Defence intelligence in the UK after the Mountbatten reforms: Organisational and inter-organisational dilemmas of joint military intelligence

Abstract

This article examines the establishment and evolution of the UK’s Defence Intelligence organisation (DI) from 1963 until the present date. It does so in terms of theories and concepts concerning the organisation of intelligence agencies and communities. The argument is made that DI was originally set up with a mandate to both undertake intelligence analysis on a joint service basis and coordinate the intelligence activities and appreciations of the three services and Ministry of Defence civilian intelligence machinery. This mandate was further divided by requiring the analytical work to be done both in response to defence and to national requirements and priorities. The article argues that as DI became increasingly established and managed in terms of being a stand-alone agency, the less it was able to manage its coordination and divided departmental/nation roles. It further argues that an unintended consequence of the DI was to weaken operational intelligence support to the services, necessitating the recent re-establishment of single service intelligence organisations.