One of the least studied contexts for public administration reforms is political instability (Mele and Ongaro, 2014). The literature has discussed political instability from various perspectives (Dowding and Kimber, 1983). It is a basic source of variation in institutions and policies whose frequency and character depend on public preferences, and salient events and issues (Horovitz et al., 2009: 1). Among its main characteristics are frequent personnel changes in higher political and bureaucratic positions (Milio, 2008: 922–3) and frequent shifts in coalitions (Grøn and Salomonsen, 2019: 444). These circumstances may impact a government’s ability to design, implement, and evaluate policy strategically and effectively. Political stability is the regularity of the flow of political exchanges. The more regular the flow, the more stable a society (Ake, 1975). When high-level decisionmakers are frequently replaced, the policy capacity (Wu et al., 2015) of governance is significantly challenged. Studies on this phenomenon demonstrate that it has a negative impact on reform and policy in developing (Dixon et al., 2018: 762) and developed countries (Piattoni and Smyrl, 2003). Mele and Ongaro’s (2014) pioneering analysis reveals how turnover in political leadership represents a threat to reform.

Political instability can impact the political will to formally design administrative reform and implement it, as well as the need for mundane work when large, visible reform has been proposed. Indeed, in order to move forward from a policy design (Birkland, 1997; Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1994) to its implementation (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973), there must be the political will to do so (Kingdon, 1984; Treadway, 2012). According to Post et al. (2010), political will is achieved when a sufficient set of decisionmakers with a common understanding of a particular problem is committed to supporting a potentially effective policy solution. This argument implies that decisionmakers’ sustained commitment to investing resources is mandatory for any policy change (Brinkerhoff, 2000). In the context of administrative reform, scholars and decisionmakers consistently point to political will as a sine qua non for public administration reform (OECD, 2010: 222; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2017: 25). However, given that administrative reform is a long process, frequent personnel changes in higher political and bureaucratic positions could reduce their willingness to actively promote reform.

Moreover, in order for change to survive, design and implementation are not enough. As in most reforms, in order to have an ongoing and cumulative effect, public administration reform requires maintenance. Political sustainability can never be safely assumed because usually policymakers cannot make “binding commitments” (Patashnik, 2003). New politicians and bureaucrats can always change their minds, and earlier agreements can be revised or even nullified (Stiglitz, 1998). Therefore, reformers “must often make tactical concessions in order to build a winning political coalition” (Patashnik, 2003: 206) and deal with the feedback that comes after the reform passes (Patashnik, 2014). Hence, frequent personnel changes in higher political and bureaucratic positions could reduce the potential for maintaining the reform and increase the potential for new, opposing veto players who will reverse the reforms.

What contribution does highlighting public administration reform in the context of political instability make to the literature? This study adds more insights to a relatively neglected topic in the administrative reform literature (Mele and Ongaro, 2014). Specifically, its results improve our understanding of the political will of elite decisionmakers to actively promote or support reform when it is likely that they will not remain in office for long. Moreover, as a case study, it tests the argument that without mundane work and maintenance, policy changes might not survive. We should stress that studying administrative reform in the context of political instability is also important for more stable societies, as one cannot take for granted that stability will remain in the future.

We explore our question inductively through the “sad story” of the attempts to reform Israeli public administration from its establishment in 1948 until 2021. Given its political instability and non-governability, Israel is a “wicked environment” for public administration reform. Although a relatively young nation, Israel is a vibrant democracy where institutional reforms are frequently introduced but often fail to materialize. Over time, various Israeli committees and think tanks have recommended reforms in public administration, but all attempts to implement these recommendations have systematically and comprehensively fallen short. While since the 2000s several incremental changes or minor attempts at change have occurred, Israel has experienced only two real attempts at comprehensive reform: one effort in the 1990s and a second in the 2010s. However, although these two attempts seemed promising at the time, they both failed. Hence, to date, Israel has never experienced comprehensive reform in its public administration.

The rest of the article is organized as follows. The second and third parts briefly describe the importance of political will and highlight political instability as an important context for studies about public administration reform. In the fourth section we detail the methodology we used. Based on our long-term analysis of the Israeli case, the fifth section explores how public administration reforms develop in cases of political instability. The paper ends with a theoretical discussion and recommendations.

Political will and public administration reform

Political will has been defined in various ways and contexts across disciplines (Treadway, 2012). In policy studies, political will exists when a sufficient set of decisionmakers with a common understanding of a particular problem on the formal agenda is committed to supporting a potentially effective policy solution (Post et al., 2010). Political will is considered to be present when political actors are motivated to engage in strategic, goal-directed behavior that advances their personal agenda and objectives, which inherently involves risking their relational or reputational capital (Treadway 2012: 533), and exhibit a credible intent to promote or block change at a systemic level (Kpundeh, 1998). Thus, desirable policies depend on the political will of government players that can overcome inertia and industry lobbying (Kingdon, 1984). This view implies that politicians’ sustained commitment to investing resources is mandatory for any policy change.

The public policy and administration literature echoes the need for this commitment (Kickert, 2011). In their influential model of public management reform, Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011: 25) identified “political party ideas” as an important element in such reform. They explained that political parties require ideas about how they would like to govern, including issues of structure, style, and process (p. 32). However, they differ from bureaucrats in their attitudes toward issues such as competitive tendering and privatization (Pierre et al., 2017). Throughout the world, politicians say they want to “reduce bureaucracy,” “decentralize and put power closer to the people,” or even adopt more specific proposals, such as creating a special ministry or agency for various issues (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2017: 32). Common examples are the conservative regimes of Thatcher in the U.K. (1979–1990), Reagan in the U.S. (1980–1988), and Mulroney in Canada (1984–1993) (Savoie, 1994). In all of these cases, politicians drew from a large pool of ideas from a variety of sources in an attempt to create reforms (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2017: 30).

Referring to the New Public Management (NPM) wave of reforms, Pollitt and Sorin (2011: 58) noted the manipulation of politicians and senior officials, with the prime motive of saving money and/or gaining more control over operating agencies. They argued that politicians should be considered both enthusiastic buyers and, subsequently, sellers of ideas. Certainly, there are occasions when public management reform is pushed forward by powerful politicians or officials who ignore their potential drawbacks, in effect “rationalizing them away” (Pollitt and Sorin, 2011: 34: 57). The core NPM idea that the public sector is highly inefficient and that money can be saved and services improved by using the right business techniques is obviously a deeply attractive one to many politicians. Pollit and Sorin (2011) explained that NPM has been a somewhat self-interested and even, on occasion, slightly cynical exercise by politicians as well as senior civil servants. Faced with strong pressures to restrain ever-rising public expenditures and citizens’ increasing demands on government services (Aucoin, 1990; Pollit and Sorin, 2011), politicians have launched schemes to cut back the public sector. However, knowing that these cutbacks are unlikely to be popular, they have cloaked them in programs of reform that promise “more with less.” Thus, the main aim has actually been to increase their control over the agencies, rather than improve customer service (Pollitt and Sorin, 2011: 56).

The literature also refers to politicians’ involvement in the post-NPM wave of public administration reforms, which began in the late 1990s (Reiter and Klenk, 2019). Focused on problems arising from increased vertical and horizontal specialization in NPM (Christensen and Lægreid, 2007), the core ideas and measures of this reform were designed to strengthen the central political and administrative levels through structural reintegration and by increasing capacity at the top (Christensen, 2012). One argument was that politicians and senior civil servants have largely been deprived of their ability to control staff due to functional fragmentation, agencification and the privatization of public services (Althaus and Vakil, 2013). In this context, politicians’ involvement was obvious, as one of the main elements of post-NPM reform involves reimposing the hierarchical control of politicians over public servants (Christensen and Lægreid, 2007).

The literature suggests that politicians’ lack of attraction to several aspects associated with specific policy areas might reduce their motivation to act even over the long-term. Politicians might try to claim credit for positive events to convince the public of their competence (Carpenter and Krause, 2012; Moynihan, 2012), and might increase public funding for reforms to promote their chances of reelection (Nielsen and Baekgaard, 2015: 550). Their decision-making can also be predicted by their desire to avoid blame for negative events and the resulting bad press that might damage their self-interests (Soroka, 2006).

Nevertheless, such situations have rarely appeared relevant to the area of public administration reform. Scholars in this field have pointed to the existence of a “learning group” of politicians and influential individuals at the top of the executive branch who have the motivation and opportunity to modify their behavior in light of their experience (Hood and Peters, 2004: 279) as one important element in the “combination of historical and political conditions” that does not always arise in practice (Olsen and Peters, 1994). Thus, although politicians’ involvement in such reform may not always be a major element in the process, the possibility that they would intentionally leave the arena to others for a long period of time has not been considered. However, all of these studies and insights have been made based on the analysis of politically stable societies. Exploring these insights in the context of political instability, therefore, may enrich our understanding of administrative reform.

Political instability and public administration reform

Political stability is usually defined as the regularity of the flow of political exchanges (Ake, 1975). Hurwitz (1973) suggested five distinct approaches to political stability: the absence of violence, government longevity, existence of a legitimate constitutional regime, the absence of structural change and multifaceted societal attributes. However, in this article we limit our discussion to the survival of the government (Sanders and Herman, 1977), and as other public policy and administration scholar have suggested (Mele and Ongaro, 2014), to frequent personnel changes (turnover) in higher political and bureaucratic positions such as ministers and office managers.

The replacement and turnover of politicians and bureaucrats are a critical element in a society’s stability and directly influence its administrative system (Meier and O’Toole, 2006). As the literature demonstrates, changing political agendas is a leading element that challenges the administration’s ability to function as a unified body when reputational threats appear (Grøn and Salomonsen, 2019). In turn, changes in political party control and lack of organizational performance may both affect turnover rates among senior bureaucrats (Boyne et al., 2010).

The idea that political instability is a main factor that leads to the lack of sustained political will and the latter finally affects the dynamics of public sector reform usually do not discuss in the mainstream literature. Given that most developed societies tend not to suffer from continuous political instability, it is not surprising that there is little consideration of its impact on public administration reform. However, this does not necessarily mean that such situations will not arise in the future. Moreover, acute political instability in developed societies does exist. In their important study of Italian civil service reform and innovation, Mele and Ongaro (2014) analyzed how turnover in political leadership represents a threat to reform. In such cases, they suggested, success depends on “meeting certain conditions for successful policy entrepreneurship.” Hence, the a priori expertise of policy entrepreneurs, their ability to repackage the issue, keep a community of practice alive and maneuver within the dynamics of the legal process are key elements. However, because the “maintenance activities” necessary for the success of the reform are disregarded, the implementation of such initiatives, which is less visible, suffers from greater discontinuity. Indeed, when political parties are continually changing, various undesirable phenomena appear. Thus, in such situations, politicians may deliberately design the public administration to be cumbersome and slow in order to be able to claim credit for improving service to the public (Golden, 2003), and signal their competence through legislative activism, which leads to the overproduction of laws and norms (Gratton et al., 2017).

To date, research has focused on such political strategies and other elements in the design and implementation of public administration reform. However, the literature has not yet connected these insights to public administration reform in cases of political instability (Lodge and Gill, 2011; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2017; Reiter and Klenk, 2019). This does not mean that scholars have ignored decision-making approaches when studying reform. Indeed, general studies about public administration reform have increased in the last two decades. By the 1970s, calls for more emphasis on management skills in local and central government set the scene for the NPM era of the 1980s and 1990s (Pollitt, 2013). Most NPM reforms focused on marketization and privatization, horizontal specialization in public apparatuses, contracting out, private-sector management methods, improved efficiency, performance management and an outcome-based orientation. As such, they represented a more radical type of change. The radical change agents championing this approach did not hesitate to use power to impose it. Such change requires long-term political will and the effective use of power. Quietly, this wave came to dominate many administrative systems worldwide (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2017).

Since the late 1990s, public administration reforms have taken a more incremental approach (Christensen and Lægreid, 2007). In such cases, “reforms do not normally replace each other, but instead, new reforms are often added to old ones producing hybrid administrative systems...” (Christensen, 2012: 2). This process leads to an ever-more complex and “layered” system in which the new elements are adopted and institutionalized as formal or informal constraints. As we will demonstrate, the Israeli experience, characterized by ongoing political instability, is quite different from other developed countries.

Methodology

In an effort to understand the lack of public administration reform in Israel in greater depth, we used a qualitative, constructivist research method. Such an approach enables us to understand events in their natural settings by attempting to make sense of or interpret phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011). Rather than beginning with hypotheses and testing them, in this method, we begin with the data and look at the themes that emerge from them.

Research tools

Our research is based on content analysis and in-depth interviews. We conducted content analyses (Krippendorff, 2018) of Israeli material, including legislative documents; reports and minutes of committee meetings inside and outside the Knesset (Israel’s parliament); governmental decisions; Knesset plenary records and minutes from meetings; and print and online press sources, such as reports from the media, NGOs, and the government.

In addition, between July 2019 and November 2020 we conducted 21 in-depth interviews with politicians, high-level bureaucrats, national labor union decisionmakers and senior journalists (for more details, see Supplemental Appendix 1). We selected non-elected officials based on their knowledge of and involvement in public administration reform and requested that they refer us to others.

Interview procedure

Most of the interviews were conducted face-to-face; the rest took place by phone. They lasted 35–120 min, depending on the interviewee’s knowledge. Several respondents were interviewed twice for clarification and additions. Our informants were told at the beginning of each interview that their words would be quoted and were given the option to keep all or parts of the interview anonymous or unrecorded. All interviews were transcribed. Throughout the process, we took steps to be as objective as possible and maintain a reasonable social distance. To facilitate transferability (Guba, 1981) and ensure a thorough understanding of the definition and context of the research, we took detailed field notes during and after each interview.

We asked the interviewees to describe the main current and past events and developments in public administration reform, as well as their involvement in the process.

Analytical procedure

For the analysis, we adopted an inductive approach based on grounded theory to allow the codes and categories to emerge from the data (Charmaz, 2014). We focused on understanding the barriers to reform as reflected in the eyes of the main actors. We conducted inductive coding and categorized each segment of the interview. For example, we grouped codes such as “politicians’ turnover” and “senior bureaucrats’ turnover” under the category “political instability,” and codes such as “non-tenable achievement,” “lack of public interest,” and “unpopular area” under the category “sources of political will.” Our analysis involved switching between the data, codes and emerging categories. In addition, to help identify potential biases and ensure intercoder reliability, we had a research assistant review the anonymous transcripts of the interviews and check the coding.

Findings

Sustained lack of political commitment

Israel is a parliamentary democracy. Its public administration was mainly established under the British Mandate in Palestine from 1917 to 1948 (Cohen, 2016; 2019). Supplemental Appendix 2 presents a timeline of the main events related to the Israeli civil service. The Israeli civil service employs about 76,300 full-time workers, not including those employed by outsourcing through contractors. Sixty-three percent of Israeli civil servants are women (CSC, 2019). Since Israel’s establishment in 1948, centralized control over the public administration has been one of its main characteristics (Dery and Sharon, 1994; Galnoor et al., 1998). Over-centralization also characterizes the relationship between the central and local government (Beeri, 2020), and the latter is heavily dependent on and closely regulated by the former (Eshel and Hananel, 2019). This situation has continued into the 1990s and 2000s (Cohen, 2016; Galnoor, 2011).

In addition to strong centralized control in its political and administrative systems, Israel suffers from what has been described as non-governability, meaning, the inability of decisionmakers to formulate public policy and implement it effectively over time (Arian et al., 2002; Nachmias and Sened, 1999). Given the reality of political instability, long-term strategic considerations take a back seat to short-term considerations in the conduct of governmental players (Cohen, 2015; 2016). The problem of non-governability is directly connected to Israel’s politically unstable environment. Since 1977, when the right-wing Likud Party won the national elections for the first time, the party ruled the country for most of the 1980s, with the exception of the unity government between the Likud and the Ma’arach (Israel’s main left-wing party) from 1984 to 1986. In the years to come, the Likud dominated the political arena, with several exceptions such as Ehud Barak’s left-wing government (1999–2001) and Ariel Sharon’s (2001–2006) and Ehud Olmert’s (2006–2009) centrist governments. From 2009 to 2021, Benjamin Netanyahu, the head of the Likud Party, served as the Israeli Prime Minister.

Although Netanyahu remained in position for so many years, the political arena in Israel is very unstable (interviews 7; 8; 21). Most of the other politicians and ministers are frequently replaced (interviews 9; 17; 19). Moreover, given the fact that Israeli law allows the government to make political appointments to various senior administrative posts (including the Director-General of each ministry), it is not only the politicians who are frequently replaced by new ones (often before completing 12 months of duty), but also the appointed Directors-General of their ministries. In such an environment, long-term strategic considerations take a back seat to short-term considerations in the conduct of the various players in the public policy arena (Cohen, 2012; 2015). This situation makes real public service reform quite challenging.

The crucial need to reform the Israeli public administration was the focus of many governmental and non-governmental committees between 1960 and 1990. Examples include the Horowitz Committee (1963), Moses Committee (1965), Zanbar Committee (1981), Lorenz Committee (1985), Dror Committee (1986), Zussman Committee (1989) and the most important one—the Kubersky Committee (1989). In Ongaro’s (2009) terms, the committees’ recommendations targeted different components: financial management, audits and performance, personnel and organization. Nevertheless, two real attempts to implement these recommendations in a comprehensive way—Galnoor’s attempt between 1994 and 1996 and Dayan and Tzur’s attempt between 2013 and 2018—never succeeded (interviews 16; 19).

The aim of the Kubersky Committee was to comprehensively review the civil service and suggest recommendations for improving it. Published in 1989, the committee’s report included recommendations to (1) redefine the goals and tasks of the civil service, (2) establish clear boundaries for political involvement in public administration, (3) improve service to the public by reducing government involvement, (4) enhance the managerial capacity of the directors general by granting them greater discretion and flexibility, and (5) transfer authority from the Ministry of Finance to operating units, thereby decentralizing control (Kubersky Committee, 1989; Trachtenberg Committee, 2011). However, although decisionmakers seemed enthusiastic about the Kubersky Committee’s ideas and adopted them unanimously, and some claimed they understood the importance of the issue and desired improvement (interview 16), in practice its major recommendations were not implemented (Galnoor et al., 1998: 401).

Given the radical nature of the Kubersky Report, it took Israel 6 years to start moving toward change. In 1994, Israel experienced the most serious attempt at real public administration reform thus far—not incrementally, but in a systematic and comprehensive manner. Following the Kubersky Committee’s recommendations, Itzhak Galnoor, the new Civil Service Commissioner, designed the Change-Generating Steps plan for combining comprehensive reform with selective short-term changes. He adopted the approach of “selective radicalism” (interview 9) to promote the so-called NPM reform (CSC, 2013; Galnoor, 2011: 59; Galnoor et al., 1998). Faced with the traditional opposition of the powerful Finance Ministry, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) alone could not implement a uniform, centrally directed reform (Galnoor, 2011). Hence, adoption of most of the detailed recommendations of the Kubersky Report was not a real option. Because making such radical choices would require a major overhaul of the civil service laws, initial steps in implementing change would come from outside the CSC, leaving its transformation into a policy and oversight unit until a later stage. Because the goal was to change Israel’s administrative culture gradually (interview 9), the initial focus would be on replacing and/or re-educating senior civil service staff through new methods of recruitment, remuneration and professional in-service training at a special public management and policy school. The idea was that the new senior staff would subsequently become change agents who would establish clearer lines between political and administrative appointments (Galnoor et al., 1998).

In 1995, Benyamin Netanyahu started his first tenure as Prime Minister. The CSC led by Galnoor was considered a threat to political appointments, which had been the traditional tool for controlling the administrative apparatus (Cohen, 2019). Hence, the CSC was moved to the Prime Minister’s Office, and a new civil service commissioner, Shmuel Hollander, was appointed (interviews 19; 14). Hollander served in this position for 14 years and had little interest in continuing the reforms (Galnoor et al., 1998: 404; State Comptroller, 2006: 250; interview 9).

During these 14 years, Israeli politicians did not demonstrate any real motivation to engage in strategic, goal-directed behavior that would advance the reform’s agenda and its objectives. None of the new governments, either right wing or left wing, demonstrated any real commitment or motivation to promote reform. They re-appointed Hollander to the post time after time. Several petitions to remove him from office were submitted to the Supreme Court, stressing his long-term in office. Ultimately, Hollander resigned.

Several failed attempts at incremental reform were initiated. Examples include the “reform headquarters” created during the government of Prime Minister Ehud Barak (1999–2001), and the recommendation to adopt the model submitted to Finance Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in May 2004. Since the 2000s, several developments, mostly sporadic initiatives or specific changes, have occurred that might be considered incremental or failed attempts at reform (interviews 17; 19). In 2003, a governmental economic plan containing far-reaching measures on taxation and capital markets reignited efforts to shrink the public sector. In 2004, government offices (ministries) and auxiliary units were given increased control over areas including decisions about personnel levels, regulatory changes, acting appointments, private work permits, study abroad visas, workmen’s compensation, hourly employment for special situations and the signing of contracts. In 2006 and 2007, they were allowed to manage internal tenders and their offices at limited levels. However, these measures were incremental and not part of comprehensive reform. In 2007, the CSC proposed structural changes, including a new approach to managing government departments and support units. Despite Prime Minister Olmert’s approval of some measures, they were not implemented. In 2008, the Attorney General and the Prime Minister’s Office created an inter-ministerial team to address professional issues and changes designed to improve service (Cohen, 2016), incremental attempts that never matured (interview 19).

In 2010, Israel joined the OECD, a move that strengthened the Israeli decisionmakers' understanding about the need for reform (CSC, 2013: 68–9; interviews 2; 10; 12; 14). In the summer of 2011, Israel experienced an unprecedented wave of protests demanding policy changes and the rebuilding of the welfare state. Subsequently, the government established the Trachtenberg Committee to develop recommendations for socio-economic change (Trachtenberg Committee, 2011: 49; interviews 19; 21). A few months later, an issue-specific committee was established to review the structure of the civil service staff. The committee’s report recommended fixing various processes and structures in the Prime Minister’s Office, reducing the number of political appointments and strengthening the National Security Council as the professional staff advising the prime minister. In October 2011, the government decided (Decision 3756) on systemic changes to strengthen the state’s policy planning, implementation and administrative flexibility—in the spirit of the Trachtenberg Report’s recommendations (interviews 2; 10). Shortly thereafter, the government established a team to reform personnel management in the civil service and match its capabilities to Israel’s changing needs by creating the necessary culture, leadership, and mechanisms (CSC, 2013: 4).

In September 2012, a serious attempt at comprehensive reform was initiated. The reform team was led by the new Civil Service Commissioner, Moshe Dayan. Dayan appointed Ron Tzur as chief of staff to head the project. Tzur’s first task was to coordinate the subcommittees and design the report on how to implement the reform. To improve its chances of being implemented, the plan relied on two basic concepts. The first was “implementation as a process” and a “telescopic approach” (interviews 14; 17; 19; 20), beginning with small changes and building each year to more challenging reforms. The initial stage focused on the reform of the Nachshon 4 offices (the pilot offices that were chosen initially to implement the core components of the reform). Based on the insights gleaned, the program was adjusted and applied to 31 more offices. The second concept was the establishment of a circular and spiral process, reflecting the insights arising during any stage of the program. In using this strategy, the committee acknowledged the need to reform the fundamental underpinnings of the civil service including its basic values, organizational culture, and language (CSC, 2013).

Interestingly, union workers, who traditionally fear reform (interviews 10; 18), did not challenge the process (interviews 12; 15). Ironically, the main veto players came from the CSC itself (interviews 5; 17; 19), which was engaged in a serious conflict between the old guard and the few dozen workers in the reform headquarters (interviews 5; 14; 15; 20). In practice, the reform headquarters was functioning as a separate commission within the CSC (interviews 8; 13; 14). Several senior CSC officials made significant efforts to impede the process (State Comptroller, 2017), arguing that, “organizationally speaking, the CSC was not prepared well” (Daniel Hershkowitz in a Knesset meeting, 16 October 2018). Ultimately, the reform headquarters was dismantled in 2017.

In September 2018, the government approved the appointment of Daniel Hershkowitz as the new Civil Service Commissioner. His appointment followed a media firestorm after Benjamin Netanyahu’s attempt to appoint a candidate lacking sufficient qualifications who was a relative of two workers on his personal staff (Heruti-Sover, 2018). To date, the new commissioner has refused to convene the steering committee for the reform (interview 17), nor does he promote the reform (interview 1). Some claim he has “forgotten he is a gatekeeper” (Filut, 2019). Thus, as of 2018, reform efforts have ceased. Moreover, some have expressed concern that ending the reforms might lead to their incremental reversal (interviews 2; 10; 14; 17; 20). As Tzur noted, “When no one keeps pushing for change, nothing ensures that the achievements will hold” (interview 19).

Political instability and politicians’ motivation for involvement

While our findings suggest that in the 1990s, senior Israeli politicians cared about the condition of the civil service and expressed interest in promoting reform (interviews 7; 9; 16), the consensus among interviewees was that subsequently politicians have displayed little genuine commitment to reform. Although aware of its importance, the politicians usually focused more on foreign affairs and security challenges than on reform to improve public administration (interview 9). While there are “good people who understand and show some signs of caring,” (interview 19), they are the exception (interview 14).

In 2016, the Knesset special committee on civil service reform stated clearly that when it comes to politicians, “There is not enough involvement at both the government level and certainly at the Knesset level” (Knesset, 2016: 6). Indeed, all our interviewees agreed that, other than a few who showed some signs of involvement for short periods, given the structural conditions of political instability, Israeli politicians have demonstrated little commitment to promoting public administration reforms in the past few decades (interviews 14; 21; 22). As one interviewee said: “The politicians are not a factor... It does not really interest them…” (interview 7).

Our interviewees explained that politicians understand that public administration reform is lengthy, its success difficult to measure, and its results potentially overturnable by successive governments. They have little reason to involve themselves or allocate their limited resources to the process when their position in a given ministry might be short-lived. They favor short-term solutions and neglect the long-term strategic considerations integral to designing and implementing civil service reform (interviews 2; 9; 12; 13; 17).

Most politicians regard the area as “grey” (interview 10) or “boring and technical” (interview 8). There is common agreement among former civil service commissioners that public administration reform is not a topic that will move the public the way foreign policy and security challenges do (interviews 9; 14; 15). Furthermore, civil society organizations have not promoted reforms and have not always agreed with the need for them. Hence, Israeli politicians have been less than enthusiastic about becoming involved in an issue that has few benefits for them. In addition, politicians do not see any benefit in being identified with the civil service in Israel, given its poor image and lack of prestige in the eyes of the public. Instead, they find it more beneficial to criticize the public service for its performance and to call for the reduction of bureaucracy and regulations (interviews 10; 19; 21). Hence, with the exception of political appointments, they have little interest in the structural setting and characteristics of the civil service (interviews 8; 20).

However, the factor that emerged from our analysis as the key issue blocking political will in the Israeli case was political instability. Even if public administration reform were of great interest to the public, the consensus among our interviewees was that the results of the reform are intangible and not immediate, which also reduces the politicians’ motivation to engage with the subject. As one respondent remarked, “This is not tangible, like building two new harbors and presenting it to the public; you cannot point here to a specific achievement” (interview 13). The interviewees explained that, given the politicians’ understanding that public administration reform is lengthy, its success is difficult to measure, and its results could be overturned by successive governments, they have little reason to involve themselves in the process or allocate their limited resources to it.

In addition to the limited benefits of promoting reform, the political costs of doing so are high. Not only do politicians fear that reform will reduce their political influence, particularly their ability to make political appointments, but they also consider the costs associated with engaging in struggles with others, as it threatens the narrow self-interests of well-organized, powerful groups, such as labor unions, senior bureaucrats and other politicians (interview 8). As they usually have no appetite for being branded “troublemakers” (interview 17), politicians are hesitant to take the lead. They also believe that public administration reform might prompt resistance from bureaucrats, who will then use the press to attack their popularity, leak their plans to others, undercut their decisions in other areas, or form alliances against their initiatives (interview 3). Israeli politicians also consider the political costs associated with tangling with the Histadrut, the national labor union (interview 21). The union’s fear that the government and the Ministry of Finance will take advantage of the reforms to infringe on the rights of employees and limit the labor union’s power could translate into attempts to brand the politician an enemy of the middle class (interview 18).

Opportunity costs are also part of Israeli politicians’ calculations. In their eyes, whatever resources they invest in supporting reform must be offset by forgoing investments in other areas. Public administration reform requires them to be active in complex and challenging environments. Should they intervene in this long-term process, they stand to lose the benefits they could have reaped by promoting other initiatives (interview 13). Given that the Israeli public is much more interested in other issues, investing one’s time, energy, and reputation in such an unpopular area seems irrational. Again, the structural condition of political instability intensifies these considerations. Why should ambitious politicians invest their limited resources in such a complex and uncertain issue?

Discussion and conclusions

Our goal was to add to the limited research on public administration reform in the context of political instability. The results from our examination of the Israeli case, which exemplifies this situation, indicate that decisionmakers in such an environment find it difficult to strategically plan and formulate public policy and implement it effectively over time. Moreover, our empirical results lead us to conclude that Israeli decisionmakers have little motivation for such reform nor the ability to promote it even if they wanted to, given the high costs and limited benefits for politicians of doing so. Furthermore, in line with Patashnik’s (2014, 2003) argument, in this case, even positive steps taken towards change dissolved over time due to narrow political and administrative interests. As the Israeli experience reveals, in such cases, any incremental achievements may disappear over time, because new political actors may ignore, dismiss, and even reverse changes introduced by their predecessors. Thus, paradoxically, Israel’s “wicked environment,” which creates the need for reform, also creates powerful barriers to such reform—particularly the lack of political will. For players in such a public policy arena, long-term strategic considerations based on a coherent ideology take a back seat to short-term considerations.

Our findings shed light on the normative role of politicians in the process of public administration reform, as well as their motivations and incentives (or lack of them) to be actively involved. As Moynihan and Roberts (2021) suggested, the political context in which public administration operates has a strong influence on how it functions. As we demonstrated, political instability plays a major role in the politicians’ calculations. As Fung and colleagues (2007) argued, scholars often focus exclusively on specific politicians rather than on an institutional understanding of how governmental decisions are shaped. Yet, we cannot ignore the effect of these institutional settings on the players themselves. Thus, the Israeli experience demonstrates how difficult it is to achieve significant public administration reform without real political involvement and support from the senior political level. We may conclude that, without politicians’ active involvement in public administration reform, it is hard to expect bureaucratic efforts to translate into clear and lasting achievements.

The future picture of Israeli public administration is not an optimistic one. Time will tell whether various recommendations and efforts will mature into successful public administration reforms. Currently, political instability and non-governability will probably continue to block new reforms. In March 2021, Israeli citizens voted for the fourth time in 2 years to establish a government. Those elected in April 2019, September 2019, and March 2020 could not create a viable coalition. The 2020 Israeli elections marked the 10th time in a row that early elections were held, demonstrating how political instability is a major obstacle to change. The COVID-19 response also revealed root problems of non-governability, political patronage, lack of public trust in governance, amateur improvisations, and the inability to strategically plan, design, implement, and evaluate policy outcomes (Tzur & Cohen, 2020). Hence, in the era of COVID-19 and economic crises, public administration reform is not even a potential issue on the policy agenda. In such environments, without a radical crisis or the appearance of a determined policy entrepreneur (Kingdon, 1984), there is little reason to think that the situation will change. At this point, the entrepreneur will first have to put the problem of the lack of administrative reform on the public agenda, and then move forward with plausible, if inevitably temporary, solutions to it.

Our study has a number of limitations that raise possibilities for future research. The major limitation is inherent in our chosen methodology and our focus on the Israeli experience. Case studies can be exploratory, descriptive and/or explanatory in nature (Yin, 2009). As this is a single case, with its specificities of time, place and policy domain, we cannot claim that the behaviors we witnessed in Israel will be evident in other countries (e.g., see: MacCarthaigh and Hardiman, 2020). Indeed, the fact that Israel is a relatively small, young parliamentary democracy may limit the ability to generalize our results to other countries, especially large, established presidential democracies.

Nevertheless, our findings have practical relevance for policymakers seeking to promote public administration reform in other societies. Like all developments in the public sector, administrative reform requires a systematic approach that takes into account many factors. Those who advocate for reform should bear in mind the context in which they are working and design their changes accordingly. Repucci (2014) described a variety of contextual and procedural challenges that reformers should consider when promoting change. Most important among the contextual challenges is for individuals who design a public administration reform strategy to thoroughly understand the key players, trends, obstacles and opportunities in the country. The Israeli analysis demonstrates that the lack of politicians’ political will is rarely due to insufficient personal courage or opposition to public administration reform per se. Rather, politicians are not attracted to particular reforms because of calculations about their self-interests. Indeed, many governments cannot muster the political will to undertake meaningful reform because the accompanying budget restraints may likely lead to political recriminations in the form of loss of office and opposed voters.

The unique structural conditions revealed in the Israeli case reduced the politicians’ motivation to become active in this process because such involvement could not offer them the immediate results they sought to demonstrate their efficacy to their constituents. In such circumstances, the differences in the interests, goals and time frames of politicians and bureaucrats increase and may challenge their ability or desire to cooperate in designing and implementing effective policy. Thus, in a reality in which cost–benefit analyses lead politicians to understand that public administration reform will not promote their interests, we should not expect them to act. Working on altering the politicians’ incentives may be a good starting point for changing these dynamics.

Our findings pave the way for investigative studies with a broader theoretical and empirical scope. Further research is needed on the barriers to promoting public administration reform that change agents may face in what we term “wicked environments.” In this regard, Mele and Ongaro’s (2014) pioneering analysis should pave the way for more research on this subject. Such studies should include a comparative perspective involving a variety of public administration reforms, countries and democratic regimes. Finally, one should remember that we cannot take for granted that the political situation will remain stable in the future. Thus, studying administrative reform in the context of political instability is also important for stable societies.

Supplemental Material

sj-pdf-1-ppa-10.1177_09520767221076059 – Supplemental Material for Public administration reform and political will in cases of political instability: Insights from the Israeli experience

Supplemental Material, sj-pdf-1-ppa-10.1177_09520767221076059 for Public administration reform and political will in cases of political instability: Insights from the Israeli experience by Nissim Cohen in Public Policy and Administration

Supplemental Material

sj-pdf-2-ppa-10.1177_09520767221076059 – Supplemental Material for Public administration reform and political will in cases of political instability: Insights from the Israeli experience

Supplemental Material, sj-pdf-2-ppa-10.1177_09520767221076059 for Public administration reform and political will in cases of political instability: Insights from the Israeli experience by Nissim Cohen in Public Policy and Administration