Democratic decision-making in groups requires institutions that aggregate the preference of the choice participants into a collective choice under the restriction that no player is a dictator. Constitutions deliver alternative rules for democratic decision-making, the consequences of which are best analysed using cooperative game theory. The emergence of a power index literature in the 1980s reflects the relevance of this type of modelling of institutions for groups like the European Union, stating modalities of power for the players.
Berg, S.
and T. Perlinger (1998) `Pólya Sequences, Connected Coalitions and Voting Power Index', paper presented at the European Public Choice Conference, Góteborg, May.
2.
Edelman, P. H.
(1997) `A Note on Voting', Mathematical Social Sciences34: 37-50.
3.
Felsenthal, D. S.
and M. Machover (1998) The Measurement of Voting Power. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
4.
Garrett, G.
and G. Tsebelis (1999) `Why Resist the Temptation to Apply Power Indices to the European Union?', Journal of Theoretical Politics11(3): 291-308.
5.
Hoesli, M.
(1998) An Institution's Capacity to Act. Maastricht: European Institute of Public Administration.
6.
Owen, G.
(1981) `Modification of the Banzhaf-Coleman index for games with a priori unions'. Manfred J. Holler (ed.) Voting and Voting Power, pp. 232-238. Würzburg: Physica Verlag.
7.
Owen, G.
(1995) Game Theory, 3rd edn.New York: Academic Press.
8.
Owen, G.
and L. S. Shapley (1989) `Optimal Location of Candidates in Ideological Space', International Journal of Game Theory18: 339-356.
9.
Straffin P. S., Jr
(1994) `Power and Stability in Politics', in R. J. Auman and S. Hart (eds) Handbook of Game Theory, Vol. 2. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
10.
Turnovec, F.
(1997) `The Double Majority Principle and Decision Making Games in Extending European Union'. Vienna: Insitute for Advanced Studies.
