This article explores the impact of consolidated principles of delegation on top civil servants’ perceptions of autonomy in management and policy-making processes across European parliamentary democracies. Particular attention is devoted to the extent to which bureaucratic capacity can be equated as a principle of delegation, considering the lenses and perspectives of bureaucrats instead of relying on politicians’ formal mechanisms to control bureaucratic activities. Empirically, this article is based on a large-scale study survey of senior public executives applied in eight European countries. While consolidated principles of delegation seem to be able to explain perceptions of autonomy across parliamentary democracies, results also suggest the importance of including bureaucratic capacity as a predictor of autonomy in the last chain of delegation. This emerges as one of the strongest explanatory variables of perceptions of managerial autonomy, regardless of the hierarchical position of respondents. However, it does not impact on bureaucrats’ perception of policy autonomy, as respondents’ position within the administrative state and the distinct traits of national public bureaucracies in Europe have a greater impact on the delegation of authority.
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