The Life of Adam and Eve and the nature of Second Temple religious devotion: Can Satan be trusted concerning the worship of Adam? *

Abstract

The Life of Adam and Eve contains an episode in which Satan describes the protoplast Adam receiving worship from the angels of heaven, worship commanded by God himself. This tradition has played a role in recent debates over the nature of Second Temple religious devotion to the God of Israel. In particular, it has been put forward as an example that undermines arguments that Israel’s God alone was the exclusive recipient of Jewish cultic worship. Within this debate, the reliability of Satan as a narrator within the Life of Adam and Eve has yet to be considered. Demonstrating Satan to be an unreliable narrator would have significant implications for the role of the Life of Adam and Eve in the debate regarding the nature of Jewish religious devotion.

Introduction

The Life of Adam of Eve (LAE throughout) ¹ presents a curious episode, one in which God, through Michael, commands the angels of heaven to worship the protoplast Adam, a command that is obeyed by many of the angels, though not all. ² This episode has recently received attention due to its significance for debates regarding the nature of Jewish monotheism in the late Second Temple period and the implications of such monotheism for the development of devotion to Jesus in the early Christian movement. ³ If Adam is indeed worshiped, then this tradition may offer evidence of Jewish religious worship and devotion that was extended to a figure other than the God of Israel. Such a tradition would offer an important precedent for early Christian devotion to Jesus. Or might the tradition be evidence of a Jewish commitment to “two powers in heaven,” with Adam representing a second power that is worthy of worship? Although a different reading of the tradition, it too would offer an important precedent for early Christian devotion to Jesus. Such proposals are not without opponents, opponents who question whether the tradition (1) is representative of Second Temple Judaism; and (2) truly depicts worship directed toward Adam. The following study will (1) review the place of the LAE in the debate over the nature of Second Temple cultic worship; (2) consider preliminary issues including date and textual history of the LAE; and (3) introduce a factor yet to be considered in the previously noted debate, namely, whether the narration of the episode in which Adam receives worship would be understood as reliable by its earliest audience. The study concludes by considering the significance unreliable narration of Adam’s worship in the LAE would have for the debates over the nature of Jewish monotheism and early Christian devotion to Jesus.

The worship of Adam and the debate regarding the nature of Jewish religious devotion

This episode in which Adam is the object of angelic worship seems to sit in stark contrast with the majority of evidence that indicates Jews of the Second Temple period restricted worship for the God of Israel alone. Larry Hurtado has been an ardent supporter of the position that cultic worship functioned as a strict boundary marker between the God of Israel and all other entities. ⁴ Hurtado has frequently laid out the evidence to support such a position, evidence that includes the following: the existence of one and only one temple for the God of Israel, singular devotion and sacrifice in that temple to the God of Israel, tradition in which worship of angels or beings other than the God of Israel is forbidden, the testimony of Greeks and Romans regarding the singular worship practices of Jews, the willingness of Jews to suffer and/or die rather than offer cultic and religious devotion to anything other than the God of Israel. ⁵ With this firm boundary marker in place, Hurtado applies it to what he perceives as cultic devotion offered to Jesus in the early Christian movement. From these two data points, Hurtado draws conclusions regarding Jesus’ divinity. Yet, the figure of Adam in the LAE, along with a handful of other figures in Second Temple literature, runs against the grain of this evidence put forward by Hurtado and thus raises questions about whether cultic worship functions as the firm boundary marker between the God of Israel and all other entities. ⁶ Seizing on these presumed exceptions to the schema for Jewish monotheism put forward by Hurtado, others have offered alternatives schemas, schemas in which the Adam of the LAE plays a noteworthy role. Here these alternative schemas and the role Adam plays in them will be outlined, as will responses from those like Hurtado who maintain what might be regarded as an “exclusive” understanding of Jewish monotheism.

Adam and human inclusion in the worship of Israel’s God: Crispin Fletcher-Louis

While not rejecting the strong evidence offered by Hurtado regarding singular Jewish cultic devotion to the God of Israel, Crispin Fletcher-Louis contends that extant examples of human figures receiving worship, including Adam and the Enochic Son of Man, requires a nuancing of Hurtado’s schema of Jewish monotheism. ⁷ Fletcher-Louis sees in the LAE a clear example of a human figure, Adam, being the appropriate object of cultic worship. ⁸ The appropriateness of Adam as an object of worship in LAE is, for Fletcher-Louis, closely tied to his identity as the image and likeness of God. ⁹ Drawing on the work of Corrine Patton, Fletcher-Louis notes that the language of “image” and “likeness” was common language used to describe objects of cultic worship in non-Israelite religious devotion. ¹⁰ Fletcher-Louis then uses Genesis 1:26 as a means of grounding such cultic language in the theological commitments of Israel and Judaism. ¹¹ He contends that the language of humanity being made in the image of God essentially presents humanity as an idol that represents God in the world. ¹² Such an idol that truly bears God’s image and is made by God himself, Fletcher-Louis argues, is an appropriate object of worship, contra idols fashioned from earthly materials by human hands, of which worship is clearly forbidden. ¹³ Thus, the worship of Adam, who through the bearing of God’s image and likeness represents God as a proper idol, is an appropriate means of worshipping Israel’s God. In this way, Fletcher-Louis finds a way of wrapping a human figure into the otherwise exclusive worship of Israel’s God, making that worship actually inclusive of human figures. For Fletcher-Louis’ overall project, the worship of Adam ultimately serves as a precedent in Second Temple Judaism for the worship of Jesus by his earliest Jewish followers.

Adam as a Second Power in Heaven: Andrei Orlov

Andrei Orlov is one of a handful of recent voices championing the presence of a well-established “two powers in heaven” theology within Second Temple Judaism. ¹⁴ Scholarly understanding of such a theological construct seemingly falls between (or even blurs) two poles: the first in which the one God of Israel exists in two distinct powers/entities yet remains one; and the second in which the one God of Israel has a supreme heavenly agent that essentially acts as God. ¹⁵ Orlov’s study of a “two powers” phenomenon within the theological framework of Second Temple Judaism proposes that the first power is primarily understood in aural theophanic terms, while the second power is understood in ocular theophanic terms. Of particular importance for this study is Orlov’s analysis of Adam in the LAE. ¹⁶ He contends that, contra Fletcher-Louis, Adam of the LAE is not merely a human included in divine worship, but he is in fact a newly created “second power” and portrayed as the manifestation of the God of Israel, the first power. ¹⁷ Orlov makes much of the fact that in the scene in which Adam is worship, the specific instruction given is not to worship Adam, but rather, to “worship the image and likeness of the Lord God.” ¹⁸ Orlov contends: “Angelic veneration, therefore, shepherds the human protagonist into his new supra-angelic ontology, when he becomes an “icon” or “face” of the deity.” ¹⁹ For Orlov the tradition in the LAE depicts a scene in which the former “second power,” Satan, has been replaced by a new “second power,” Adam. It is Satan’s replacement by Adam as the “second power” that is the catalyst for Satan’s efforts to destroy Adam. ²⁰

Preliminary issues

The date and nature of the LAE

Closely related to the debate over the LAE’s significance for reconstructing Second Temple Jewish monotheistic commitments is both the date and nature of the LAE itself. These are complex issues that have strongly divided interpreters, with some favoring a post-Second Temple and perhaps even Christian origin and others placing the LAE squarely in the matrix of Second Temple Judaism. ²¹ The implications for the LAE as a witness to Second Temple Jewish monotheism are obvious. If the LAE is dated after the Second Temple period and/or is the product of Christianity rather than Judaism, it loses all significance for debates regarding Second Temple Jewish monotheism. Here I offer a brief overview of this debate and the issues involved. ²²

Two prominent voices in this debate are Marinus de Jonge and Johannes Tromp, both of whom ultimately conclude that the LAE is a Christian document that dates to the third or fourth century. ²³ Tromp and de Jonge look for features in the LAE that can be identified as Christian, yet have no Jewish parallel. To this end, they identify three elements: (1) the use of spices offered to God as incense (GLAE 29:3-6); (2) the reference to Adam being washed in the Acherusian Lake (GLAE 37:3); and (3) a triangular seal on Adam’s tomb (GLAE 42:1). ²⁴ Of these, they dismiss the spices offered as incense as they could plausibly find an origin in Judaism. ²⁵ However, they find significance in both the Acherusian Lake, which finds parallels in Christian writings but no such parallels in Jewish writings, and the triangular seal, for which they note a connection between both Christian baptism as a seal and the significance of the number three in Christianity. On the basis of this evidence, de Jonge and Tromp favor a post-Second Temple Christian origin, though, they acknowledge the totality of this evidence is relatively weak and not without alternative explanation. ²⁶

Independent of Tromp, de Jonge has sought the bolster the case for a Christian origin by noting the similarity between the description of God’s mercy toward Adam and Eve in both the LAE and the works of Irenaeus, Tertullian, and Theophilus of Antioch. ²⁷ Following the trajectory of de Jonge and Tromp, Jean-Daniel Kaestli previously argued for a Christian origin, though on the basis of the parallels between the fall of Satan tradition in the LAE and other Christian traditions. ²⁸ However, through the influence of Jan Dochhorn, Kaestli has recently changes his mind. ²⁹ Dochhorn has sought to demonstrate that the LAE reflects significant exegetical engagement with the Hebrew Bible rather than the LXX, evidence he claims supports a Jewish rather than Christian origin. ³⁰ He also argues that the LAE reflects rabbinic forms of exegesis, which would also support a Jewish origin. ³¹ Finally, Dochhorn cites parallels between Second Tempe literature and the LAE, parallels that allow for the latter to fit well within the former. ³² In a more recent work, Dochhorn has gone as far as to argue that the narrative form of the LAE may even date to as early as the time of Archelaus. ³³ While Dochhorn offers features of the LAE that might be consistent with a Jewish and perhaps Second Temple origin, John Levison contends that Dochhorn’s observations are a “fragile tripod,” that do not prove a Jewish provenance any more than de Jonge and Tromp’s observations prove a Christian one. ³⁴

Given the complexities of this debate, it is not my intention to seek a resolution or even to favor one position over another. I ultimately concur with John Levison, who sees inadequate evidence to come to any firm conclusion regarding the date and nature of the LAE. ³⁵ However, because significant scholarly voices have brought the LAE (and in particular the tradition in which Adam is the object of angelic worship) into the debate regarding the nature of Second Temple Jewish monotheism and a Second Temple origin cannot be ruled out, I propose to pursuing the following question: If the LAE (and the tradition of Adam receiving worship therein) is a product of Second Temple Judaism, what significance does it hold for the debate regarding the nature of Second Temple Jewish monotheism? Thus, moving forward, I assume a Second Temple date merely for the sake of argument, in order to assess the relevance of the LAE for reconstructing Jewish monotheism.

The textual history of the LAE

The textual history of the LAE is incredibly complex. ³⁶ The textual tradition comes to us in five different languages, Greek, Latin, Armenian, Georgian, and Slavonic. ³⁷ Even among texts of the same language, there are different versions and recensions of the tradition. While the manuscripts of different languages can be quite similar, at times having only minor differences, they can also vary widely in the ordering of events and/or the traditions they contain. For example, traditions found at the beginning of the Latin, Armenian, and Georgian version come much later in the Greek version. And in fact, large portions of the Latin, Armenian, and Georgian version are missing in Greek and Slavonic versions. The tradition of Adam receiving worship is a noteworthy example of this phenomenon. Additionally, our extant manuscripts of the LAE are quite late, leaving significant questions about the early transmission of the text. It is also quite clear that certain textual traditions have experienced Christian influence, and that the Christian church, which was largely responsible for the maintenance and transmission of the LAE, was not shy in manipulating it.

This complicated textual history has obvious implications for any sort of narrative analysis of the LAE (analysis that will follow below), particularly any such analysis that hopes to yield results regarding the meaning of the original form of the narrative and the way in which that form might bear witness to Second Temple Jewish thought. Given the rearrangement of events within the textual tradition and the possibility of added narrative details and episodes, one is unable to confidently make any assessments regarding the original narrative on the basis plot development and progression. Similarly, assessments of any original characterization are also impeded by the existence of these changes made to the text. Thus, any thorough and/or comprehensive narrative analysis of the LAE as it may have originally existed in the Second Temple period is impossible. And yet, I contend that some aspects of narrative analysis could still be feasibly applied to the LAE. One could offer some basic insights on character construction from pericopes that are regarded as stable and/or likely to be a part of the original LAE. For example, if one finds similar actions of Adam in multiple pericopes, pericopes that are deemed relatively stable and/or original, such actions could be used for the purpose of character analysis and the generation of meaning within the LAE. In all such instances, proper caveats regarding the uncertainty of the text are clearly necessary.

Does the LAE depict veneration of Adam rather than worship?

While Bauckham’s first step is to dismiss the tradition of Adam receiving worship on the basis of its uncertain date and nature, he also argues that what is depicted in the tradition is not true cultic worship but rather mere veneration. He is likely right in his argument that the word behind the Latin adorare (“worship”) is the Greek προσκυνέω, which can convey the act of cultic worship but can also merely convey the act of adoration/veneration of one who is superior. ³⁸ Bauckham opts for the latter, claiming that the angels merely offer veneration to one superior to them and not cultic worship. ³⁹ However, Fletcher-Louis offers a strong rebuttal. He notes that the object of adorare is not Adam per se, but rather the “image and likeness” of God that in some way resides in or is closely associated with Adam. It is noteworthy that the command given by Michael, first to all the angels and then twice to Satan directly, is “Worship the image of the Lord God,” (14.1; see also 14.2 and 15.2) and never “worship Adam.” ⁴⁰ It is actually Satan and not Michael who says, “I do not have it in me to worship Adam,” (14.3) explicitly stating that Adam is the object of worship. Fletcher-Louis argues that since the object of worship is explicitly identified as the image and likeness of God, then true worship and not mere veneration is indeed intended. ⁴¹ This argument is quite strong, and as such, the claim that the text only intends to portray veneration rather than worship appears weak and unable to resolve the tension between the worship of Adam seen in the LAE and an exclusive monotheistic understanding of Jewish religious devotion and practice.

Is Satan a reliable narrator? An unconsidered possibility

As related to the worship of Adam in the LAE, an option yet to be considered, may offer a way forward for proponents of an exclusive Jewish monotheism in explaining what appears to be a relatively aberrant tradition in Second Temple Judaism. Surprisingly, analysis of the worship of Adam tradition has never, to my knowledge, considered the source of the tradition within the actual narrative of the LAE and the implications of that source for the narratival reliability of the tradition. In the narrative, the source of the account of Adam receiving worship is Satan, a detail that should raise the question of whether he is best understood as a truthful and reliable narrator. Yet, as noted above, narrative analysis of the LAE is significantly complicated by the text’s complex textual history. Therefore, the narrative and character analysis that follows will be guided by the necessary caution identified above. It will rely on repeated details related to characterization rather than unique or isolated details. It will also consider a tradition’s textual stability and indicators that the tradition is a later interpolation.

Additionally, the narrative and character analysis that follows will be informed by the insights from the field of cognitive linguistics. ⁴² Traditional narrative analysis of biblical texts often views the text as a closed system, and thus the analysis of such approaches is often strictly focused on the explicit and implicit clues of the text itself. Only limited consideration of the broader context is allowed, such as the consideration of language, grammar, or some level of broad cultural knowledge. ⁴³ Often such limitations are regulated by the knowledge that is clearly held by a text’s implied author and implied reader. ⁴⁴ This approach sees characterization as a “text-internal event,” one dictated solely by the implied author and the narrator of the text. ⁴⁵ Yet, this approach to understanding narratives and their construction of characters fails to account for the role of real authors and real readers. Proponents of a cognitive linguistic approach to narrative analysis and characterization argue that no real reader comes to a text as a blank slate, and no real author expects this from a reader. ⁴⁶ In reality, real readers come to texts with mental models for various characters, models informed by cultural knowledge. ⁴⁷ Authors write with knowledge of such models and use them in the creation of both narratives and characters, at times affirming the model and at other times subverting it. Thus, a narratological approach that is informed by insights from cognitive linguistics is not only going to consider the explicit and implicit clues within a text, but also the cultural knowledge that a real historical reader of the text could or would possess and that an author could draw upon to construct a text’s characters.

An understanding of character analysis informed by cognitive linguistics offers a broader way forward for character analysis within the narrative of the LAE. This character analysis can consider not only the words and actions of a character in what might be regarded as a stable tradition, but it can also consider the previously held knowledge about a character or character type that is brought to the text by its real readers. That knowledge might then offer interpretive insights into how an author anticipated a character and his or her actions to be understood within the narrative. Thus, the knowledge that a Second Temple Jewish reader could bring to the text regarding the character of Satan as well as Adam and Eve can be used to assess their words and actions within the narrative of the LAE.

A case for Satan as an unreliable narrator: considering the reader’s knowledge of Satan

In light of the insights on character analysis taken from the world of cognitive linguistics, any character analysis of Satan in the LAE first requires consideration of the cultural knowledge that the text’s historical readers would have possessed regarding such a figure. Assessments of the figure Satan in Second Temple Judaism are challenging for a variety of reasons, not least of which is the lack of a unified and coherent narrative regarding such a figure in the Second Temple literature. Assessments are also complicated by the multiplicity of names given to powerful demonic opponents of Israel and its God in the Second Temple literature (e.g., Satan, Devil, Belial, Mastema, Azazel) and uncertainty regarding the possibility that a single character lies behind these diverse names. Thomas Farrar has argued that the concept of a “leading supernatural opponent” (i.e., a leader of demonic opposition against God) was prevalent in Second Temple thought and literature. ⁴⁸ Such a concept would be helpful for assessing Satan as a character, as it would provide an existing category that Second Temple readers could draw upon when they encounter Satan in a narrative text. Yet, Tom de Bruin has recently called into question the existence of such a category, arguing that it is built on relatively thin evidence. ⁴⁹ De Bruin recognizes the presence of powerful demonic beings that oppose God and his people within Second Temple literature, but he feels the evidence is far too limited to conclude that such figures were widely identified with a single leader of demonic power. However, for the purpose of the present project, the belief in a single leading figure is not particularly important. What is important is an existing category within the Second Temple period of what might be called a preeminent supernatural opponent (PSO) of God. This category would include powerful demonic figures that were understood to play a prominent role in opposing God and his people. ⁵⁰ As such, Second Temple Jewish readers could locate the Satan of the LAE with a larger category of powerful supernatural opponents of God and attribute to him the types of characteristics often seen attributed to other such powerful demonic figures of which they would be familiar. The existence of such a category need not mean that Second Temple Jews shared a common narrative and/or theological commitments about figures within this category or even identified such figures by using the same titles or names, but it does mean that such figures, along with the various narratives and theological commitments linked to them, were available for ancient authors to draw upon for both theological and narrative purposes. Given the present study’s particular interest in Satan’s trustworthiness as a reliable narrator in the LAE, here I am particularly interested in the character trait of deception within collective Jewish thinking about PSOs and whether that trait would be readily available to both a Jewish author and reader for the purpose the literary construction of such a character.

Although somewhat slight, there does seem to be evidence that by the late Second Temple period, some Jews had begun to link in some way a PSO with the serpent of Genesis 3. 1 Enoch 69.6 is perhaps the first reference to such a tradition. Here a supernatural figure named Gadreel (identified as a “satan”) is said to have “led Eve astray.” A more explicit reference is found in Revelation 12.9: “The great dragon was thrown down, that ancient serpent, who is called the Devil and Satan, the deceiver of the whole world—he was thrown down to the earth, and his angels were thrown down with him.” ⁵¹ While Revelation is a Christian text that slightly post-dates the Second Temple period, it likely echoes a tradition at home in Second Temple Judaism. The LAE is clearly familiar with the serpent of Genesis 3 being connected with Satan, explicitly referencing it in chapter thirty-three. And in one Latin version there is an episode that describes Satan convincing the serpent to help him deceive Eve. When the serpent resists the initial effort, Satan says, “Be my dwelling place, and through your mouth I will speak what needs to be spoken” (LAE 46:4a). ⁵² This tradition also appears in some form in the Greek, Armenian, and Georgian versions of the LAE, and thus there is reason to affirm the basic tradition’s originality. The LAE also seems to expect its readers to be familiar with Satan’s role in deceiving Eve in the Garden when it alludes to but does not explicitly describe the tradition in Chapter ten: “But when Adam saw her and the devil with her, he cried out with tears and said, “O Eve, Eve, where is the work of your penitence? How have you again been seduced by our enemy by whom we have been deprived of our dwelling in Paradise and of spiritual joy?” (LAE 10.3–4). ⁵³ From this evidence, it is safe to conclude that the reader of LAE is expected to be familiar with an existing tradition in which Eve was deceived in the Garden of Eden by a PSO, one that went by the names Satan and Devil.

While not connected to the original deception of Adam and Eve, there are a number of Second Temple Jewish traditions that connect a PSO to lying and deception. In the Damascus Document, Belial is identified as the tempter and deceiver of Israel (CD 4.12–19) and is also associated with leading God’s people to speak apostacy (CD 12.2–3). In the War Scroll, a PSO is identified as the “Angel of Darkness,” who leads astray the “sons of deceit” (1QS 3.20–22). In the New Testament, a PSO (regularly identified as Satan or Devil, but not exclusively so) is associated with deceit and lying a number of times. He is the “father of lies,” “a liar” and one “in whom there is no truth” (John 8.44). As seen above, he is the “deceiver of the whole world” (Rev 12.9). In 2 Corinthians 11.14, Paul claims that “Satan disguises himself as an angel of light,” a claim that clearly implies an intent to deceive. Again, while the examples from the New Testament are products of the early Christian movement that emerged from Second Temple Judaism, there is little reason to conclude that their thinking regarding these characteristics of a PSO bear Christian originality or creativity. The best explanation for these traditions is that they were already present in the thought world of Second Temple Judaism and were borrowed by early Christians.

From this evidence, it seems reasonable to conclude that a common feature of Jewish narratives and theological commitments regarding PSOs included the character trait of deception, particularly the deception of human beings. A Jewish author could then assume a reader’s previous knowledge of such a trait in his or her literary depictions of a PSO. Thus, before even considering the implicit and explicit messages of the text of LAE, it seems safe to conclude that many of its readers would already be conditioned to understand a figure like Satan as one who was inherently deceptive and could not be trusted in what he says.

A case for Satan as an unreliable narrator: considering narrative clues within the LAE

While the author of the LAE could assume that readers would be inclined to perceive Satan as an untrustworthy character, the text itself also offers episodes and details that seem to reinforce that very perception. One such episode is the narration of Adam and Eve’s penance after their failure in the Garden of Eden, particularly the account of Eve’s penance.

Yet, before considering the narrative value of this episode, a comment on its textual history is necessary. The episode of Eve’s penance is found in the Latin, Armenian, Georgian, Slavonic, and some Greek versions. However, it is missing in what have been regarded by many as the stronger and more reliable Greek manuscripts. ⁵⁴ In the Greek manuscripts where it does appear, it only appears in an abbreviated form. ⁵⁵ Additionally, when the episode appears in a Greek text, it appears in a different place than in the Latin, Armenian, and Georgian versions. The episode’s absence in what has long been regarded as the more reliable Greek manuscripts as well as its different narrative placement in Greek texts that include the tradition has raised questions about the form of the penitence narrative as it currently exists in the Latin, Armenian, and Georgian versions. Was this form based on an earlier but abbreviated Greek text? Was the entire tradition a later creation that was first added to a Greek text and then borrowed by the Latin, Armenian, and Georgian? And even if it can be regarded as belonging to an original Greek version in some form, does its narrative placement in the Latin, Armenian, and Georgian versions reflect a redactional rearrangement?

Relevant to these questions is the recent work of Jean-Pierre Pettorelli, who found and published a second Latin version of the LAE (noted above). ⁵⁶ This Latin version betrays the existence of another Greek model, one that is different from and perhaps earlier than what has long been regarded as the more reliable Greek witness to the LAE. ⁵⁷ The results of Pettorelli’s works present a real possibility that the penitence episode found in the Latin, Armenian, and Georgian versions are actually dependent on an early Greek model and thus could bear witness to an earlier and more reliable Greek version than the Greek version that has long been favored. If that is the case, then both the tradition and the narrative location of the tradition may represent our earliest form of the LAE. Clearly, much ambiguity remains regarding the original form of the LAE in general and the penitence narrative more specifically. Yet, with these caveats in place and the tentative nature of the evidence clearly established, I will consider the significance of the episode of Eve’s penance for the characterization of Satan in the LAE.

As a result of their expulsion from the garden of paradise, Adam and Eve are without food and in danger of dying from starvation (LAE 2–4). They decide to engage in acts of penance in order that God might provide for their hunger (LAE 5.1–3). While Eve is engaged in her act of penance (standing up to her neck in the Tigris River), Satan comes disguised as an angel of God. He pretends to weep with her and tells her a series of lies: (1) that God has heard her and accepted her penance; (2) that all the angels of heaven have interceded before God on her behalf; and (3) that God sent him to end her penance and to give her the food from Paradise that she had before (LAE 9.1–5). Eve believes these lies and after coming out of the water is led by Satan to Adam. Adam, who is not deceived, bemoans Satan’s second deception of Eve (see the reference to LAE 10 above). In the abbreviated Greek version of this story (GLAE 29:12-13) most of the elements are maintained: (1) Satan appears to Eve disguised as an angel of God; (2) Satan weeps as if mourning with Eve; (3) Satan claims that God has heard Eve’s request; (4) Satan claims that the angels and all created things have beseeched God on her behalf; and (5) Eve believes Satan and ends her penance. Interestingly, in this Greek version (unlike the Latin, Armenian, and Georgian), Eve specifically states: “the enemy deceived me a second time.” As argued above, it is quite plausible that some form of this episode belonged to the original version of the LAE. ⁵⁸ If so, then this episode would play a significant role in shaping the characterization of Satan in the LAE. Most importantly, it depicts him as a deceiver who is willing to lie about the actions of God for the sake of destroying God’s human creations. Such a depiction of Satan would then likely influence a reader’s understanding of the episode in which Satan claims that God demanded that all the angels in heaven worship Adam, that is, in the same way and for the same reason that Satan has twice deceived Eve, he also tries to deceive Adam. When this episode of Eve being deceived by Satan is combined with a readers’ preexisting understanding of Satan as a deceptive PSO, the case that the reader would question the reliability of any narration from Satan becomes quite strong.

As noted above, the story of Eve’s penitence is only present in some of the Greek witnesses and when present, it occurs in a different narrative location than it does in the Latin, Armenian, and Georgian versions, making the tradition’s placement in the narrative textually unstable. Yet, if the latter versions are dependent on an early and more reliable Greek text, their location becomes even more significant for the characterization of Satan in the LAE. The reason for this increased significance is that the episode in which Satan lies to Eve about God accepting her penance occurs immediately before the episode in which Satan describes the worship of Adam. If readers, who were already predisposed to not trust Satan, encountered a story in which Satan lied to Eve about the actions and words of God, they are likely to be highly suspect of the testimony of Satan regarding God commanding his angels to worship Adam in the pericope that immediately follows. I would argue that the sequencing of these two pericopes could function as a means by which the author signals to the reader that the testimony of Satan regarding God’s command to worship Adam is deceptive in nature and thus, unreliable.

Additional narrative clues that suggest Satan’s testimony is unreliable are found in the very pericope containing that testimony. The first clue is that Adam is completely unaware of being an object of worship, even though Satan claims it was to Adam that the angels purportedly bowed down and worshipped. This detail would be consistent with the conclusion that the event never occurred and Satan has invented it. The second and more important clue is found in Adam’s response to Satan’s story: “Hearing this, Adam cried out with a great shout because of the Devil, and said: “O Lord, my God, in your hands is my life. Make this adversary of mine be far from me, who seeks to ruin my soul” (LAE 17.1). Both the Armenian and Georgian versions read “who desires to lead me astray” in place of “who seeks to ruin my soul.” Regardless of the precise wording, it seems that a stable part of the tradition has Adam communicating to God that he perceives in Satan’s testimony regarding himself as an object of worship an effort to mislead and/or ruin him in some way. If the story relayed by Satan was truthful, it is hard to understand how it would serve to destroy Adam’s soul. Yet, if the story is false, then it can be understood as another attempt by Satan to lead Adam to perceive and grasp for himself an identity that is greater than what he actually possesses, that is, a divine identity. This latter detail seems to be a strong narrative clue that Satan’s testimony regarding Adam as an object of worship is yet one more intentional deception that seeks to bring God’s newly created humanity into destruction.

While thorough narrative analysis of the LAE is not possible due to its textual uncertainty, the limited analysis that is possible does support the conclusion that Satan is an unreliable narrator, and that the reader is meant to dismiss his testimony regarding Adam as the object of worship as both false and destructive. When the reader’s preunderstanding of Satan as a deceiver is brought together with the narrative details of the LAE considered here, I contend a strong case for Satan as an unreliable narrator emerges. Such a conclusion would then mean that the LAE does not bear witness to a Second Temple tradition in which Adam receives worship, but only bears witness to an attempt by Satan to deceive Adam into thinking he is an appropriate object of worship.

Tradition of Adam worship independent of Satan’s testimony?

The theory proposed here would be significantly undermined by evidence of a tradition in which (1) Adam rightly receives worship as described in the LAE and (2) that tradition was divorced from the narration of Satan. If it could be demonstrated that the LAE is not the original source of this specific tradition but that it borrowed an existing tradition and placed it on the lips of Satan, then the role of Satan’s unreliable narration has little significance for the tradition’s place in Second Temple Judaism. In response to this potential problem, it is noteworthy that outside of the LAE there is no extant Second Temple text that describes Adam’s worship by angels. In this regard, the LAE, if a witness to Second Temple Judaism, stands alone. However, some interpreters of the LAE have argued that there are Second Temple (and even rabbinic) texts that do seem familiar with a tradition of Adam receiving worship, though whether that means they are familiar with the LAE or an independent tradition is unclear.

Michael Stone has argued that 2 Enoch indicates knowledge of a tradition in which Adam receives worship, a tradition received either through the LAE or a related tradition. ⁵⁹ To be clear, Stone is not trying to argue for a tradition in which Adam is worshiped that is independent of the testimony of Satan. He is in fact trying to demonstrate that the narrative of Adam and Eve’s penance and Satan’s fall from heaven were a part of the earliest version of the LAE. Yet, one might consider the evidence put forward by Stone as possible evidence for a tradition of Adam receiving worship independent of its narrative setting (i.e. Satan’s narration) in the LAE. Thus, here we consider the significance of the evidence for knowledge of such a tradition in 2 Enoch. Stone first points to 2 Enoch 31, which discusses Satan’s rebellion and expulsion from heaven. In the text, it may be implied that this rebellion is related to an adversarial relationship between Satan and Adam, as it is Satan’s knowledge of God’s intention to create a new world and place it under the authority of Adam that apparently leads Satan to rebel. Stone acknowledges that this tradition alone does not demand knowledge of Adam’s worship as described in the LAE, but merely knowledge of a tradition in which the creation of Adam results in Satan’s rebellion. ⁶⁰ However, he argues that when this tradition is paired with 2 Enoch 21-22 it is “quite explicit that 2 Enoch knew a tradition resembling that in the primary books of Adam,” that is, the tradition of Adam receiving worship from angels in the LAE. ⁶¹ In 2 Enoch 21, Enoch is brought to the edge of the seventh heaven and is invited by God to “stand in front of the face of the Lord forever.” ⁶² Later, 2 Enoch 22:6-7 recounts: “And the Lord said to his servants, sounding them out, “Let Enoch join in and stand in front of my face forever! And the Lord’s glorious ones did obeisance and said, ‘Let Enoch yield in accordance with your word, O Lord.’” Stone makes much of the phrase “sounding them out.” He notes the earlier translation from W. R. Morfill of “making a trial of them.” ⁶³ He argues that this trial of the angels is in some way recalling the failure of Satan to honor God’s first creation Adam, and that this text is then evidence of 2 Enoch’s knowledge of a tradition similar to the one found in LAE in which Satan refuses to worship Adam. ⁶⁴ He notes parallels between the episode of Adam’s worship in LAE and 2 Enoch 21-22: (1) Adam is created//Enoch brought to heaven; (2) Michael brings Adam to worship before God//Michael brings Enoch to worship before God; (3) in the Adam story, angels are commanded to bow down to Adam and Satan refuses//in the Enoch episode, God tests whether the angels will obey this time and they bow down (though to God, not Enoch) and accept God’s command. ⁶⁵ These parallels are interesting and might suggest some connection between 2 Enoch and some form of the tradition recounted in the narrative of Satan’s fall in the LAE, that is, a tradition in which Satan responds negatively or inappropriately to God’s creation of Adam. However, these parallels have one significant flaw when it comes to establishing a connection between 2 Enoch and knowledge of a tradition in which angels worship Adam. In the LAE story, the angels are commanded to worship Adam, and it is this worship of Adam that Satan refuses. In the 2 Enoch episode, no worship of Enoch is commanded, and instead, the angels are merely asked to receive Enoch among their ranks. This significant difference raises questions as to whether any intentional parallels actually exist between 2 Enoch and the tradition of Adam receiving worship. The case would be stronger if Enoch himself was the object of angelic worship, but that is not the case. Perhaps 2 Enoch is familiar with a tradition in which Satan is envious and unaccepting of Adam, yet there seems to be no reason to conclude that 2 Enoch is familiar with a tradition in which Adam is the object of angelic worship. As it relates to the purposes of the present study, it seems this tradition from 2 Enoch is not valid evidence of knowledge of a tradition in which (1) Adam rightly receives angelic worship and (2) is also independent of Satan’s narration.

Crispin Fletcher-Louis has argued that the tradition of Adam receiving worship dates to the Second Temple period. ⁶⁶ Fletcher-Louis is not advocating for a tradition of Adam worship independent of Satan’s narration, but some of the evidence he puts forward could be considered for such a case. Fletcher-Louis claims that Philo is almost certainly a witness to the tradition of Adam receiving worship, as in his On the Creation of the World, he claims that when Adam was created the other animals, in amazement, worshiped or bowed down before him (Opif. 83). ⁶⁷ Although Fletcher-Louis only argues that this tradition is evidence of Philo’s knowledge of a tradition in which angels worship Adam, one might build on that argument by claiming that the absence of Satan in this Philonic tradition reflects knowledge of a tradition in which angels worship Adam that is independent of Satan’s narration. Yet, I contend that there is no sound basis to draw from this Philonic tradition Philo’s knowledge of a tradition in which Adam is worshiped by angels. The tradition in Philo is quite different than that of the LAE, as in Philo it is the other animals of the earthly creation that bow down to Adam, not God’s heavenly angels. The former need only be understood as the animals of the earth recognizing Adam’s role as their ruler and thus prostrating themselves before him. No cultic worship of Adam need be implied by Philo in such a tradition. This tradition is quite different from the angels of heaven, beings of an exalted and supernatural status, worshipping the very image of God, Adam, in heaven. The latter example, as argued above, appears to be a clear example of cultic worship, where the tradition from Philo does not. Thus, I would contend that this example in Philo should not be understood as Philo’s knowledge of a tradition in which Adam was rightly worshiped by the angels in heaven.

Finally, there is rabbinic tradition that clearly knows of a tradition in which Adam receives worship from angels. This tradition claims that when Adam was created the angels mistook him for a divine being and wished to proclaim him “holy,” a proclamation that likely implies a desire to revere Adam as one would the God of Israel. ⁶⁸ In the tradition, God does not command the worship nor is Satan involved in any way. Thus, this rabbinic tradition could reflect knowledge of a tradition in which angels worshipped Adam, one independent of Satan’s narration. However, a couple of observations should be offered in response to such a possibility. First, the tradition is presented as one of mistaken identity and nothing more. The angels offer worship to Adam because he was made in the divine image and they become confused, a confusion that is quickly remedied by God when he puts Adam to sleep. Thus, Adam is clearly not an appropriate object of worship, and once the distinction between Adam and God is made, the angels’ behavior is quickly remedied. Second, the nature and origin of this tradition is uncertain. It is possible that this rabbinic tradition is a response to the narrative found in the LAE, and functions as a rabbinic corrective to the tradition. ⁶⁹ It does so by not denying a basic premise of the narrative, that is, that Adam did at one point receive worship from angels, but it reinterprets the narrative as a case of mistaken identity and demonstrates that Adam is not rightly an object of worship. If such is the case, then these rabbinic traditions are not evidence of an independent tradition in which Adam is worshipped but are merely aware of the tradition found in the LAE—a tradition in which Satan is the narrator. Another possibility is that this rabbinic tradition does betray knowledge of a tradition in which angels mistakenly (not rightly) worship Adam, and that the LAE has taken this same tradition and recast it as a distortion by Satan meant to deceive Adam. ⁷⁰ Thus, the testimony of Satan in the LAE could be recognized by the reader as partially true, in that the reader is familiar with a tradition in which angels did mistakenly try to offer worship to Adam. However, the reader also knows that this worship was not commanded by God and that the refusal to worship was not the cause of Satan’s fall. The existence of such a tradition would actually make the case that the LAE is presenting Satan as a deceptive narrator even stronger, as the reader would perceive the depiction of Adam receiving worship as a distortion of a tradition they already knew. Obviously, both of these proposed understandings of the rabbinic witness are speculative. However, they demonstrate that this rabbinic witness need not be understood as evidence for a tradition in which (1) Adam is rightly understood as an object of worship and (2) that is also independent of Satan’s narration.

The worship of Adam and the nature of Jewish monotheism: concluding remarks

Returning to the debate over the relevance of the LAE’s tradition of Adam worship for the nature of Second Temple religious devotion, the conclusions resulting from the analysis above (namely that Satan’s claim that Adam was the object of angelic worship is a deception within the narrative) would rule out this tradition as an exception to the larger body of evidence in which Jews granted worship to the God of Israel alone. It would also remove any evidence that Adam was regarded as a “second power” in heaven, as the worship of Adam is the only detail in the LAE that could possibly lead to such a conclusion. Additionally, the tradition would then hold relatively little significance as a precedent for the worship of and devotion to Jesus in the early Christian movement. To be sure, the debate regarding the nature of Jewish monotheism (e.g., exclusive, inclusive, or two powers) is hardly decided on the basis of the present analysis. A number of possible traditions would still require explanation to justify the position of exclusive monotheists, including the Enochic Son of Man and Moses in the Exagoge of Ezekiel the Tragedian. ⁷¹ It may still be that these examples are best explained in terms of an inclusive form of Jewish monotheism or even a two-power paradigm. However, the interpretation offered here regarding the worship of Adam in the LAE would aid in removing one obstacle for those who argue for an exclusive Jewish monotheism within Second Temple Judaism. It would also better clarify the proper objects of consideration for those proposing a two-power understanding of the God of Israel in the Second Temple period.